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1 Foreword - Brigid Laffan
FOREWORD 
by Brigid Laffan1
The need for EU reform is gaining ground and 
rising on the European political agenda. In 2015 
the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
started a research project on the use of financial 
resources in Europe. This project, part of the 
Integration, Governance and Democracy strand, 
has followed the approach of the RSCAS in 
combining multidisciplinary academic researchers 
and practitioners from the EU Institutions and 
Member States. 
As part of this project, a first workshop was 
organised on Own Resources,2 followed by a 
workshop on Efficiency and Effectiveness of the EU 
Budget.3 Scrutiny of EU policies was the third of 
this series. 
The workshop brought together multidisciplinary 
academics, politicians and practitioners, who 
engaged in a lively discussion touching upon the 
different facets of scrutiny of EU legislation and 
their links with the decision-making process. 
In a period of deep crisis of the European project, 
of a scarcity of financial resources and with the 
EU facing new challenges, a rationalization and a 
concentration of resources would make its policies 
more efficient. Scrutiny of the implementation 
of EU legislation should be part of this process 
to make EU policies more focused on European 
priorities. EU scrutiny should not remain a 
concept managed internally by each institution, 
but should complete the legislative cycle in 
order to deliver better regulation. Is this already 
happening? How can better scrutiny be achieved? 
1 Brigid Laffan, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies.
2 A. De Feo, B. Laffan (eds) EU Own resources: Momentum 
for a Reform? Contributions to an RSCAS workshop, EUI 2016, 
doi: 10.2870/176147 ISBN: 978-92-9084-384-9, http://bookshop.
europa.eu/en/eu-own-resources-pbQM0116048/
3 A. De Feo, B. Laffan, Effectiveness and European Added 
Value of the EU Budget, pending.
How could scrutiny of EU policies contribute to 
reform of the EU? 
These are some of the questions which were 
addressed during the workshop and which can 
find some answers in the contributions collected 
in this publication.
Brigid Laffan    
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BETTER 
REGULATION: 
SCRUTINY OF EU 
POLICIES
by Alfredo De Feo
Abstract
This introductory chapter, based on the oral 
and written contributions to the workshop, 
highlights the contribution of soft law through an 
interinstitutional agreement to reinforce scrutiny 
of EU policies with enhanced participation by 
stakeholders.
The chapter reviews the two initiatives that the 
Juncker Commission put at the top of its political 
agenda: Better Regulation and a Budget Focused 
on Results. After an analysis of the impact of 
these initiatives on the legislative process, the 
article concludes that a cultural change at the 
administrative level has started but this is not yet 
embedded in the policy-decision mechanism.
Introduction
The Commission and the Council have culturally 
dominated the European decision-making 
process, at least until the Lisbon Treaty. The 
European Parliament’s influence has nevertheless 
increased over time, even before the introduction 
of co-decision.
The Treaty entrusts the Commission with 
implementation competences, while the European 
Parliament, with the support of the Court of 
Auditors, gives discharge to the Commission on 
budget implementation. Scrutiny of EU policies 
is not limited to the discharge procedure, but is 
a more complex activity which involves all the 
Institutions. The Institutions have developed a 
number of tools – ex-ante and ex-post impact 
assessments and policy evaluations – to enhance 
the monitoring of existing legislation and the 
preparation of new legislation. 
Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty (art. 318) invites 
the Commission to submit an annual report on 
the evaluation of the Union’s finances based on 
the results achieved. This report, addressed to the 
legislative authority and to the Court of Auditors, 
increases the number of tools to evaluate the 
implementation of the EU policies. Article 318 has 
favoured a cultural change within the Institutions, 
which are now becoming aware of the necessity of 
scrutiny. 
The European Parliament has among its primary 
tasks the scrutiny of EU policies. Experience 
shows that, so far, the EP is more effective in 
monitoring linked with political decisions. For 
instance, the control of the Parliament in the 
discharge procedure is more oriented toward 
influencing future implementation mechanisms, 
rather than toward sanctioning the Commission 
and the Members States. The EP practice of 
postponing decisions on discharge, which is not 
foreseen by the Treaty, has the objective of obliging 
the Commission to change its implementation 
methods according to requests formulated by the 
EP.
To enhance the follow-up of EU policies, since 
the beginning of EU legislation the European 
Parliament has tried to expand its legislative 
influence on the secondary level of legislation, 
the so-called implementing rules, which are 
adopted by the Commission with the comitology 
procedure. 
Scrutiny and comitology
The first control of policies starts in the pre-
legislative phase. Since the first regulations in 1960 
implementing the Common Agriculture Policy, 
the Commission was aware of the importance of 
obtaining a Member State consensus on all the 
implementing rules. The Member States were 
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not ready to leave management decisions to the 
Commission. The comitology mechanisms were 
therefore introduced as a way of reducing the 
Commission’s autonomy, at first in the domain 
of agriculture. The mechanism proved successful, 
both for the Commission, which had the great 
majority of its proposed measures accepted, and 
for the Council, which gained full control over 
and visibility of implementing measures. This 
procedure rapidly spread into all policy areas.
The literature4 frames this procedure either as 
an intergovernmental bargaining procedure or 
as supranational deliberation aimed at problem 
solving. Both descriptions apply to the practice of 
deliberations on implementing rules. However, the 
accountability of this procedure was questioned 
when the EP increased its legislative competences. 
Nevertheless, the Member States considered 
these procedures useful not only to control the 
implementing powers of the Commission but also 
to limit EP interference in legislation. 
The EP was aware that even in the consultation 
procedure a large part of the definition of 
legislation was below its radar. In 1988 the first 
interinstitutional agreement on comitology was 
signed by Jacques Delors and Sir Henri Plumb5 
with a commitment by the Commission “...to 
keep Parliament fully informed of all proposals 
it submits to ‘comitology’ committees.”6 In spite 
of this agreement, the EP reacted and did not 
hesitate to use its budgetary competences, 
freezing the allocations7 for the organisation of 
comitology meetings until progress was made in 
4 Siderius, K and Brandsmajcms, G. J. The Effect of 
Removing Voting Rules: Consultation Practices in the Commission’s 
Delegated Act, JCMS, 2016 Volume 54. Number 6. pp. 1265–1279 
DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12380.
5 Westlake, M. The Commission and the Parliament: 
Partners and rivals in the European policymaking process. London: 
Butherworth (1994).
6 Bradley, K. (1997) ‘The European Parliament and 
Comitology: On the Road to Nowhere?’
European Law Journal, Vol. 3, pp. 230–54.
7 Credits for the meeting were entered into the B0-40 
chapter (reserve).
the recognition of the EP ‘droit de regard.’  In 1994 
the three Institutions agreed on a modus vivendi,8 
with a commitment by the Council to take into 
consideration (non-binding) EP opposition 
to some implementing measures and seek an 
acceptable solution. The Commission and the EP 
also concluded specific agreements in sectoral 
areas.9
The Lisbon Treaty modifies comitology by 
introducing the Delegated Acts (TFEU art. 290). 
This modification is perceived as a further increase 
in EP influence. Christiansen and Dobbels10 
convincingly argue that “real progress [had] been 
minimal and that the EP does not make full use of 
its new powers.”
EP determination to be more involved in 
monitoring the implementation rules seems more 
motivated by form than by substance. The EP 
scrutinises delegated acts, but after the adoption 
of the text its interest in the follow-up fades. While 
the situation varies from committee to committee, 
two reasons seem to emerge: the technical content 
of the majority of the decisions, and the absence of 
political decisions linked to the assessment of EU 
policies. The EP is a political (and not a technical) 
body, and, as such, in the absence of political 
decisions it loses interest.
8 “Modus vivendi” of 20 December 1994 between the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning 
the implementing measures for acts adopted in accordance with 
the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the EC Treaty”, p. 1. 
OJEC. 04.04.1996, n° C 102.
9 Samland-Williamson on transparency (1998), Structural 
policies: agreement Klepsch-Millan (1993), Gil Robles-Santer 
(1999); in Financial services Lamfalussy procedures.
10 Christiansen, Thomas & Mathias Dobbels (2012), 
‘Comitology and delegated acts after Lisbon: How the European 
Parliament lost the implementation game’, European Integration 
online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 16, Article 13, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/
texte/2012-013a.htm.
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The emergence of a new 
culture
This introduction aims to underline the strong 
interest of the EP in participating in the decision-
making process concerning delegated acts. 
During the period 2013-2017, the EP opened 512 
procedures.11 At the same time, this interest in 
defining the implementing 
rules for legislation has 
not been translated into 
a growing influence in 
monitoring during the 
implementation periods of 
programmes.
Signs of culture change 
are emerging at different 
levels: changes are being driven by the scarcity 
of financial resources, the need to improve the 
efficiency of EU policies and the focus on European 
Added Value.
This change became more concrete with the 
arrival of the new Commission in 2014. The 
concepts of Better Law-Making and a Budget 
Focused on Results were promoted to the top of 
the interinstitutional political agenda. At the 
first mid-term of the Juncker Commission, Vice 
Presidents Timmermans and Georgieva not only 
imposed these two concepts on the Commission 
services but also tried to involve the budgetary and 
political authorities in supporting this agenda and 
in guaranteeing a change of culture in the whole 
legislative cycle.
This publication aims to contribute to answering 
the following questions:
a. Is there coherence between the two 
approaches?
b. Are the other Institutions and the 
Member States equally involved in these 
approaches?
c. Can we benefit from other experiences 
within and outside the EU?
d. How far are evaluations taken into account 
in the decision-making process?
11  Source: EP Legislative Observatory.
Better Regulation 
The Lisbon Treaty (art. 318) invites the Commission 
to submit a report on the evaluation of the Union’s 
finances based on the results achieved. It was only 
after five years that the annual reports presented 
by the Commission substantially improved, but 
they remain somewhat administrative papers and 
the link with political decisions is still difficult to 
detect. 
The annual report is not the only novelty; the 
Juncker Commission made a commitment to 
implement a Better Regulation programme.
A comprehensive programme12 was launched in 
2015 around 4 axes:
a) Concentration on Priority initiatives 
(period 2015-2017: 77 initiatives 
indicated);
b) Proposals for Withdrawal (period 2015-
2017: 109 proposals withdrawn);
c) Repealed Laws (period 2015-2017: 48 acts 
repealed);
d) Regulatory simplification (period 2015-
2017: 137 cases simplified).
Attention to outputs and ex-post evaluations has 
increased in recent years, but full attention has not 
been achieved yet. However, each Commission 
proposal now takes into account the principles of 
Better Regulation.
These positive achievements have been recognised 
by the Impact Assessment Institute (IAI), which 
scrutinised the implementation of the European 
Commission’s Better Regulation Package after May 
2015.13 Nevertheless, the study raises a number of 
criticisms. The main ones are: 
12  EC: Better Regulation and Transparency Commission, 
Assessment of the achievements during the period 2015-2017 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/2-years-
on-better-regulation_en.pdf 
13  Impact Assessment Institute, A year and a half of the 
Better Regulation Agenda: what happened?, IAI-BR1½Yr-170130f, 
http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/4e262e_6b29131f31ad40fd8072fef2
b6280bd6.pdf 
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- About half of the proposals have neither 
Impact Assessment nor justification for 
the exceptions; 
- The procedures outlined in the 2015 Better 
Regulation Guidelines are not always 
followed and, again, exceptions are not 
duly justified; 
- Transparency and effectiveness need to be 
improved; 
- The neutrality of the IA cannot always be 
guaranteed; 
- Subsidiarity and proportionality should be 
justified by factual evidence.
In spite of these observations, the Better Regulation 
approach is progressing under the leadership of 
VP Timmermans and with constant monitoring 
by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board.14 This body 
carries out an ‘objective quality check of its impact 
assessments’ and gives the Commission green lights 
to proceed with proposals. The EP recommends 
that this body should assume a ‘supra partes’ role 
and has asked for it to be autonomous from the 
Commission, constituting an Advisory Board 
for all the EU Institutions. The contribution by 
Bernard Naudts highlights the role and influence 
of this body in the evaluation of policies.
Better Regulation is not only at the centre of 
attention in the EU bubble. National parliaments 
also follow the process, as is described in detail 
in the contribution by Katrin Auel.15 In addition, 
Elena Griglio assesses how national parliaments 
tackle impact assessment tools with reference to 
the EU decision-making process and the type of 
functions they perform from a legal constitutional 
point of view,.
14 Regulatory Scrutiny Board advisory body to the 
Commission.
15 See also Auel, K. and Neuhold, C. (2016) ‘Multi-arena 
players in the making? Conceptualising the role of national 
parliaments since the Lisbon Treaty,’ Journal of European Public 
Policy, published before print, doi: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1228694 
The Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) on Better 
Law-making of April 2016 was a further step 
towards defining some common principles shared 
by the Council, Commission and Parliament. It 
sets out a common understanding of the timing 
and processes to make the legislative cycle more 
transparent. The agreement gives more relevance, 
among other things, to tools such as ex-ante and 
ex-post impact assessments, public stakeholder 
consultations and evaluations. 
The principles of the IIA
The IIA confirms a procedural framework of 
interinstitutional cooperation which is essential 
to progress in the direction of more effective 
EU legislation. The first feature to underline is 
that the three Institutions have subscribed to 
the Agreement on Better Law-making, which 
underlines the common coordinated effort to 
achieve and monitor better legislation.
The Agreement is based on clear principles of 
law such as “democratic legitimacy, subsidiarity 
and proportionality and legal certainty.” The 
Institutions also agree to promote “simplicity, 
clarity and consistency in the drafting of Union 
legislation and to promote the utmost transparency 
of the legislative process.”
A policy dialogue to set the 
legislative agenda
In the Union’s legislative mechanism, legislation 
is a responsibility shared between the three main 
Institutions. This represents a de facto limit to 
the right of initiative of the Commission, but it is 
necessary that through policy dialogue the three 
Institutions highlight their priorities and act 
where it is most likely that an effort will be made 
to conclude the co-decision procedure. In this 
respect, the IIA provides not only procedures for 
consultation on their priorities between the two 
branches of the legislative authority but also a ‘joint 
declaration’ on the year’s legislative programming. 
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The IIA includes a competence of the Commission 
to withdraw legislative proposals in the policy 
dialogue, as Nicola Lupo explains in his article on 
the roles of the EP and the Council following the 
decision of the Court of Justice in case C-409-13 
Council v. Commission.
The preparation of 
legislation: impact 
assessment
Impact assessment is the recognised method 
to evaluate each piece of legislation. It should 
contain the main justification for whether 
or not Union action is needed, respect for 
subsidiarity and proportionality, and should map 
out the quantitative and qualitative economic, 
environmental or social impacts. Even if the 
obligation to carry out impact assessment is on the 
Commission, the Council and the EP can make 
assessments of their amendments, but only when 
they consider it “appropriate and necessary.” The 
preparation phase should include both public and 
stakeholder consultations, and the results should 
be communicated to the co-legislators.
The Regulatory Scrutiny 
Board (RSB)
The Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) was 
created by the Commission in May 201516 and is 
entrusted with the task of controlling the quality 
of draft impact assessment reports and offering 
independent opinions to the Commission (and 
other Institutions) on the methodology used (see 
the contribution by Bernard Naudts). 
Ex-post evaluation of 
legislation
The IIA also contains five articles on ex-post 
evaluation.17 The Commission and the legislative 
16 Decision of the President of the Commission on the 
establishment of an independent Regulatory Scrutiny Board, 
C(2015) 3263 final  https://tinyurl.com/y972hzqg
17 IIA on Better Law-making, 0J L 123, 12/5/2016, art 22 
authority share the multiannual planning of 
evaluations of existing legislation, which includes 
requests for scrutiny from the Council and 
Parliament. Evaluations should be based on 
“efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, coherence and 
value added” and “should provide the basis for 
impact assessments of options for further action.” 
The scrutiny activity has become more relevant with 
the appearance, in most of the recent legislation, 
of performance objectives and indicators, 
and macro-economic conditionality, together 
with evaluation and reporting arrangements. 
Furthermore, the cohesion policy also includes 
the possibility of drawing supplementary funds 
from a “performance reserve” of structural funds.
The Committee of Regions (CoR) also plays a 
role. Its Territorial Impact Assessment Strategy 
is recognised in the Protocol concluded by the 
CoR with the Commission and Parliament, as is 
described in the contribution by Beatrice Taulègne.
At the legislative level, most of the 2014-2020 
Regulations contain indicators and review clauses 
(there are about 700). The combination of these 
two tools should facilitate revision of the legal 
texts where necessary. In theory, the existence 
of these clauses should raise scrutiny from 
being a technocratic exercise to a more political 
dimension. Nevertheless, the use of review clauses 
in legislative regulation has so far been quasi-non-
existent. 
The contribution by Mariana Hristecheva assesses 
the concrete commitment of the Commission in 
the evaluation of the Cohesion policy.
Scrutiny of EU legislation closes the circle of the 
(ex-post). In the context of the legislative cycle, evaluations of 
existing legislation and policy, based on efficiency, effectiveness, 
relevance, coherence and value added, should provide the basis 
for impact assessments of options for further action. To support 
these processes, the three Institutions agree to, as appropriate, 
establish reporting, monitoring and evaluation requirements in 
legislation, while avoiding overregulation and administrative 
burdens, in particular on the Member States. Where appropriate, 
such requirements can include measurable indicators as a basis on 
which to collect evidence of the effects of legislation on the ground.
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legislative cycle. This function has become even 
more relevant in recent years, mainly for two 
reasons: a) the great majority of legislation with a 
financial impact is adopted in one go, every seven 
years; and b) due to a reduction in the quantity 
of legislation, all Institutions, and the EP in 
particular, can devote more time to oversight of 
the legislation. 
To conclude, the mechanisms set within the IIA 
on Better Law-Making for evaluations and impact 
assessments are important and cover most of the 
legislation, but as Bernard Naudts pointed out 
during the workshop, they are not always reader-
friendly. Moreover, clear conclusions cannot 
always be drawn from the evidence.
An EU Budget Focused on 
Results
Better Regulation is oriented towards enhancing 
the tools to monitor legislation. The funds allocated 
to the different programmes are submitted to the 
financial scrutiny of the Court of Auditors and 
the European Parliament through the discharge 
procedure.
Since 2010, The Court of Auditors18 and the EP 
Budgetary Control Committee19 have played an 
important role in putting more emphasis on the 
outputs of EU legislation than only on compliance 
with rules and the error rate. The quality of 
expenditure and the outcomes of EU legislation 
are becoming more and more relevant evaluation 
parameters. The indicators introduced in the 
legislative programmes offer a measurable tool for 
decision-makers to evaluate outcomes.
As indicated above, most of the current legislation 
has a mid-term review clause – usually requested 
by the EP – but often this exercise remains a 
procedural step. EU Institutions, including the 
Parliament, do not seem inclined to re-open at 
18 See European Court of Auditors Making the best 
use of EU money, 2014, @ http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/
ECADocuments/LR14_02/QJ0614039ENN.pdf 
19 A. D’Alfonso Discharge procedure for the EU budget 
Political scrutiny of budget implementation, EPRS, 2016  @ https://
tinyurl.com/yb9vrtyj
mid-term the Pandora’s box of legislative acts. 
In his contribution, Paul Stephenson highlights 
the leading role of the Court of Auditors (ECA) 
in the ‘chain of accountability,’ and the evolution 
from compliance audit to performance audit is 
described in President Vitor Caldeira’s introductory 
speech. The ECA, in its special reports and the EP 
resolutions presented by the budgetary control 
committee, urged the Commission towards a 
budget more focused on results. 
In 2015, the Commission took the lead by 
launching the #EUBudget4Results  initiative to 
maximise the Union’s budget effectiveness in 
supporting EU policies. The relevance given to this 
flagship initiative has already had a considerable 
impact on the Commission’s administrative 
culture. Furthermore, Conferences organised 
in 2015 and 201620 and their follow-ups at the 
interinstitutional and national levels have involved 
many actors from all the Member States.21 
The Discharge Procedure, which falls within the 
EP competencies, is certainly one of the highest 
political syntheses of all the scrutiny work 
performed within the Institutions and is a powerful 
means to influence and change implementation 
methods. Nevertheless, these procedures often do 
not lead to a change of legislation or to a different 
allocation of resources. 
Performance indicators
Indicators are an essential tool for policy-makers, 
and they are also essential for public opinion to 
be able to evaluate the impact of policies. They 
facilitate the evaluation of the outcome of policies 
and programmes, and the impact on countries, 
regions, industries, the environment and social 
groups. Composite indicators combine different 
elements.22
20 See the Recoding and transcript of the 2016 Conference 
at http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget4results/conference/2016/
index_en.cfm
21 At the interinstitutional level a technical working group 
has been created with Council and EP experts; at the national level 
a series of meetings has been organized. 
22 Eurostat, Towards a harmonised methodology for 
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Eurostat, OECD and the United Nations are 
committed to developing more sophisticated 
categories of indicators at a higher standard. 
Indicators contribute to describing and/or 
anticipating the effects of a policy. The above 
institutions have developed a code of general 
principles23 concerning the independence and the 
professional ethics of public statistical institutes 
and their assessment methods. At the same time, 
Eurostat and national institutes recognize that 
policy-makers cannot only rely on evidence-
based indicators as reality is more complex and 
opinion-based elements should also be taken 
into consideration.24 A balance between evidence 
and opinion-based indicators should give policy-
makers a complete picture of the impact of a 
policy.
The literature classifies indicators in three broad 
categories25 and recognises that they can be 
misused or abused. 
statistical indicators, 2014, ISBN 978-92-79-40322-4, ISSN 
2315.0815, doi:10.2785/56118 https://tinyurl.com/y8rgop6l 
23  United Nations Fundamental Principles of Official 
Statistics (UN 2014b), the European Statistics Code of Practice 
(ESSC 2011). See also Eurostat, Getting messages across using 
indicators, 2014, ISBN 978-92-79-27205-9, ISSN 2315-0815, 
doi:10.2785/36378 p 14.
24  Eurostat, Relevance of indicators for policy making, 2017, 
ISBN 978-92-79-68871-3 ISSN 2315-0815 doi:10.2785/53076, p.11.
25  Indicators for Instrumental use, Conceptual use and 
Political use.
Indicators in EU legislation
As indicated above, the EU has started to use 
indicators as a tool for informed decisions in the 
legislation linked to the multiannual framework 
2014-2020. 
The indicators included in EU legislation should 
correspond to the categories defined by Eurostat:
Sources: Eurostat Towards a harmonised methodology, 2014, p. 14
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About 55 regulations contain more than 700 
indicators of different types measuring their 
performance against 61 general and 228 specific 
objectives.
Source: European Commission, DB 2018, Working Document 1, 
p. 10
The Commission itself recognises that, apart from 
Headings 3 and 4, the evidence for indicators is 
only partially available, especially for programmes 
in sub-heading 1a. For the Cohesion policy, about 
80% of the indicators are provided with data but 
these refer to the period 2014-2015.
This assessment exercise through measurable 
objectives/indicators shows weaknesses at the 
conceptual level. In real life, the situation is 
more complex: according to the Commission 
“some good indicators rely on information that 
is, at times, not available on a regular basis; some 
dimensions of performance are very difficult 
to measure; in addition, contextual factors can 
importantly influence final results, and indicators 
cannot eliminate or adjust these factors.”26 
Even if there have been virtually no governance 
decisions taken on the basis of measurable output, 
the Budget Focused on Results has produced a 
change of culture, especially after the Commission 
26  European Commission, DB 2018, Working Document 
1, p. 16 at http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/2018/
DB2018_WD01_en.pdf
integrated performance indicators in the hearings 
for the preparation of the 2018 budget.
This change of culture has reached the EP 
administration, where a service dedicated to 
impact assessment has been created. It produces 
analyses on Commission Impact Assessments on 
its own initiative. However, it is still questionable 
whether these analyses are fully exploited by the 
Members of the EP.                                                                                 
A practical example: the target of Europe 2020
The working document for the preparation of the 
2018 budget presents the results of some monitored 
programmes. Europe 2020 is one of these. Its 
strategy includes five main targets: employment, 
research and development, climate and energy, 
education and the fight against poverty and social 
exclusion, which, according to the Commission, 
should produce the following outcomes:
a) Raise the employment rate of the 
population aged 20-64 from the current 
69% to at least 75%;
b) Achieve the target of investing 3% of GDP 
in R&D, in particular by improving the 
conditions for R&D investment by the 
private sector, and develop a new indicator 
to track innovation;
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c) Reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at 
least 20% compared to 1990 levels or by 
30 % if the conditions are right; increase 
the share of renewable energy in our final 
energy consumption to 20%, and achieve a 
20% increase in energy efficiency;
d) Reduce the share of early school leavers to 
10% from the current 15%, and increase 
the share of the population aged 30-34 
who have completed tertiary education 
from 31% to at least 40%;
e) Reduce the number of Europeans living 
below national poverty levels by 25%, 
lifting 20 million people out of poverty.  
Source: Eurostat
The table above shows the progress made since 
2008 and also the distance still to be covered 
towards the relevant Europe 2020 targets. The 
situation in the area of employment, research and 
development and the fight against poverty or social 
exclusion has remained at the same level as in 
2008. The information produced by the indicators 
has not produced a change in the legislation. 
The weaknesses of the 
scrutiny
The paragraphs before show the progress the 
Commission has made in imposing mechanisms 
to evaluate policies in its services, but this 
information is still not embedded in the decision-
making process and most of the time evaluations 
remain without follow-up. The evaluation of EU 
public spending has not been raised to the political 
level, because of a number of factors:
a) Path dependency. After the approval of a 
piece of legislation, the legislative authority 
lacks the motivation to re-open discussion 
on the legislative text. It considers that the 
Commission should solve weaknesses in 
the implementation phase. 
b) The financial envelopes embedded in 
legislation give a guaranteed allocation to 
policies. These are a further disincentive. 
Institutional stakeholders 
(the EP and the Member 
States) are generally 
reluctant to change the 
financial envelope, which 
often contains the ‘essence’ of 
the legislative compromise.
c) The indicators – 
even if they are included 
in the primary legislation 
or delegated acts – are 
often perceived by the 
legislative authority as a 
technical element which 
has not received its political 
endorsement.
d) The Budgetary Authority perceives 
the links between the indicators and 
the allocation of resources as results of 
political decisions, with the risk of creating 
a more technocratic budget and reducing 
the political added value of budgetary 
decisions. 
e) The number of indicators and objectives 
included in legislation is very often too 
high and de facto creates a disincentive for 
efficient monitoring. Indicators need the 
full political endorsement of the legislative 
authority. A reduction of their number 
should also facilitate the reading of results. 
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These factors lead to the conclusion that the 
Council and the EP lack political ownership of the 
evaluation mechanisms used by the Commission. 
The #Budget4results initiative has not yet been 
translated into better-informed budget allocation. 
Supplementary steps are necessary to address the 
weaknesses highlighted above. There is no magic 
wand which would allow the quality of expenditure 
to be taken into consideration. 
How could the decision-
making process better 
integrate scrutiny? 
To raise scrutiny to a political level and influence 
the decision-making process, all the Institutions 
should acquire ownership of the procedure. 
Creation of a structured framework could be a 
step forward in this direction. 
The presentation by Rolf Alter27 highlighted four 
challenges:
i. Insufficient use of evidence;
ii. Uneven implementation;
iii. Stakeholder engagement; 
iv. Inadequate evaluation of results.
Responding to these challenges will improve the 
political added value of the Better Regulation 
programme. Scrutiny is not, and should not be, an 
exercise per se, but it should aim to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure 
by linking funding to the results it delivers. 
Scrutiny should lead to political decisions. This 
element, for the time being, is missing.
Introducing more flexibility, or even suppressing, 
the financial envelopes from regulations could 
be a step in the right direction. Financial 
envelopes could still indicate the magnitude of 
the expenditure allocated to an initiative but the 
annual allocation should be defined on the basis 
of previous performance. This change will draw 
the attention of the budgetary authority, which 
should take more responsibility in the evaluation 
of performance, based not only on budgetary 
decisions but also on legislative implementation.
27  Director of the OECD.
The IIA on Better Law Making or the IIA on 
budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary 
matters and on sound financial management could 




Enhancement of the oversight of legislation would 
gain from being framed by an interinstitutional 
agreement to structure the scrutiny exercise. As 
legislative and budgetary procedures are ruled by 
co-decision, the same should apply to scrutiny of 
legislation. In November, after the presentation 
of the Court of Auditors’ report and possibly 
before the final decision on the N+1 budget, the 
legislative and budgetary authorities should agree:
a. To submit EU policies to in-depth 
scrutiny in the following years. This 
would be much more efficient if all the 
Institutions focussed on a limited number 
of policies every year. The Institutions 
should plan in-depth evaluation of policies 
in such a way as to cover all policies in a 
period of 3-4 years. The European Court 
of Auditors could autonomously decide to 
give particular attention to these policies 
in its annual report or in a special report. 
b. The calendar leading to the preparation of 
political decisions, if necessary. Scrutiny 
should be finalised within fourteen months 
at the latest, in time for the Commission to 
make concrete proposals, if appropriate, in 
the draft budget (year N+2). 
c. The dates of special trilogues dedicated 
to scrutiny, where the Institutions can 
exchange information about their work in 
progress.
This procedure would have the advantage of 
raising awareness and increasing ownership of 
scrutiny at the political level. 
This will not only give visibility to the scrutiny 
function, but also improve the democratic 
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accountability of implementation. It will reinforce 
the role of the European Parliament, which will 
accompany the EU legislation through the whole 
cycle from preparation to scrutiny and, last but not 
least, it will constitute an incentive for beneficiaries 
to focus on outputs and outcomes.
Once each Institution agrees on the frame, they 
should define the internal procedures to best carry 
out the exercise. In fact, scrutiny of EU policies 
should not be limited to the budgetary aspect 
but also to legislative elements, and it should 
somehow involve stakeholders, who should give 
their view of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
implementation of policies in the spirit of the 
Better Law-Making agreement. 
Scrutiny within each 
Institution
Mrs Calviño, in her presentation, underlined the 
progress made by the Commission in assessing 
EU policies in the frame of the EU Budget Focused 
on Results, and stressed the efforts of DG BUDG 
to coordinate the contributions of the different 
Commission services.
EP Rules of Procedure28 facilitates joint activity by 
parliamentary committees to conduct scrutiny in 
the legislative and budgetary domain. A resolution 
adopted in plenary should conclude the EP 
internal procedure. Ideally the resolution should 
clearly state the outcome of its investigation and 
either approve the Commission implementation 
or, where appropriate: 
a. Ask the Commission to modify the 
implementation of the legislation;
b. Ask the Commission to modify the 
legislation;
c. Ask the Budgetary Authority to increase/
reduce the annual allocation of resources.
28 EP Rules of Procedure, Rule 55 Procedure with joint 
committee meetings. “The Conference of Presidents may decide 
that the procedure with joint meetings of committees and a joint 
vote is to be applied.”
With a plenary decision, scrutiny would assume 
a political dimension, which is so far missing. 
The decision would then have a direct impact on 
implementation and on budgetary allocation. 
The Council has never been pro-active concerning 
the scrutiny of legislation. After the adoption of 
a piece of legislation, the Council seems to have 
little concern with questioning implementation. 
Member States, in fact, are co-responsible 
for the implementation of the vast majority 
of programmes. Therefore, the Council lacks 
motivation to question implementation, which 
is a sort of gentlemen’s agreement between the 
Member States. At the same time, the Member 
States see an interest in assessing whether the 
allocation of funds respects the conditions set 
in the Regulation, especially in the presence of 
performance reserve mechanisms.
Last but not least, the Court of Auditors should 
play an important role in delivering the results of 
their audits to the Institutions. The contribution 
by Béatrice Taulegne also underlines the efforts 
of the Committee of Regions to monitor the 
implementation of EU policies. 
Fiorini and Hoekman give a concrete example 
of how Better Regulation ‘can indirectly generate 
greater economic benefits,’ improving the 
governance and the regulatory process of the 
services trade policy.
To conclude, a structured framework might 
transform the bureaucratic/technocratic exercise 
of scrutiny into a more political procedure with 
the involvement of all the Institutions. Indicators 
should remain an important component of the 
assessment, but other elements – opinion-based 
factors – should also play a role. The aim of 
scrutiny is to enhance legislation. The fact that 
scrutiny can also lead to a different allocation of 
resources or a modification of a regulation should 
not be excluded, provided that the budgetary 
and legislative authority can co-decide the 
modification.
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Conclusions
The articles published in this edited volume give 
a wide overview of how the initiatives Better 
Regulation and a Budget Focused on Results have 
started to frame EU policies in a new dimension, 
favouring the efficiency and effectiveness of 
EU policies. However, this process is not yet 
embedded in political decision-making. A further 
reflection on how measurement of the results of 
EU policies could contribute to more informed 
decisions should constitute a supplementary step 
that academics and institutions need to make.
14 The oversight of EU legislation - Vitor Caldeira
THE OVERSIGHT OF 
EU LEGISLATION
 by Vitor Caldeira
I am very grateful for the invitation to be here 
today at the European University Institute to 
participate in this workshop on better regulation 
and the scrutiny of EU policies. It is a pleasure to 
be able to contribute to this discussion. Indeed, as 
the introductory note announcing this workshop 
states: “In a period of unprecedented crisis for the 
European project, the EU has the opportunity 
to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness by 
focusing on its political priorities and a better use 
of its financial resources. The evaluation of the 
impact of EU policies should not be an exercise 
in itself; it will become more effective if linked to 
clear political decisions.”
In my last official public engagement as President 
of the European Court of Auditors (September 
2016), I shared my views on some of these issues 
at the 2016 conference organised by the European 
Commission on an EU Budget Focused on Results, 
and in particular on the issues of simplification and 
better regulation. These were recurrent themes in 
the work of the Court during much of the sixteen 
years I was a member. 
I recall very well that at that point the Court, under 
the last multi-annual framework, was calling on 
the Commission to improve the legal frameworks 
for EU spending and to make spending schemes 
more output-oriented and easier to manage. It is 
clear that simplification and better regulation will 
be just as important this time around. But I think 
that was always to be expected and it is not a sign of 
failure. The EU budget system naturally grows in 
complexity as policies and funding arrangements 
develop, and so it needs to be pruned back at 
regular intervals.
I think we have reached such a point. Since 2008, 
the EU has had to respond to major challenges:
• the banking and sovereign debt crises;
• a prolonged period of low economic growth 
and high unemployment in Member States; 
and
• the ongoing refugee crisis and security threats.
• It has done so by setting up new EU-level 
bodies and mechanisms and by mobilising the 
EU budget. For example, we have seen the EU:
• establish new agencies and supervisory 
mechanisms for regulating the financial sector;
• introduce mechanisms to provide financial 
assistance to Member States in need;
• increase its use of financial instruments across 
the EU budget; and, of course,
• establish the European Fund for Strategic 
Investment outside the EU budget but backed 
by an EU budget guarantee.
As a result, the overall arrangements by which EU 
policies are funded have become more complex. 
Financial management has become more 
challenging. And it has become more difficult to 
ensure effective accountability and auditing.
I believe the ‘Better regulation’ and ‘Simplification’ 
initiatives of the Commission should be seen as 
instruments for pruning the current arrangements. 
The question is how should they now be applied 
to the EU budget system? The work performed 
by the European Court of Auditors would suggest 
that three things are particularly important in the 
run-up to the next programming period. First, 
there is a need to consider what to cut back. The 
EU budget is limited to around 1% of GNI, so it 
is important to ensure the funds available are 
used to best effect. This means targeting funds to 
where they can add most value. But it also means 
identifying the spending schemes that are not 
bearing fruit.
So far, the Commission has – in the mid-term 
review of the MFF – identified a small number 
of well-performing schemes to be reinforced. The 
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more challenging task of reviewing the results 
of the first years of spending under the current 
MFF still remains. The mid-term evaluations were 
expected to provide an opportunity to do this in 
2017. However, there is a timing problem. The 
2014-2020 spending programmes got off to a slow 
start and the 2007-2013 spending programmes 
are only now being closed. This means there 
will be only limited evidence available about the 
performance and value added of EU spending 
programmes before the next MFF is proposed by 
the Commission at the end of this year.
Second, there is a need to re-shape the EU 
budget around the EU’s strategic priorities. The 
ECA’s annual report (in 2015) observed that the 
allocation of funds in the budget could be better 
aligned with the Europe 2020 strategy priorities. 
It was also found that the objectives of individual 
spending programmes could be better linked to 
the targets to be achieved by the end of the period.
Third, there needs to be space left in the EU budget 
for new growth. New challenges or crises are bound 
to arise. So there needs to be sufficient room in 
the budget to respond. As the Commission makes 
clear in its mid-term review, the extra flexibility 
that was introduced for the current MFF – such as 
the contingency margin – proved useful. But these 
possibilities were quickly exhausted as the EU was 
called upon to respond to the refugee crisis and 
increased security threats. However, I note that the 
Commission did make some interesting proposals 
to make it easier to move funds around within the 
budget as well as to hold more funds in reserve.
There is much encouraging language in the 
proposals presented so far. For instance, the 
proposal for revision of the financial regulation 
aims to encourage the next generation of EU 
spending programmes to pay for results achieved 
rather than just reimburse costs incurred. But if 
one looks carefully at the opinion on it issued by 
the ECA last January, there remain a number of 
issues to be addressed and a need to base proposals 
on clear evidence about how spending schemes 
are performing.
I believe this is a time to look forward and to 
be constructive and I would like to finish with a 
general remark. A greater focus on results will 
undoubtedly help. But we must also simplify 
the system as a whole, while addressing new 
challenges or crises, as I mentioned earlier. In 
this regard, I would like to mention three major 
specific challenges facing the EU:
• global instability (which risks further 
increasing migratory pressures and security 
threats);
• climate change (which entails a risk of 
occurrences of extreme natural events 
requiring increased demands from the EU 
budget to intervene within the EU, and globally 
may also result in displaced people seeking to 
migrate to the EU); and
• Brexit (which will occupy much of the 
decision-making machinery of the EU over the 
next two years but may offer an opportunity 
for reforming the EU budget).
There is also the broader challenge of regaining 
citizens’ trust in the EU and its institutions, and 
here the EU budget system is important; it is 
difficult to get someone to trust something they 
don’t understand. The Union needs a more user-
friendly EU budget system. It needs to be easier 
for institutions, enterprises and citizens to see that 
system working. All EU institutions and Member 
States should stand ready to work closely together 
to achieve this goal.
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BETTER 
REGULATION, 
SCRUTINY AND EU 
BUDGET FOCUS ON 
RESULTS 
by Nadia Calviño 29 
The EU budget represents about 1% of EU-28 
GNI or 2% of overall public spending. It fulfils 
very specific functions, complementary to 
national budgets. Unlike national budgets, the 
major part of the EU budget has historically been 
devoted to redistributive measures to build and 
sustain support for European integration. With 
today’s challenges facing the European Union, 
more weight is given to allocative efficiency and 
investments in European common goods. In its 
current state, the EU budget is mainly meant as an 
investment budget focusing on better economic, 
social and territorial cohesion across the European 
territory, specific European policies improving 
competitiveness for growth and jobs (e.g. research) 
and use of natural resources (e.g. agriculture), 
European public goods (single market, single 
trade policy), security and citizenship policies as 
well as the EU external policy. 
For years, especially during periods of prosperity, 
the main concern of budget stakeholders was to 
absorb European funds according to the rules. 
Higher absorption rates and lower error rates 
meant positive conclusions from the scrutiny of 
the EU budget. With the economic crises having 
put unprecedented fiscal pressures on national 
budgets, the EU budget’s focus has further shifted 
towards being a crucial investment instrument 
whose value lies in delivering tangible results on 
the ground. Therefore along with the quantitative 
29 Nadia Calviño, European Commission, Director-
General for Budget 
implementation of the EU budget, one of the 
main challenges has been to address the existing 
scepticism on the actual impact of the EU 
budget on the ground. This led the Commission 
to launch the “EU Budget Focused on Results” 
strategy in order to move from the primary 
focus on compliance with the rules and to look 
also at performance. This strategy has required 
a very significant investment at political and 
technical level, in order to change the mind-set of 
stakeholders, within the European Commission 
but also in the other European institutions, such 
as the Parliament and the Court of Auditors, as 
well as the Member States. 
EU budget regulatory and 
political framework
The EU budget environment is relatively complex. 
Over 30 policy areas are funded with multiple 
sources of funding, using different types of 
instruments, under different management modes 
and involving different actors. This requires strong 
accountability and optimal control mechanisms to 
ensure the budget is properly and effectively spent.
The figure below presents the performance 
framework of the EU budget within its political 
context (i.e. the Europe 2020 Strategy and the 
political priorities of the Juncker Commission) 
while also reflecting the regulatory environment 
in which it operates.  
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The overarching objectives that guide the Union 
and its Institutions are defined in the Treaties. 
Within this framework and taking into account 
the economic, political and social situation, the 
Heads of State or Government of the EU Member 
States define a long-term strategy for the Union, 
its European institutions and Member States, and 
the social partners. Currently, this is the Europe 
2020 Strategy agreed in 2010. It is a 10-year growth 
strategy for the Union as a whole. The strategy put 
forward three mutually reinforcing priorities of 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth with five 
headline targets:
1.  Raise the employment rate of the 
population aged 20-64 to at least 75%;
2. Invest 3% of GDP in Research and 
Development;
3. Reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at 
least 20% compared to 1990 levels or by 
30% if the conditions are right, increase 
the share of renewable energy in our final 
energy consumption to 20%, and achieve a 
20% increase in energy efficiency;
4.  Reduce the share of early school leavers to 
10% and increase the share of population 
aged 30-34 having completed tertiary 
education to at least 40 %;
5. Reduce the number of European living 
below nation poverty lines by 25 %, lifting 
20 million people out of poverty.
The success of this strategy depends on all the 
actors of the Union, acting collectively. The EU 
budget is one of the levers towards the Europe 
2020 objectives, while a wide range of actions at 
national, EU and international level also contribute 
to delivering concrete results: 
– At national level the EU targets have 
been translated into national targets 
and trajectories in order to reflect the 
specificities of each Member State. The 
success of Europe 2020 strongly and 
primarily relies on the ability of the 
Member States to play their part in 
implementing the necessary reforms at 
national level. 
– At supranational level the Commission 
works closely with the Member States to 
support and monitor progress towards 
the achievement of Europe 2020 targets 
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and to ensure strengthened coordination 
of economic policies between Member 
States. This is done through the European 
Semester, the EU’s annual cycle of 
economic and budgetary coordination. 
Alongside this coordinated effort, EU 
policies, instruments and legal acts, as well 
as financial instruments are mobilized 
to pursue the Europe 2020 Strategy’s 
objectives.
The political priorities of the Juncker Commission 
defined by President Juncker in the political 
guidelines provide a roadmap for the Commission’s 
action that is fully consistent and compatible with 
Europe 2020. The differences in scope between 
the Commission’s priorities and Europe 2020 
reflect the fact that the Commission’s priorities are 
tailored to the Commission’s particular role and 
competencies, whereas Europe 2020 is a strategy 
for all EU institutions and Member States. Changes 
over time also reflect the Commission’s duty to 
respond to new challenges that have emerged or 
grown in prominence since the development of 
the Europe 2020 strategy, such as the refugee crisis.
The Multi-Financial Framework (MFF) translates 
the Union’s political priorities into financial terms 
for at least 5 years setting maximum annual 
amounts (ceilings) for EU expenditure as a 
whole and for the main categories of expenditure 
(headings). The MFF hence supports EU policy 
actions over a period long enough to be effective 
and to provide a coherent long-term vision to the 
various stakeholders. 
The 2014-2020 MFF and its constituent spending 
programs were designed with a focus on European 
added value to help deliver on the commonly 
agreed goals of the Europe 2020 growth 
strategy. The programs have their own, tailored 
performance frameworks embedded in their 
legal bases. The performance is assessed against 
the objectives and measured using the indicators 
decided by the legislator. 
Therefore, although closely related, a distinction is 
made between:
• the performance of the Union (the EU 
institutions and its Member States) in 
achieving the high level commonly agreed EU 
objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy;
• the performance of the Commission and 
its Directorates-General as an institution in 
implementing the 10 priorities of the Juncker 
Commission; and
• the performance of the spending programs in 




The MFF 2014-2020 is the first to introduce 
performance frameworks across the EU budget. 
This constitutes an ambitious step towards greater 
transparency and accountability, alignment of 
scarce public resources to strategic priorities and 
objectives, and more efficient and effective use 
of EU funds. The MFF provides a stable funding 
framework for programs which contribute to the 
achievement of the Europe 2020 strategic long 
term objectives in the areas of competitiveness for 
jobs and growth, economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, sustainable growth and natural 
resources, security and citizenship and external 
action (Global Europe). The focus on political 
priorities is further reflected in the Commission’s 
Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic 
Change, which highlights the ten policy areas on 
which action is being focused during the current 
mandate of the Juncker Commission.
The 2014-2020 MFF has brought about some 
significant improvements in terms of how EU 
money is invested, notably:
• Competitiveness, EU value-added and 
strengthened conditionality: the share of the 
budget spent in programs considered to bring 
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the highest EU added value in terms of jobs 
and growth and enhancing competitiveness 
has been significantly increased. This has been 
notably the case for Horizon 2020 program 
for research and innovation and the new 
Connecting Europe Facility that supports the 
development of trans-European networks 
in the fields of transport, energy and digital 
services. It is also the case of Erasmus+, with 
a strong EU value-added in its transnational 
mobility activities, contributing to skills 
development, employability of students and 
fighting unemployment. Moreover, new 
provisions have been introduced for the 
implementation of the European Structural 
and Investment Funds to improve their 
effectiveness and European added value, 
notably by concentrating resources on 
key Europe 2020 objectives, establishing a 
performance framework based on measurable 
indicators and targets linked to the release 
of a performance reserve, introducing ex-
ante conditionalities as well as creating closer 
linkages with the EU economic governance 
and the European Semester process. 
• Performance budgeting: a performance 
budgeting system, aligned on the Europe 2020 
strategy, has been established. Performance 
benchmarks have been embedded in the legal 
bases of multiannual programmes, including 
a set of clearly defined objectives, indicators, 
milestones and long-term targets, which are 
reported on, both ex-ante and ex-post, at the 
time of the draft budget. 
• Simplification: progress has been made in 
reducing the number of programmes and 
instruments and grouping some of them 
under a common framework with uniform 
rules, simplifying procedures for application 
and declaration of costs by final beneficiaries, 
facilitating the deployment of innovative 
financial instruments, and improving the cost-
efficiency of controls. 
• Flexibility: the introduction of new 
instruments allows for shifting available 
monies between headings and years, which 
represents a major step forward in terms of 
flexibility within the total MFF ceilings to 
accommodate evolving needs. 
• Leveraging: the MFF 2014-2020 and the 
related spending programmes have also laid 
down the foundations for a more systematic 
use of financial instruments as a means to 
leverage the EU funds, and authorised the 
setting-up of EU Trust Funds in the external 
policy area. 
• Mid-term review/ revision: to make sure that 
the EU budget planning framework continues 
to correspond to the economic situation and 
the latest economic projections. Therefore, 
the MFF mid-term review/ revisions allows 
for a reassessment of Union priorities and the 
adjustment of the EU budget implementation 
over the remaining period of the MFF based 
on progress made and changes in the political 
and economic context.
Therefore, the EU budget’s performance 
framework was not built from scratch, but is 
rather subject to incremental improvements in its 
monitoring, implementation and reporting.
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Complementarity and 
mainstreaming 
The performance framework of the EU budget is 
based on the principle of complementarity. EU 
programmes support the EU policy priorities in 
the relevant areas and are complementary to the 
other non-financial activities of the European 
Commission such as legislative proposals, 
regulatory and coordination activities and those 
of the Member States that are carried out in the 
pursuit of common policy objectives. This is 
particularly evident in relation to the European 
Structural and Investment Funds, which are 
deployed in the Member States and support 
structural reforms and job creation. It is not 
unusual for several programmes to contribute to 
one policy (and indeed for a single programme 
to contribute to multiple policies). For example, 
research and development policy is supported not 
only by Horizon 2020 but also by the European 
Regional and Development Fund, and large 
industrial programmes such as Galileo, ITER or 
Copernicus. 
In the same way, different policies are mainstreamed 
into several programmes. The 2014-2020 MFF 
includes provisions that mainstream the EU’s 
climate, biodiversity and gender objectives in 
all major EU policies. The EU budget is thus an 
important tool to support the achievement of 
these cross-cutting policy objectives.. 
Climate change: To respond to challenges and 
investment needs related to climate change, the 
EU has decided that at least 20  % of its budget 
for 2014-2020 – roughly EUR 180 billion over 
this period − should be spent on climate change-
related action. To achieve this result, mitigation 
and adaptation actions are being integrated into 
all major EU spending programmes, in particular 
Cohesion Policy, regional development, energy, 
transport, research and innovation, common 
agricultural policy as well as the EU’s development 
policy. Starting from the 2014 budget the 
estimates for the climate related expenditures are 
monitored on an annual basis in accordance with 
the methodology founded on Rio markers.
Biodiversity: The EU has committed to halting 
the loss of biodiversity and the degradation of 
ecosystem services in the EU by 2020. Similarly to 
climate action mainstreaming, biodiversity-related 
expenditure is tracked in a consistent way across 
the EU budget with detailed instrument-specific 
guidelines. In addition, EU budget spending in 
other areas should not have a negative impact on 
biodiversity. 
Gender equality: Gender mainstreaming is an 
important element in EU policy agenda. Gender 
equality is a cross-cutting objective for all policy 
areas: fundamental rights and citizenship, 
employment and social inclusion, cohesion policy, 
education, research and innovation, external 
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actions and development cooperation. Except for 
actions specifically targeting gender inequality 
issues, for the majority of programmes it is not 
always possible to estimate the amounts that are 
allocated to gender issues. Thus the approach of 
gender mainstreaming is preferred over gender 
budgeting. 
EU Budget Focused on Results
In 2015, the European Commission launched 
the “EU Budget Focused on Results” (BFOR) 
strategy. One of its main objectives was to present 
the performance features of the Multiannual 
Financial Framework 2014-2020, making a first 
assessment of their effects, identifying actions 
for strengthening further the performance 
orientation of the budget implementation and 
supporting effective communication on EU 
Budget achievements.. 
Rebalancing compliance with 
performance
A major element of the strategy was changing the 
European Union spending culture, by rebalancing 
compliance and performance objectives for the 
EU budget. The unpresented fiscal pressures on 
national budgets over the last decade highlighted 
the importance of the EU Budget as an investment 
instrument that can deliver tangible results 
on the ground. European innovation projects, 
cross-border infrastructure and employment 
programmes for graduates are just a few examples. 
More recently, the EU budget was instrumental 
in coping with migratory pressures at the EU’s 
borders and refugee integration in Member States, 
providing support in humanitarian crisis and 
ensuring fast response in emergency situations. 
While the EU budget continues to be the subject 
of unparalleled scrutiny, a democratic and desired 
system of public spending control, it is also called 
on to provide the highest possible EU added value.
EU added value
A well-performing budget effectively supports the 
European Union’s response to arising challenges 
and long-standing priorities. Economic growth 
and financial stability compete for funds with new 
needs related notably to security and migration. 
Many of these issues can be addressed more 
effectively at European that at national level. 
Capitalising on the advantages of the single 
market and supplementing national budgets 
where they are unable to cope individually, the EU 
Budget’s contribution to the solutions brings clear 
added value. A major objective of the EU Budget 
Focused on Results strategy is thus to ensure that 
EU programmes and projects not only deliver the 
desired results on the ground, but do so better than 
any Member State could if it were to implement 
them on its own.   
The EU Budget’s focus on results strategy is built 
in four key 4 pillars that cover both the substance 
and conceptual framework of the EU budget’s 
performance:
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In which areas do we spend?
The EU Budget must be aligned with European 
priorities: investing in programmes dedicated to 
jobs, growth and competitiveness, serving multiple 
objectives, for example climate mainstreaming, 
and making sure it is flexible and agile to address 
new challenges.  
How do we spend? 
Simple, accessible funding continues to be a core 
objective. Financial instruments and investment 
funds such as the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments attract additional funding from 
other public and private sources, ensuring higher 
financial leverage from EU money and thus more 
accessible funding. 
How are budget implementation and 
performance assessed? 
A well-performing EU Budget complies with 
the rules and contributes to the desired results. 
The Commission and Member States should 
cut unnecessary audit and control costs, while 
reducing errors in spending and better protecting 
the EU Budget. Moreover, the results of spending 
should be evident – both on paper, and on the 
ground.  
How do we communicate?
European citizens have the right to know what 
the EU Budget’s results are. The EU Results is a 
centralised online source of examples of EU-
financed projects across policy areas. Next 
to easily accessible information for citizens, 
communication about the EU Budget performance 
with all stakeholders should be more open, timelier 
and more productive.
Improved transparency and 
accountability as regards EU 
Budget performance
The EU Budget Focused on Results strategy has 
brought about significant improvements in the 
EU Budget’s performance framework in recent 
years. The Commission provides up-to-date 
performance information on the EU budget in a 
comprehensive set of documents when presenting 
the budget proposal for the upcoming year and 
when reporting on the previous year’s budget 
implementation and performance:
Programme statements 
attached to the Draft Budget
The performance information per programme is 
compiled in the working document “Programme 
Statements of operational expenditure” 
accompanying the draft budget. Thus, the 
performance information is regularly updated 
every year. The purpose of Programme Statements 
is to substantiate the Commission’s draft budget 
proposal with available performance information. 
They provide the best available performance 
information, encompassing both the ex-post 
information on programmes’ performance and 
ex-ante estimations in terms of future outputs and 
results. Since the draft budget 2017, programme 
statements include a programme update section, 
which provides a quick overview of the most recent 
progress in the implementation of the programme 
based on quantitative and qualitative information. 
The programme statements thus present the status 
of programme implementation, relevant findings 
of evaluations or programme related studies, and 
on this basis, the budgetary planning for the year. 
Annual Management and 
Performance Report for the 
EU Budget and the Integrated 
Financial Reporting Package
In 2016, the Commission released for the first 
time an Integrated Financial Reporting Package. 
The package aims to improve transparency and 
to streamline the information concerning the 
performance of the EU Budget. The package 
contains the annual accounts, the Annual 
Management and Performance Report, the 
Financial Report, and the Communication of the 
protection of the EU budget. Among these reports, 
the Annual Management and Performance Report 
provides information on the progress of the 2014-
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2020 MFF programmes and the latest available 
evidence on the results of the 2007-2013 MFF 
programmes. In addition, it shows how the EU 
budget contributed to the Commission’s political 
priorities and the Europe 2020 objectives. The 
report merges the previous “Synthesis” and 
“Article 318 TFEU” reports in one document in 
order to deliver annually a single performance 
report on the EU budget.
Conclusion: Better 
Regulation, Better EU Budget 
Scrutiny and Focus on 
Results
Increased focus on performance is indispensable 
in a context of growing needs and budgetary 
discipline. Therefore, a number of improvements 
have been introduced to further streamline and 
enhance the information and reporting on EU 
programme results with a view to improve the 
implementation of the programmes. Built to 
encompass objectives, performance indicators 
to monitor progress and regular reporting on 
achievements, the EU performance framework is 
aligned with international standards. It is framed 
by the legal and political setup and a multi-
layered architecture of budgetary and policy 
tools involving many different actors at national 
and supranational level. In this context, realistic 
expectations are important for success: the process 
of improving the evaluation and performance 
frameworks is a gradual one where every step 
forward counts. The “EU Budget Focused on 
Results” initiative has strengthened the discipline 
in the Commission’s approach to performance: 
focusing on the four key questions, allowing 
progressive improvements where they are most 
needed, and thus enabling better accountability. 
For better EU budget scrutiny, the following 
lessons learned since the start of the “EU Budget 
Focused on Results” initiative must be taken into 
consideration:
• The performance of the EU budget must 
consider the multiplicity of objectives as well 
as the complementarity and mainstreaming 
of policies and programmes; at the same time, 
consistency should be ensured throughout the 
very dense legal framework;
• Establishing the budget is a political process 
with multi-institutional layers; indicators can 
inform on performance, but cannot replace 
political decision-making;
• It is challenging to pick the right indicators, 
but this should not lead to a propensity to 
add unnecessary new ones, or delete existing 
useful indicators; the cost of collecting 
performance data to inform indicators should 
not be neglected;
• Stakeholder understanding and expectations 
of performance can be dramatically different, 
and cannot be addressed by a simple traffic-
light type approach, or by an overly complex 
system of indicators, measures and rules;
• Avoiding unrealistic expectations: there is 
often a time-lag between evaluation and 
decision, between real program timing and 
budgeting and reporting cycles that cannot be 
overcome;
• Sometimes the link to the EU budget is not 
clear-cut: results and outcomes are not easily 
attributable or directly linked to the money 
allocated, which does not mean lack of 
performance or results thanks to the associated 
investment.
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EVIDENCE-BASED 
EU POLICIES: THE 





The European Commission is committed to 
ensuring that EU policies deliver better results 
for citizens, businesses and public authorities 
and that they achieve their objectives in the most 
efficient and effective way. Accordingly, its policy 
action is centred on evidence: any adoption of a 
new initiative, or  revision of an existing one, or 
a decision to repeal outdated acts is subject to an 
analysis of the impacts both ex ante and ex post.
Ex-ante impact assessments are carried out in 
order to compare policy options and discern their 
expected economic, social and environmental 
impacts, and their potential impact on 
competitiveness and administrative burden, in 
particular for SMEs, digital aspects, territorial 
impact, etc. For new initiatives, whenever possible 
an assessment is also made as to whether action 
should be taken by the Union, or it is best left to 
the Member States. Impact assessments may rely 
on evidence collected from previous evaluations 
of the initiative under review, or evidence on 
international experience with similar initiatives, 
or simply brand-new evidence collected for the 
purpose. Ex post, the Commission is committed 
to evaluating all EU activities intended to have 
an impact on society in a proportionate way. 
Evaluations gather evidence to assess how well an 
intervention has performed (or is working) and 
draw conclusions on whether the EU intervention 
continues to be justified or should be modified. 
In its evaluations, the Commission takes a critical 
look at whether EU activities are fit for purpose 
and deliver, at minimum cost, the desired changes 
to European citizens and businesses and contribute 
to the EU’s global role. In both cases, the evidence-
gathering starts from the monitoring data and it 
continues with the collection of additional data, 
statistical information, case studies, interviews 
with stakeholders and modelling exercises.
As the initiator of legislative and non-legislative 
initiatives, the Commission applies the ‘Evaluate 
First’ principle to make sure any policy decision 
takes into due account lessons learnt from past 
EU action. This is imbedded in the regulatory 
framework. For example, regarding Cohesion 
policy, evaluations are required under the Financial 
Regulation30 and the Common Provisions 
Regulation31 and should follow the principles 
outlined in the Better Regulation Guidelines.32 
Within the Commission, in practice this entails 
a participatory process involving the relevant 
services. Interservice Groups, for instance, are 
created in order to steer all evaluation studies and 
impact assessments. They include experts from 
relevant services throughout the Commission. 
The Regulatory Scrutiny Board provides opinions 
and recommendations on the resulting studies. 
The Interservice Consultations which lead to the 
adoption of the assessments ensure validation at 
the Commission level. The participatory process 
also entails the active participation of a variety of 
actors.  Stakeholders and the general public are 
consulted early in the process. All the roadmaps 
for evaluations and inception impact assessments 
serve to inform interested parties about the 
direction and details of the planned work. Open 
public consultation also ensures feedback from 
the general public on the initiative under review. 
30 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1
504540860925&uri=CELEX:32012R0966




25 Evidence-Based EU Policies: the DG Regional and Urban Policy’s Perspective - Mariana Hristecheva
Further consultations with stakeholders (through 
surveys, interviews, workshops and case studies) 
are carried out as the study progresses and relevant 
experts are usually invited to contribute to the 
conceptual and methodological frameworks of 
the work. The European Parliament and the 
Council in their role as legislators benefit from 
the evidence collected for a given policy initiative, 
as it allows them to take an informed decision 
when deliberating on a legislative proposal. The 
Commission presents the results of its studies in 
various fora (committees, working groups etc.) 
in the European Parliament and the Council 
preparatory and decision-making bodies. The 
institutions also contribute to the collection of 
evidence: the two legislative branches are entitled 
to perform impact assessments of their own on 
their substantial amendments to the initiatives 
proposed by the Commission. The European 
Parliament, for example, carries out its own 
studies on the effects or impacts of policies. The 
Member States are also closely involved in the 
production of evidence (through the provision 
of data, feedback on experience with EU policies 
and examples of national or regional good 
practices etc.). The European Court of Auditors 
contributes to the body of evidence on EU policies, 
in particular through its performance audits. 
The Court regularly reviews the implementation 
and the performance of policies, providing 
recommendations for future refinements. 
DG Regional and Urban Policy 
and the delivery of Cohesion 
Policy
The Directorate General Regional and Urban 
Policy follows the approach described above to 
pursue its objectives, as framed by the Treaties on 
the European Union and on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) provides that, in order 
to strengthen its economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, the Union is to aim at reducing 
disparities between the levels of development 
of the various regions and the backwardness of 
the least-favoured regions, and that particular 
attention is to be paid to rural areas, areas affected 
by industrial transition, and regions which 
suffer from severe and permanent natural or 
demographic handicaps. 
DG Regional and Urban Policy activities contribute 
to most of the Commission’s overarching priorities 
in various ways. Its funds directly support the 
delivery of such priorities and the implementation 
of country-specific recommendations issued in the 
context of the European Semester and it ensures 
the necessary investment-enabling conditions 
through following up ex-ante conditionalities for 
the 2014-2020 programmes.
DG REGIO’s contribution is particularly 
significant for the delivery of the following five of 
the Juncker Commission’s priorities: 
(1) A New Boost for Jobs, Growth and     
Investment; 
(2)A Connected Digital Single Market; 
(3)A Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-
Looking Climate Change Policy; 
(4)A Deeper and Fairer Internal Market with 
a Strengthened Industrial Base; 
(8)Towards a New Policy on Migration. 
The EU is committed to creating more and better 
jobs and a socially inclusive society. These goals 
are also at the core of the Europe 2020 strategy, 
which sets the overarching strategic framework 
for the 2014-2020 period. 
DG Regional and Urban Policy provides support 
to deliver these objectives, notably through 
interventions financed under the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the 
Cohesion Fund (CF), which, together with the 
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other European Structural and Investment (ESI) 
Funds,33 are among the European Union’s main 
instruments for investment.34 Through the ERDF 
and CF, a critical mass of investment is delivered 
in key EU priority areas to deliver structural 
change and respond to the needs of the real 
economy by supporting job creation, business 
competitiveness, economic growth, sustainable 
development, and by improving citizens’ quality 
of life, thus contributing to the goals of the Europe 
2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth and the objectives of Cohesion Policy 
enshrined in the Treaty.
The ERDF and CF are implemented through 
shared management. In this management mode, 
the co-legislators fix the legal framework and the 
overall funding and determine the allocations by 
MS and categories of regions. The Commission 
adopts programmes following negotiation with 
the Member States. As regards implementation, 
Member States’ administrations (at the national, 
regional and local levels), are in charge of 
operational implementation and report at least 
annually on the rhythm of implementation in 
terms of selection of investment projects and 
their expected achievements, as well as completed 
projects and results achieved. The Commission 
cooperates with them and closely follows the 
progress of programmes through analysis of 
monitoring data. In particular, the monitoring data 
feeds into performance frameworks, which are the 
European Commission instrument for identifying 
– and giving early warning on – the existence of 
implementation weaknesses and for rewarding 
programmes for swift delivery. Moreover, at the 
33 European social fund (ESF), European agricultural fund 
for rural development (EAFRD) and European maritime and 
fisheries fund (EMFF).
34 This contribution provides a snapshot of the activities 
carried out under the ERDF and the CF, which make up about 
24% of the EU budget. DG Regional and Urban Policy is also 
involved in the management of the following instruments: (1) the 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), which is the means 
by which the EU supports reforms in ‘enlargement countries’ with 
financial and technical help; (2) The European Union Solidarity 
Fund (EUSF), which was set up in 2002 to grant financial assistance 
to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to 
the EU, mainly in the event of major national or regional natural 
disasters.
end of the period, the EC evaluates the results 
achieved at the EU level. 
DG Regional and Urban Policy has established 
a tradition of focussing on the analysis and 
evaluation of Cohesion Policy. The policy 
evidence is gathered and analysed through three 
main functions in the DG: 1) evaluation (ex-
post assessment of implementation and policy 
impacts), 2) impact assessment (ex-ante analysis 
of options for future policy), and 3) economic 
analysis (statistical analysis of socio-economic 
development of EU regions). The Evaluation unit 
regularly analyses the monitoring data reported 
by Member States, and carries out evaluation 
studies as needed. The main evaluation exercise 
(in terms of scope, resources and impact) is the 
ex-post evaluation, which is carried out at the 
end of a programming period. The studies are 
based on a variety of methods, from econometric 
to counterfactual analyses and case studies. The 
function of impact assessment and economic 
analysis focuses on the strategic design of cohesion 
policy. Impact assessments are prepared primarily 
for the policy orientation of a new programming 
period, but also for any other Commission 
initiatives likely to have significant impacts on 
the EU economy, society, and environment. DG 
REGIO also prepares the Cohesion Report, usually 
biannually, and in any event on time to feed into 
the debate on future cohesion policy. Other units 
in the DG (horizontal units such as the Unit for 
Urban and Territorial development or Smart 
Specialization, and geographical units) also carry 
out studies dedicated to specific aspects of policy. 
Cohesion Policy: the 
evidence so far
2007-2013 Programming Period
The most recent ex-post evaluation, completed 
in September 2016, covered the programmes 
supported by the two main REGIO funds 
(ERDF and Cohesion Fund) during the previous 
programming period 2007-2013 for a total of EUR 
269.9 billion. 
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The ex-post evaluation involved 14 work 
packages, most of them organized by themes 
(SME support, Transport, Environment, Energy 
Efficiency, Financial instruments etc.). In most 
instances, these evaluation studies were carried 
out by independent contractors35 who, in turn, 
used experts from Member States. In addition, 
each study also relied on input from independent 
academic experts. The evaluation also sought 
to elicit feedback from a variety of stakeholders 
(through surveys, workshops and interviews) 
and from the general public (through open public 
consultation).36 
In terms of methods, the choice was driven by 
data availability and the suitability of the method. 
Most of the studies include case studies (at the 
project, programme or country level) and theory-
based analysis. Counterfactual studies were used 
to estimate the impact of policies at the regional 
level. Assessments of the overall potential impacts 
of policies across regions and countries, on the 
other hand, were provided through general-
equilibrium analyses. 
For example, the modelling exercises inform 
us that, given the volume of investments, 
their thematic distribution and the rhythm of 
implementation, Cohesion Policy is likely to 
have benefited all Member States to a significant 
extent. The policy multiplier over the period to 
2023 is estimated at 2.74, implying that each euro 
invested in cohesion policy is likely to generate 
an additional 2.74 euro of additional GDP over 
the long term. This amounts to a total of almost one 
trillion euros of additional GDP generated in the 
EU economy by 2023. Each MS and region, even 
the net contributors to the policy, will experience 
a positive impact owing to its implementation. 
The essential achievements of the policy are 
35  With the exception of the macroeconomic modelling 
exercise, performed by the Commission.
36  All the material produced in the Ex Post Evaluation 
is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/
evaluations/ec/2007-2013/ 
also visible on the ground. More than 1,100,000 
jobs were created through Cohesion Policy 
interventions up to the end of 2015, thus 
sustaining the employment rate in many Member 
States. In parallel, more than 380,000 projects to 
support investment in SMEs were undertaken 
across the EU in the period, thus improving the 
business environment and sustaining investment. 
Cohesion Policy has also supported close to 
120,000 research and innovation projects, thus 
ensuring a significant level of investment in this 
area and positively influencing gross EU domestic 
expenditure on R&D. Achievement data reported 
by 2007-2013 programmes notably point to an 
estimate of 15 million additional people covered 
by broadband access, which helps create the right 
conditions for digital networks and services to 
flourish, giving consumers and businesses better 
access to digital goods and services across Europe, 
in particular in rural areas. The investments in 
water facilities ensured that almost 6 million 
additional people have access to a new or 
improved supply of drinking water, which is 
expected to bring health benefits in the long term. 
Similarly, due to investments in cohesion policy, 
almost 7 million people are now connected to 
improved/new facilities for the treatment of 
wastewater. Significant achievements in the area 
of energy efficiency and renewables also resulted 
directly from supported interventions: close 
to 5,000 MW of reported additional capacity 
for renewable energy production; a reported 
reduction of greenhouse emissions by more 
than 420,000kt of CO2 equivalent.37
Notwithstanding these achievements, there is 
constant striving to further improve. In particular, 
the ex post evaluation highlighted how the 
monitoring of Cohesion Policy had improved 
from the previous 2000-2006 period, and there 
had been a strong focus on investing money, 
delivering projects and generating outputs. 
37  DG REGIO, 2016 Annual Activity Report, https://
ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/aar-regio-2016_
en_0.pdf
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However, very few 2007-13 programmes had a 
‘focus on results,’ setting clear goals for changes at 
the regional level, selecting projects accordingly 
and tracking progress towards those goals. The 
acknowledgment of such limits has led to the 
development of the result-orientation approach 
used in the current 2014-2020 programming 
period.
2014-2020 Programming Period 
One of the major changes in cohesion policy 
in the current period is its result-orientation. 
This is the first programming period when the 
Commission and Member States have agreed on 
the inclusion of an explicit and detailed logic of 
intervention for each type of investment. When 
designing programmes, the Managing Authorities 
have defined the objectives to be pursued by the 
investments and the result indicators which are 
to be used to monitor progress in achieving these 
objectives. In addition, output indicators are 
regularly reported in order to track implementation 
over time. The targets to be attained by the year 
2023 are defined for both result and output 
indicators.  
As a result, given the current result-orientation 
of cohesion policy, the monitoring data collected 
from Member States on the implementation 
of their programmes is much richer and more 
structured than ever before. All the data is 
regularly uploaded to the European Commission 
Open Data Platform38 and made available to the 
public in a timely manner.  
A second provision related to gathering evidence 
on the impacts of a policy includes a requirement 
for Member States to carry out impact evaluations 
for each type of investment (corresponding to the 
objectives of the programme). It is expected that 
this requirement will significantly improve the 
38 The Open Data Platform (ODP) was launched in 
December 2015 by DG Regional and Urban Policy together with 
the other 3 DGs for European Structural and Investment Funds: 
Agriculture, Maritime and Fisheries, and Employment. For over 
530 programmes, the platform visualises the latest data available 
at the EU, country and programme levels.  The ODP is available at: 
https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/  
knowledge from which, together with our ex-post 
evaluation, we will draw lessons and conclusions 
at the policy level by the end of the period. For 
example, based on the evaluation plans received 
from Member States to date, it is estimated that 
a minimum of 2000 evaluation studies will be 
produced by the end of the period in relation to 
ERDF and CF programmes. Many of these studies 
will be impact evaluations, providing assessments 
of the impacts of policies at the regional level 
and by themes (including R&D, SME support, 
environment, transport etc.). The Commission 
will analyse these evaluations and possibly conduct 
additional studies if deemed necessary.  
Another major change introduced in the 2014-
2020 programming period has been the devising 
of a performance framework as one of the tools 
to achieve result-orientation of the ESI Funds.39 
The idea behind the performance framework is to 
create a mechanism for rewarding swift progress 
of programmes in carrying out investments 
according to plans. 
In practice, the programmes are organised in 
priority axes, and each priority is described by a 
limited number of result and output indicators. 
The performance framework40 includes a subset 
of these indicators representing the majority41 of 
the funding and with fixed milestones (for the 
end of 2018) and targets (for the end of 2023). All 
the performance frameworks include a financial 
indicator, which represents the total expenditure 
in the priority axis. For each priority, achieving the 
programmed milestones and targets rewards the 
programmes with the corresponding performance 
reserve.42
39 DG REGIO, Guidance Fiche Performance Framework 
Review and Reserve in 2014-2020, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_
policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/guidance_performance_
framework.pdf
40 For ERDF and CF, the performance frameworks only 
use output indicators and key implementation steps (e.g. for 
infrastructure projects that would not be completed by the end of 
2018). For ESF, they can also use result indicators. 
41 The Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
215/2014 requires programme authorities to document coverage of 
the indicators (more than 50% of allocation) and the evidence and 
calculation method for the targets and milestones set.
42  The performance reserve represents between 5% and 7% 
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The Managing Authorities submit annual reports 
to the European Commission on progress 
towards milestones and targets. Assessment of 
these reports provides an opportunity to discuss 
performance of the programmes, to identify 
priorities showing signs of underperformance, 
and to send – in justified cases – appropriate 
observations and to engage Member States in 
discussion on implementation weaknesses.
The objectives set for the 2014-2020 programming 
period are ambitious. They involve providing 
support to 1,100,000 firms, creating 450,000 new 
jobs in supported enterprises, giving broadband 
access of at least 30 Mbps to 14,500,000 additional 
households, building additional waste recycling 
capacity for 2,500,000 tonnes/year, serving 
4,500,000 additional persons with an improved 
water supply and 8,500,000 persons with improved 
wastewater treatment. Many people will benefit 
from flood protection measures (over 7,600,000 
persons) or fire protection measures (almost 
6,500,000 persons). In terms of energy efficiency, 
the estimated decrease in annual primary 
energy consumption by public buildings is over 
4,600,000,000 kWh/year. 
The information from the 2017 Annual 
Implementation Reports – which refer to the 
end of 2016 – indicates that the programmes are 
already starting to work towards the majority 
of these objectives. In particular, in the area of 
support to enterprises, 140,000 firms and 25,000 
start-ups have already started receiving support.43
The future ahead
The conception of the future of the Cohesion policy 
post-2020 will be embedded in a wider political 
process in tune with the preparation of the next 
MFF. The MFF should reflect the ambitions for the 
future of the European Union in budgetary terms. 
It will be in accordance with the principles of 
evidence-based policy-making, taking account of 
of the allocation to the priority axis and 6% of ESI Fund resources 
at the level of the EU and Member States.
43  Most recent data available, as published in: https://
cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/funds/erdf (page accessed on 
01/09/2017)
current and past performance, broad consultation 
processes and assessment of the impact of the 
options under consideration.
A broad reflection on the future of Europe has 
already been initiated by the Commission with 
the presentation of the White paper on the future 
of Europe and the way forward on 1 March 2017 
and the subsequently issued reflection papers.44
So far, the White Paper and the reflection papers 
have stimulated a debate remarkable in its depth 
and coverage across Europe, which is still ongoing. 
The Commission will examine all the reactions and 
responses to the White Paper and the reflection 
papers with a view to presenting its proposals for 
the next multiannual financial framework around 
mid-2018. 
In addition to the general debate on the MFF, 
dedicated fora provide input concerning the 
future of the Cohesion policy. The latest one 
was the 7th Cohesion Forum, which took place 
on 26th-27th June 2017 in Brussels.   This high-
level political event marked a milestone in the 
preparations for the post-2020 framework for 
the European Structural and Investment Funds, 
collecting contributions from various stakeholders 
including the Commission, the Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, the 
Committee of the Regions, representatives from 
Member States responsible for the Funds and key 
policy experts, through panel discussions, keynote 
speeches and themed workshops. Another broad 
discussion platform will be provided during the 
European week of Regions and Cities, which 
starts on 9 October 2017.
44 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/white-paper-future-
europe-reflections-and-scenarios-eu27_en
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Better regulation is a key consideration for 
the Juncker Commission. Its May 2015 Better 
Regulation Package contained a set of measures 
to improve the quality and effectiveness of 
legislation, reduce its regulatory burden, and 
increase the involvement of stakeholders. The 
creation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) 
was one of the main measures to improve the 
quality of the analysis underlying policy and 
spending initiatives. This paper45 explains how the 
Board functions, how it fits in the broader Better 
Regulation cycle, and what initial lessons can be 
drawn after its first year of operation.
Better regulation
The Juncker Commission has committed to 
putting better regulation principles at the heart 
of its policy-making processes. Policies are 
to deliver better results with lower costs for 
citizens, businesses and public authorities. Its 
May 2015 Better Regulation Package46 included 
initiatives and measures with three objectives:
To improve openness and transparency. The 
45  This paper reflects the content of a presentation given 
to a Workshop on “Better Regulation: scrutiny of EU policies” 
organised by the European University Institute on 23-24 February 
2017. It relies heavily on information and documents that can 
be found on the Better Regulation pages of the Commission’s 
website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/
better-regulation-why-and-how_en. In particular, the Annual 
Report 2016 of the RSB was a main source: https://ec.europa.eu/
info/files/regulatory-scrutiny-board-annual-report-2016_en. 
The author wishes to thank the other Board members for their 
contributions to this Annual Report.
46 Communication from the Commission on “Better 
regulation for better results - An EU agenda”, COM(2015)215.
package introduced more frequent and inclusive 
consultation possibilities during the development 
of new legislation. It also created the possibility 
for citizens and interest groups to comment and 
make suggestions on existing legislation through a 
new website. These suggestions are to be reviewed 
by the new Regulatory Fitness and Performance 
(REFIT) platform, with representatives from 
business, social partners, civil society and Member 
States.
To improve the quality of new proposals. The 
Commission further refined its tools for evidence-
based law-making through inclusive impact 
assessments, looking at the economic, social 
and environmental impacts of its initiatives. It 
established independent internal scrutiny of its 
evidence and analysis with the creation of the RSB. It 
also wanted to work with the European Parliament 
and Council on the quality of legislation, which 
resulted in a new Interinstitutional Agreement on 
Better Law-making (IIABL)47 in April 2016.
To ensure that existing legislation delivers on 
expectations. The Commission committed to a 
more systematic use of evaluations48 and to evaluate 
existing legislation before making new proposals 
(‘evaluate first’). Its REFIT programme focusses 
on the reduction of regulatory burdens and the 
simplification of existing legislation, without 
jeopardising the realisation of its objectives.49 The 
new REFIT platform will also make suggestions 
for improving and simplifying existing legislation.
As such, the Commission introduced 
improvements in all phases of the preparatory 
process for new legislation. This process involves 
the preparation of evaluations and impact 
assessments, consultation of stakeholders, and the 
application of REFIT principles. The full better 
regulation cycle is shown in figure 1.
47 OJ  L  123,  12  May  2016,  p.1.: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2016:123:TOC
48 In the Commission’s terminology, evaluations are 
retrospective assessments of existing policies or spending 
programmes. Ex-ante evaluations of proposed initiatives are called 
impact assessments.
49 In the Commission’s Work Programme 2017 
(COM(2016)710), it was clarified that all initiatives that revise 
existing legislation should be REFIT initiatives.
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Figure 1: The better regulation cycle
Evaluation and fitness check
The preparation of a new initiative normally starts 
with an examination of the functioning of existing 
policy or spending initiatives. The Commission 
has a long tradition of evaluating expenditure 
programmes and has gradually extended this 
practice to policy initiatives.50 In 2013, it committed 
to make an evaluation of existing legislation before 
making a proposal for a significant revision.51 This 
‘Evaluate First’ principle was extended to all policy 
proposals in the Better Regulation Guidelines52 
and Toolbox53 in 2015. 
An evaluation assesses a specific EU law, policy or 
funding programme for effectiveness (whether the 
50 Communication from the Commission on “Smart 
Regulation in the European Union”, COM(2010)543.
51 Communication from the Commission on 
“Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation – improving 
evaluation”, COM(2013)686.




EU action reached its objectives), efficiency (what 
the costs and benefits are), relevance (whether it 
responds to stakeholders’ needs), coherence (how 
well it works with other actions) and EU added 
value (what the benefits of acting at the EU level 
are).
A fitness check is a type of evaluation that assesses 
a consistent set of several related actions. It 
focuses on identifying the collective impact (costs 
and benefits) of laws, policies and programmes, 
how they interact, and if any inconsistencies or 
synergies exist.
Impact assessment
Impact assessments examine whether there is 
a need for EU action and analyse the possible 
impacts of available solutions. These are carried 
out during the preparation phase, before the 
Commission finalises a proposal for a new law. 
They provide evidence to inform and support the 
decision-making process.
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The Commission conducts an impact assessment 
on policy or spending initiatives that are expected to 
have significant economic, social or environmental 
impacts. When the Commission does not carry 
out an impact assessment, it normally explains the 
reasons why in the Explanatory Memorandum 
that accompanies the proposal. The most common 
reason is political urgency and a lack of time to 
conduct an impact assessment.
The impact assessment report builds on the 
findings of available evaluations to analyse the 
problem the initiative tries to tackle. It further 
justifies why the EU should act and describes 
what the initiative should achieve. It analyses 
what options are available, what their impact is, 
and how they compare. The analysis of impacts 
should cover both costs and benefits, and should 
assess the economic, environmental and social 
implications in an integrated and balanced way. 
Finally, the impact assessment describes how 
implementation and impacts will be monitored 
and how and when the initiative will be evaluated. 
Indeed, the necessary implementation data should 
be collected to allow a future evaluation to review 
the extent to which the outcomes that were 
foreseen in the impact assessment have become 
reality.
The impact assessment not only informs the 
Commission’s decision-making, but also 
accompanies the Commission’s legislative proposal 
when it is sent to the European Parliament and 
Council for adoption. The extent to which the 
Parliament and Council explicitly review the 
content of the impact assessments during their 
decision-making process still varies. The IIABL 
foresees that when the European Parliament 
and Council consider substantial amendments 
to the Commission’s proposal, they will carry 
out additional impact assessments when they 
consider this to be appropriate and necessary. 
They can also ask the Commission to conduct 
additional analysis. The European Parliament has 
started making additional impact assessments 
and has already covered 32 amendments up to the 
end of 2016.54 The Council has recently agreed on 
organisational arrangements to start conducting 
impact assessments on amendments.
Consultation of stakeholders
The Commission consults interested citizens 
and stakeholders from the start to the end of its 
decision-making process.
During the planning phase, the Commission 
publishes roadmaps for its initiatives, evaluations 
and impact assessments (these are called 
inception impact assessments) for feedback. These 
documents explain why the Commission is taking 
an initiative or launching an evaluation or impact 
assessment, and how it intends to proceed. The 
feedback period normally lasts for four weeks.
For all evaluations and impact assessments, 
a twelve-week open public consultation is 
conducted. This should cover all the elements 
of the evaluation or impact assessment. In 
addition, the Commission also organises more 
targeted consultations to complement the open 
consultation. The consultation results are a main 
source for the reports and should be used in the 
analysis.
Drafts of delegated and important implementing 
acts are published for feedback (four weeks).
After the Commission has adopted a proposal, 
it invites feedback on it within eight weeks. To 
feed these views into the legislative debate, the 
Commission collects and presents them to the 
European Parliament and the Council.
Regulatory Scrutiny Board
One of the main novelties in the Commission’s 
renewed commitment to Better Regulation is the 
transformation of the former Impact Assessment 
54 European Parliamentary Research Service, “European 
Parliament work in the fields of Impact Assessment and European 
Added Value, Activity Report for 2016”; PE 598.598
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Board into a full-time Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
RSB with stronger safeguards on independence. 
Like its predecessor, the RSB continues to 
provide quality control of impact assessments. 
Furthermore, the Commission has extended the 
mission of the RSB to cover fitness checks and 
significant ex post evaluations.
The RSB provides quality assurance to the political 
level of the Commission. It checks that initiatives 
take into account all the available evidence and 
stakeholders’ views before political decision-
makers consider what action to take, if any. More 
broadly, it helps to develop the Commission’s 
policy on better regulation by providing feedback 
on the problems and issues it observes in its 
scrutiny work. The Board also provides advice 
to Commission services on individual impact 
assessments and evaluations.
The Board is an independent body within the 
Commission. It comprises a Chair and six 
regular members. All seven are appointed by the 
Commission on the basis of their expertise, to 
serve on the Board full-time on three-year non-
renewable terms. The Chair and three regular 
members come from within the Commission. 
The three remaining members are recruited from 
outside the Commission.
The RSB acts independently and prepares its 
opinions autonomously. It does not seek or 
take instructions from within the Commission, 
nor from any other national or EU institution, 
body, office or agency. All Board members act 
in their personal capacity. They share collective 
responsibility for the decisions of the Board. The 
Board’s rules of procedure cover the RSB mandate 
and proceedings.55 They define such issues as rules 
of independence and related ethics provisions, 
the scope of the mandate, and protocols for 
communication, transparency and outreach 
activities.
The Board publishes its opinions on the 
55 The rules of procedure are available at http://ec.europa.
eu/info/files/regulatory-scrutiny-board-rules-procedure_en
Commission’s website56 at the same time as the 
corresponding evaluation or impact assessment is 
published. It also publishes a list of all draft reports 
that it has considered.57
The RSB intervenes at a point before legislative 
proposals have been finalised. It helps to improve 
draft impact assessments (and evaluations) before 
Commission services finalise their proposals. 
The Board’s opinions are, therefore, not quality 
assessments of specific legislative proposals, which 
are typically prepared later.
For impact assessments, the opinion can be 
positive or negative. In the case of a negative 
opinion, the report needs to be substantially 
revised and resubmitted to the Board for a second 
review and opinion. Indeed, the Commission’s 
Working Methods specify that for impact 
assessments a positive Board opinion is needed 
before proceeding to an interservice consultation 
and eventual consideration by the College of 
Commissioners.58 The second opinion is in 
principle final. If this is negative, it signals that 
serious shortcomings remain. Whether and under 
what conditions the initiative can proceed further 
requires a political decision in these cases.
When the Board delivers a positive opinion, it 
includes reservations or only recommendations. 
Reservations allow the report to proceed on the 
understanding that relevant adjustments will be 
introduced beforehand. The final version of the 
impact assessment report should also take into 
account any recommendations from the Board.59
For evaluations, the Board started to make a 
distinction between positive and negative opinions 
in 2017. Unlike for impact assessments, a positive 
56 Board opinions on impact assessments are available 
on http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=ia and 




58 Working Methods of the European Commission 2014-
2019, C(2014) 9004.
59 The Explanatory Memorandum of the final proposal and 
Annex 1 of the final impact assessment explain how the Board’s 
opinion is taken into account.
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opinion is not required to continue the finalisation 
of the report. However, the final version of the 
evaluation should take into account the remarks of 
the Board, or explain why this has not been done.
Overall, the Board interacts with services 
constructively in a spirit of helping the system 
work more effectively and improving the quality of 
evaluations and impact assessments. It proactively 
makes its expertise and advice available in the 
initial stage of the preparation of evaluations or 
impact assessments. This can involve reviewing 
the main evaluation roadmaps and inception 
impact assessments, and providing comments and 
guidance to the author Directorate-General.
Practical experience of the 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board
Impact Assessments
In 2016 and 2017, the Juncker Commission 
has been launching much of the legislative 
work necessary to deliver on its 10 priorities. 
The workload of the Board reflects this. Table 1 
shows that the Board examined far more impact 
assessments compared to its predecessor in 2015 
and 2014.
Table 1: Impact assessments reviewed, 2014-
2017
About half of the impact assessments scrutinised 
received an initial negative opinion, resulting in 
revision and resubmission to the Board. In 2016, 
the Board subsequently gave positive overall 
assessments to all but one60 of the revised impact 
assessments that it received.
A positive or negative opinion is not the result of 
a mechanistic process or of a box-ticking exercise. 
The Board evaluates the quality of an impact 
assessment report based on the Commission’s 
Better Regulation Guidelines and verifies whether 
the minimum standards are met. However, in 
doing so, the Board also takes into account the 
context of each initiative and the proportionality of 
the analysis, meaning that the depth of the analysis 
should match the importance of the initiative. It 
considers how an individual initiative fits within 
the wider sectoral regulatory environment, to 
what extent it responds to political orientations 
that have already been agreed by the relevant 
EU institutions, and whether there is a legal 
obligation to act. Timing constraints on the 
initiative are sometimes a factor when judging the 
availability of evidence, of prior evaluations and of 
comprehensive stakeholder consultations.
A positive opinion means that, based on the draft 
examined and on clarifying discussions with the 
responsible Directorate-General during the Board 
meeting, the Board is confident that the next 
60 Revision of Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources.
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version of the document will be acceptable as a tool 
to support sound decision-making by the political 
level of the Commission. It does not mean that 
an impact assessment has 
fully addressed every aspect 
of the better regulation 
requirements. Rather, the 
Board signals that the report 
adequately communicates 
what the best available 
evidence suggests, and 
where the political judgment 
begins.
An initial negative opinion 
implies that the Board wants 
to review the report again 
before the initiative proceeds 
further. Reasons for negative 
opinions vary, but most 
often they involve multiple 
shortcomings in the initial draft report.
Common weaknesses in impact assessments 
during 2016 have been the problem definition 
and development of options (see Figure 2). As 
these are two key elements in the design of an 
impact assessment, they sometimes overshadow 
other elements. For example, when the problem 
is poorly defined, it is hard to define appropriate 
corresponding objectives and options. Likewise, 
analysis of options is of limited value if valid 
approaches are left out without explanation or 
when the options considered do not solve the 
problem. Other weaknesses have included the 
design of baseline scenarios, unclear linkages 
of objectives and options to the problems (the 
intervention logic), and a lack of quantification. 
The handling of stakeholder consultations is also 
a work in progress, and sometimes stakeholder 
consultation exercises have not been used to their 
full potential as a source of evidence. Reader-
friendliness can also be an issue: an impact 
assessment report that is too long and technical 
for non-experts becomes less useful.
Figure 2: Structural issues raised in Board 
opinions in 2015 and 2016
When finalising their impact assessments, 
Commission services have largely taken into 
account the recommendations that the Board 
made in its opinions. Figure 3 shows how draft 
impact assessments improved substantially 
after an initial negative opinion in 2016. The 
context, problem analysis, options, impacts and 
presentation were all ameliorated in the vast 
majority of cases where the Board made remarks. 
Revisions contained descriptions of problems that 
were sharper and more evidence-based, there 
was more detailed analysis of stakeholder views, 
the case for EU measures was more compelling 
and the policy trade-offs of various options were 
clearer. However, the comparison of options 
did not always improve satisfactorily. In these 
cases, it was not evident that the conclusions 
and preferred option followed logically from the 
evidence presented. In all cases but one, however, 
the Board considered that the improvements the 
services introduced in the resubmitted impact 
assessments were sufficient to merit a positive 
opinion. Positive opinions still flagged remaining 
concerns for Services to address and for policy-
makers to consider.
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Figure 3: Integration of RSB recommendations 
after an initial negative opinion in 2016
A second moment when the integration of the 
Board’s recommendations can be assessed is 
when services submit their impact assessment for 
interservice consultation, after having obtained 
the final Board opinion. Figure 4 shows that only 
in a limited number of cases does the final impact 
assessment not integrate the remaining RSB 
recommendations, or it only does so to a limited 
extent.
Figure 4: Integration of RSB recommendations 
after the final opinion in 2016
Evaluations
The 2015 better regulation package reaffirmed 
the Commission’s commitment to ‘evaluate 
first:’ to evaluate what exists before proposing 
changes. Already several decades ago, EU budget 
procedures imposed an obligation to evaluate 
spending programmes. 
Systematic evaluation 
of policy and legislation 
is more recent, but it 
is delivering pertinent 
lessons. Nevertheless, 
until recently, 
quality assessment of 
evaluations was left to 
the individual services 
and did not rely on 
a centralised quality 
control mechanism.
The Board started 
issuing opinions on 
evaluations in 2016, 
but did not give overall ratings as has been the 
practice with impact assessments. The work 
started gradually and 7 opinions were issued 
on evaluations and fitness checks. From 2017 
onwards, the Board is issuing positive and 
negative opinions on evaluations as well. This 
is for transparency reasons and should support 
the Commission’s ongoing efforts to systematise 
and improve evaluation activity. Up till mid-
June 2017, the Board has issued 11 opinions on 
evaluations and fitness checks, almost half of 
them being negative. The Board expects to receive 
18 evaluations and fitness checks for scrutiny in 
2017. Other than transparency, Commission 
working methods do not currently envisage formal 
procedural implications of a negative Board rating 
on an evaluation.
The mandate of the Board is for the RSB to only 
look at fitness checks and the most important 
evaluations. When selecting the evaluations it 
wants to examine, the Board gives priority to 
major initiatives that are scheduled for review later 
in the mandate of the Commission. This typically 
includes initiatives included in the Commission’s 
Work Programme and the preparation of the 
next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
post-2020. In particular, it includes programmes 
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with large budgets and ones with a high degree of 
innovation or political sensitivity. It also includes 
policy initiatives of a cross-cutting nature.
To increase ownership of evaluation results, 
services are now obliged to write a Staff  Working 
Document (SWD) that summarises the evaluation 
and its conclusions. The Board’s opinion on 
evaluations focuses on the quality of the SWD. 
The few (seven) SWDs that the Board reviewed in 
2016 had limited critical analysis of such issues as 
coherence, relevance and EU value added. They 
also did not systematically draw clear conclusions 
for follow-up action and did not always exploit 
all the information that external evaluators had 
collected. By contrast, the analysis of efficiency 
and effectiveness was more complete.
It appears that at least half of the impact 
assessments applied the ‘evaluation first’ principle 
in 2016. This is a positive result given that the 
increased emphasis on the implementation of this 
principle started with the May 2015 adoption of 
the better regulation package. The preparations 
for many of the impact assessments that the Board 
reviewed in 2016 had already started before that 
date. In the first months of 2017, the proportion of 
impact assessments that respect ‘evaluation first’ 
has already increased to around two thirds.
The ‘evaluation first’ principle increases 
transparency. Board review of the SWDs also 
provides an institutional safeguard against ‘cherry-
picking,’ i.e. selectively reporting evidence that 
supports a particular approach. The presence of 
such a safeguard serves to increase the credibility 
of evaluation practices. Of course, it has to be noted 
that the Board only reviews a small proportion of 
all evaluations.61
Other lessons learned
Most of the Board’s work concerns implementation 
of the Commission’s 10 priorities. While the 
overall strategy document for these priorities is not 
subject to an impact assessment, the downstream 
61 In 2016, more than 130 evaluations and fitness checks 
were finalised by the Commission.
legislative or non-legislative actions are much 
more systematically evaluated and impact-
assessed. Within each priority, the Commission 
simultaneously submits several initiatives from 
different departments in packages. This enables 
the underlying impact assessments to take 
into account the broader context and consider 
cumulative impacts of related measures. A good 
case in point is the Energy Union proposals, 
where an overall reference scenario provided a 
common starting point for energy-related impact 
assessments on specific measures regarding 
climate change, renewables, the electricity market 
and energy efficiency.
Building on existing minimum standards for 
consultation stemming from EU Treaty obligations, 
the Commission’s new Better Regulation 
Guidelines strengthened the commitment to 
carry out consultations that are of high quality 
and reach all stakeholder groups. Stakeholder 
consultations improve transparency and can have 
a positive effect on the efficiency and effectiveness 
of regulation. 
Consultations have multiple functions in evaluation 
and impact assessment. Among other things, they 
collect evidence on past performance, opinions 
on areas for improvement, options for solutions, 
evidence on impacts, and views on preferred 
options. The Better Regulation Guidelines require 
all of the above. Fulfilling all these roles in a 
single open consultation is often difficult. For this 
reason, the guidelines invite Commission services 
to complement open consultations with smaller 
targeted consultations when needed.
The Board has observed several instances 
where impact assessments treat open online 
consultations as a representative survey. The 
collection of respondents is seldom representative 
of the stakeholder population. It almost always 
oversamples some groups and undersamples 
others. Moreover, knowing the details of opposing 
viewpoints is often important to policy-makers. 
As a consequence, the Board considers that it is 
usually inappropriate to present consultation 
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results as a sort of opinion poll, showing overall 
percentages in support of a certain option without 
clarifying diverging points of view of different 
groups of stakeholders.
The Commission has a commitment to better 
quantify regulatory burden reductions or 
savings potentials wherever possible, and the 
Interinstitutional Agreement of April 2016 reflects 
this. Both regulatory burdens and impacts are 
often hard to quantify. The Board has observed 
that, in practice, quantification is often one of 
the most challenging parts of impact assessment 
work. Availability of relevant data is often a major 
constraint. This problem can only be addressed 
over time, by improving monitoring and 
evaluation provisions. For this reason, it is helpful 
when impact assessments clearly define future 
data requirements.
Conclusions
Like its predecessor, the RSB delivers quality 
control for impact assessments. Now, however, 
it also examines major evaluations and fitness 
checks. This extension of its mandate has increased 
the Board’s capacity to add value and to promote 
rigorous and transparent application of better 
regulation principles.
The RSB has taken shape and become operational 
at the peak of the political cycle, when the 
Commission is proposing specific measures to 
make progress on its 10 priorities. In its first 
year, the Board already has been able to make a 
difference to the quality of impact assessments, 
as its remarks and recommendations were largely 
taken into account in the final versions of the 
reports.
The Board is further developing and improving its 
tools and working methods in 2017. Priority work 
includes developing a set of quality performance 
indicators for impact assessments and evaluations. 
This will enable the Board to track and report on 
improvements in better regulation practices over 
time. The RSB intends to more systematically 
monitor how its recommendations on draft 
reports are implemented.
The Board is also prioritising closer upstream 
interaction with the Commission services to 
review major initiatives in the Commission Work 
Programme and identify the major challenges of 
the related evaluations and impact assessments 
early on. This early interaction should contribute 
to efficiency and improve the quality of reports.
The main novelty in 2017 is the more systematic 
review and rating of evaluations and fitness checks. 
Their quality is still lower and more diverse than 
for impact assessment. Establishing a consistent 
quality requirement across different types of 
evaluations poses a particular challenge to the 
Board. The identification of common weaknesses 
should help to improve the overall quality of 
retrospective work in the Commission.
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1. Introduction
EU institutions are subject to many rules 
embedded in the Treaties, both in the TEU and 
the TFEU. However, these rules just sketch a 
part of the discipline of the many and complex 
relationships among EU institutions that exist in 
the different decision-making processes in the 
EU legal order. Institutional practice is strongly 
influenced by non-Treaty rules and considering 
only them is often not sufficient to understand 
the real constraints that the lawmakers have to 
respect in their daily activity. Among non-Treaty 
rules, interinstitutional agreements and EP rules 
of procedure play a crucial role in particular. The 
former, foreseen by Article 295 TFEU, actualize 
and enforce the principles of loyal cooperation 
and institutional balance;63 the latter, recognized 
62 Nicola Lupo, Full Professor of Public Law, LUISS 
University, Rome, Italy.
63 Art. 295 TFEU expressly acknowledges that 
interinstitutional agreements concluded by the European 
Parliament, the Council, and the Commission in compliance with 
the Treaties ‘may be of a binding nature’. Unlike the interinstitutional 
agreement on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound 
financial management between the European Parliament, the 
Council, and the Commission on budgetary discipline (approved 
by the Parliament on 19 November 2013 and by the Council on 
2 December 2013), the interinstitutional agreement on better 
law-making does not specify that the “Agreement is binding on 
all the institutions for as long as it is in force.” Nevertheless, it 
quotes Article 295 TFEU and it seems to assume that it constrains 
the signing institutions. On interinstitutional agreements, see F. 
by Article 232 TFEU, concretely designs and 
develops the institutional autonomy of the EP.64 
This contribution will try to corroborate the above 
statement by dealing with an instrument that did 
not receive any explicit discipline in the Treaties: 
the Commission’s power to withdraw legislative 
proposals. This instrument was first experienced in 
institutional practice, although not too frequently, 
and then more recently was recognized by the 
Court of Justice. More specifically, the judgment 
of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) in case 
C-409-13 Council v. Commission of14 April 2015 
clearly recognized the power of withdrawal of 
the Commission, deriving it from the power of 
legislative initiative attributed, as is well-known, to 
the Commission. At the same time, on the basis of 
the principles of conferral of powers, institutional 
balance and loyal cooperation, the Court set some 
limits to the exercise of the power of withdrawal, 
among which is the fact that the Commission 
must state “the grounds for withdrawal” to the 
Parliament and the Council. Therefore, an action 
of annulment may be brought before the same 
Court of Justice against a decision to withdraw 
in order to check its compliance with the three 
principles and to verify whether the decision is 
supported by cogent evidence or arguments.
In the year following the above-mentioned 
judgment by the Court of Justice, both the ‘atypical’ 
sources of law, i.e. the new interinstitutional 
agreement on better law-making and the reformed 
EP rules of procedure, concretely reacted to it. 
Through new procedural rules, both contributed 
to enforcing the principles affirmed by the Court 
Snyder, ‘Interinstitutional Agreements: Form and Constitutional 
Limitations’ in G. Winter (ed.), Sources and Categories of European 
Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, Baden 
Baden, Nomos, 1996, p. 453 ff. and L. Ronchetti, ‘Gli accordi 
interistituzionali nell’ordinamento comunitario’, in Diritto pubblico, 
9 (2003), 1, p. 1 ff.
64 On the effective use of the EP’s rules of procedure as a 
way to empower the EP often beyond the provisions of the Treaty, 
see N. Brack, O.  Costa, and C.  Dri, ‘Le Parlement européen à la 
recherche de l’efficacité législative: Une analyse des évolutions de 
son organisation’, in Bruges Political Research Paper, 39/2015, p. 4 
ff. (available at http://aei.pitt.edu/63513/). 
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of Justice and to “parliamentarising” the exercise 
of the Commission’s power to withdraw legislative 
proposals, inserting it, at least normally, within 
the annual interinstitutional programming. 
2. The new 
interinstitutional agreement 
on better law-making
In the interinstitutional agreement on better law-
making between the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the European 
Commission of 13 April 2016,65 the power of 
withdrawal is quoted in two provisions. 
A first provision (no. 8) of the interinstitutional 
agreement, regarding the Commission Work 
Programme, makes reference, inter alia, to 
the withdrawal of legislative proposals. The 
Commission Work Programme, in fact, “will 
include major legislative and non-legislative 
proposals for the following year, including repeals, 
recasts, simplifications and withdrawals. For 
each item, the Commission Work Programme 
will indicate the following, as far as available: 
the intended legal basis; the type of legal act; 
an indicative timetable for adoption by the 
Commission; and any other relevant procedural 
information, including information concerning 
impact assessment and evaluation work” (italics 
added). 
On the one hand, this provision aims to re-affirm 
that the Commission is annually called on to 
revise the state of the art of its proposals, verifying 
whether it is desirable to withdraw ones that did 
not receive any attention either by the Parliament 
or by the Council, ones that can be deemed 
obsolete (so-called ‘technical’ or ‘administrative’ 
withdrawals, largely used particularly by the 
Barroso and Juncker Commissions in order to 
65 Official Journal of the European Union, L 123/1, 12 
May 2016. This new agreement replaces the Interinstitutional 
Agreement on Better Law-Making of 16 December 2003 and 
the Interinstitutional Common Approach to impact 
Assessment of November 2005. Moreover, the Annex to this 
Agreement replaces the 2011 Common Understanding on 
Delegated Acts.
achieve better regulation objectives)66 or ones 
that, in the meantime, have been the object of 
reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments 
(especially when these reasoned opinions reached 
the threshold for a yellow or an orange card).67 
On the other hand and to a certain extent, it 
would even be possible to read the provision 
as intended to state that there is a duty for the 
Commission to notify in advance its decision to 
withdraw a proposal through an insertion of this 
intention in the Commission Work Programme. 
This interpretation seems consistent with the 
second provision specifically referring to the 
Commission’s power of withdrawal included in 
the same interinstitutional agreement. Provision 
no. 9 affirms the need for the Commission to 
give a proper reason and to pre-alert the other 
institutions about its intentions. The provision 
runs as follows:
66  On the better regulation agenda of the Juncker 
Commission, see, for instance, D. Jančić, ‘The Juncker Commission’s 
Better Regulation Agenda and Its Impact on National Parliaments’, 
in C. Fasone, D. Fromage, Z. Lefkofridi (eds.), Parliaments, Public 
Opinion and Parliamentary Elections in Europe, EUI Working Paper 
MWP 2015/18, p. 45 ff. More specifically, on the appointment by 
the Juncker Commission of a vice-president in charge of Better 
Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, see L. Schrefler, A. Renda, J. 
Pelkmans, ‘What can the Better Regulation Commissioner do 
for the EU?’, CEPS Commentary, 29 September 2014 (available 
at http://aei.pitt.edu/54982/1/LS_et_al_Commission_Priorities_
Regulation.pdf).
67  This hypothesis of withdrawal, as is explicitly provided 
for by the Treaties (Protocol no. 2: Article 7), has to be deemed 
to be autonomous. In practice, however, only in one case out of 
three ‘yellow cards’ did the Commission decide to withdraw its 
proposal, and it took this decision despite re-affirming that in its 
view the original proposal respected the principle of subsidiarity 
(see F. Fabbrini-K. Granat, ‘‘Yellow Card, but no Foul’: The Role of 
the National Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the 
Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike’, 
in Common Market Law Review, 2013, n. 1, p. 115 ff.; M. Goldoni, 
‘The Early Warning System and the Monti II Regulation: The 
Case for a Political Interpretation’, in European Constitutional Law 
Review, 2014, n. 1, p. 90 ff.; D. Jančić, ‘EU Law’s Grand Scheme on 
National Parliaments: The Third Yellow Card on Posted Workers 
and the Way Forward’, in D. Jančić (ed.), National Parliaments after 
the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis: Resilience or Resignation?, 
Oxford, OUP, 2017, p. 299 ff.; and N. Lupo, ‘Le molteplici funzioni 
dell’ Early Warning System, alla luce del terzo “cartellino giallo” 
sui lavoratori distaccati’, in Dialoghi con Ugo Villani, Cacucci, Bari, 
2017, p. 583 ff.).
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“In accordance with the principles of sincere 
cooperation and of institutional balance, when 
the Commission intends to withdraw a legislative 
proposal, whether or not such withdrawal is to be 
followed by a revised proposal, it will provide the 
reasons for such withdrawal, and, if applicable, an 
indication of the intended subsequent steps along 
with a precise timetable, and will conduct proper 
interinstitutional consultations on that basis. The 
Commission will take due account of, and respond 
to, the co-legislators’ positions” (italics added).
In other words, the Commission is obliged to 
inform the other institutions about its intention 
to withdraw a legislative proposal. It should do 
this during the submission and the discussion 
of its Work Programme if its intention is already 
defined; it could do it later only if the decision 
is taken afterwards. This seems a wise choice, 
also in the light of the importance that the 
interinstitutional agreement attributes to the 
programming procedures, designing them as 
fully interinstitutional in order to reduce conflicts 
among (EU and even national) institutions in the 
following steps of decision-making.68  
3. The European Parliament’s 
reformed rules of procedure 
A new provision regarding the Commission’s 
intention to withdraw a legislative proposal was 
inserted in the context of a general revision of the 
EP rules of procedure, which was approved on 
13 December 2016 and the main parts of which 
entered into force on 16 January 2017.69
68 This choice is seen as derived from the politicization of 
the Commission by M. Dawson, ‘Better Regulation and the Future 
of EU Regulatory Law and Politics’, in Common Market Law Review 
53 (2016), 5, p. 1209 ff. On the role (actual and potential) played 
by national parliaments even in these procedures, see C. Fasone 
and D. Fromage, ‘From Veto Players to Agenda-Setters? National 
Parliaments and Their ‘Green Card’ to the European Commission,’ 
in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 23 (2016), 
2, p. 294 ff.
69 For an overview, see C. Fasone, ‘La (silente) revisione 
generale del regolamento del Parlamento europeo,’ in Quaderni 
costituzionali, 2017, n. 1, p. 159 ff.
The setting of this new rule within Rule 37 is 
extremely interesting because it is connected 
with the provisions commented on above in the 
inter-institutional agreement relating to ‘annual 
programming.’ Nevertheless, the new rule seems 
to design a procedure which is also applicable 
outside the examination of programming 
documents. More specifically, Rule 37, para 4, 
specifies that the intention to withdraw a legislative 
proposal needs to be discussed in the competent 
parliamentary committee, and also in the plenary: 
“If the Commission intends to withdraw a 
proposal, the competent Commissioner shall be 
invited by the committee responsible to a meeting 
to discuss that intention. The Presidency of the 
Council may also be invited to such meeting. If 
the committee responsible disagrees with the 
intended withdrawal, it may request that the 
Commission make a statement to Parliament” 
(italics added). Rule 37 concludes by stating “Rule 
123 shall apply.” This is the procedure provided 
for statements by the Commission, Council and 
European Council which allows a resolution to 
be voted on by the European Parliament through 
which the Parliament can exercise its influence on 
how, when and even whether the Commission will 
make use of its power of withdrawal.
4. The judgement of the 
Court of Justice   
In order to fully grasp the meaning of these 
two provisions inserted in the interinstitutional 
agreement on better law-making and of the new 
article in the EP rules of procedure, more specific 
attention should be given to the previously 
mentioned judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 
April 2015, which clearly recognized the power 
of withdrawal of the Commission on the basis 
of Article 17, para. 2, TEU, in conjunction with 
Articles 289 and 293 TFEU. 
It is true that the power of withdrawal had 
already been considered in a couple of previous 
judgments of the Court of Justice (14 July 1988, 
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Fediol v. Commission, case 188/85; 5 October 
1994, Germany v. Council, case C-280-93), but 
in neither of these cases was a statement of the 
existence of this power formulated in such general 
terms, and in both of them the legitimacy of the 
withdrawal could be related to the particularities 
of the act concerned.70 
Therefore, before this last judgement there were 
still some scholars who argued against the ability 
of the Commission to withdraw its proposals, at 
least when the proposal had started to be discussed 
by the other institutions.71 There were also some 
perplexities among the Council and the European 
Parliament in recognizing to the Commission 
such a power, especially if it was motivated by 
political reasons.72
Together with the general recognition of the power 
of withdrawal, in this judgment the Court of Justice 
pointed out some constraints that the Commission 
must respect. As the judgment affirmed, a general 
veto power in the conduct of the legislative process 
attributed once and for ever to the Commission 
“would be contrary to the principles of conferral 
of powers and institutional balance.”73 This means 
70 As has been remarked by R. Adam, Il potere di iniziativa 
della Commissione e il processo decisionale: il difficile equilibrio tra 
ritiro della proposta e potere decisionale, in A. Tizzano (ed.), Verso 
i 60 anni dai tratti di Roma. Stato e prospettive dell’Unione europea, 
Giappichelli, Torino, 2016, p. 21 ff., spec. 24.
71 R. Adam, A. Tizzano, Manuale di diritto dell’Unione 
europea, Giappichelli, Torino, 2014, p. 200 ff., arguing that in this 
case the Commission would be responsible for a “sviamento di 
potere” (détournement de pouvoir, more or less corresponding to a 
‘misuse of power’).
72 See P. Ponzano, C. Hermanin, D. Corona, The Power 
of Initiative of the European Commission: A Progressive Erosion?, 
Notre Europe, no. 89, 2012, p. 39, which also cites the few cases in 
which the Commission exercised this power for political reasons 
(only 6 cases between 1977 and 1994).
73 For some casenotes, see S. Peers, ‘The Commission’s 
power of initiative: the CJEU sets important constraints’, at http://
eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2015/04/the-commissions-power-of-
initiative.html, 14 April 2015; P.J. Kuiper, ‘Commission’s right 
of withdrawal of proposals: Curtailment of the Commission’s 
Right or Acceptance by the Court of the Commission’s long-
standing position?’, at http://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/06/01/
commissions-right-of-withdrawal-of- proposals-curtailment- of-
the- commissions-right- or-acceptance- by-the- court-of-the-
commissions- long-standing- position/, 1 June 2015; N. Lupo, 
‘Un conflitto tra Consiglio e Commissione: il diritto di iniziativa 
that the Commission must state to the Parliament 
and the Council “the grounds for withdrawal” and 
that an action of annulment against this decision 
may be brought before the same Court of Justice, 
or in order to verify whether the decision has been 
supported by cogent evidence or arguments.
This judicial review of the act of withdrawal was 
exercised and positively concluded in the case at 
hand, relating to a proposal for a regulation laying 
down general provisions for macro-financial 
assistance to third countries. The Court held 
that the grounds for withdrawal were sufficiently 
brought to the attention of the Parliament and the 
Council and that they were capable of justifying 
the withdrawal. Indeed, the Court agreed with the 
Commission that the amendments the Parliament 
and the Council were planning to make, requiring 
the use of ordinary legislative procedure instead 
of an implementing act for granting macro-
financial assistance, would have prevented the 
achievement of the objectives pursued by the 
legislative proposal – which aimed precisely to set 
a framework regulation to accelerate the decision-
making on the matter at hand – and therefore 
deprived it of its raison d’être. 
Furthermore, the Court analysed somewhat in 
depth the legislative process as it had developed, 
and more specifically the outcomes of the 
‘tripartite meetings’ (better known as ‘trilogues’).74 
It concluded that in that case the Commission did 
not infringe the principle of sincere cooperation, 
as it had even pre-announced its intention to 
withdraw the proposal if the Council and the 
Parliament did not find an agreement on a 
different option.
legislativa della Commissione include il potere di ritiro, ma non e ̀ 
privo di limiti’, in Quaderni costituzionali, 2015, n. 3, p. 792 ff.; and 
S. Ninatti, ‘Un conflitto tra Consiglio e Commissione: la conferma 
del ruolo della Corte come arbitro dell’equilibrio istituzionale nella 
forma di governo dell’Unione’, ivi, p. 795 ff.  
74 On ‘trilogues’ see, among others, O. Costa, R. Dehousse, 
A. Trakalová, Codecision and “early agreements”: An improvement 
or a subversion of the legislative procedure?, in Notre Europe, no. 
84, 2011; G. Rugge, ‘Il ruolo dei triloghi nel processo legislativo 
dell’UE’, in Il diritto dell’Unione europea, 2015, n. 4, p. 810 ff.; R. 
Corbett, F. Jacobs, D. Neville, The European Parliament, 9th ed., 
London, Harper, 2016, p. 284 ff.
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5. Conclusion: towards a 
parliamentarisation of the 
power of withdrawal
In synthesis, on the one hand, the Court of Justice 
recognized the power to withdraw, founding its 
“constitutional basis”75 in Article 17, para. 2, TEU, 
“read in conjunction with” Articles 289 and 293 
TFEU. This means that this power, unlike the 
basis invoked by the Commission in the act at 
stake (which only referred to Article 293, para 2, 
TFEU), but in conformity with the interpretation 
adopted by the Advocate General, is seen as a 
natural corollary to the Commission’s power of 
legislative initiative, rather than as an aspect of 
the power to amend its proposals. This approach 
seems correct, as the legal and political effects on 
the two institutions co-exercising the legislative 
function of the power to withdraw a legislative 
proposal are much more relevant than those 
deriving from one or more amendments proposed 
by the Commission. 
At the same time, on the other hand, the Court 
significantly limited the power to withdraw, 
arguing that it needs to be exercised in conformity 
with the principles of conferral of powers, 
institutional balance and sincere cooperation. 
Of course, it is up to the same Court, through 
the judicial review it thus introduced, to check 
whether these principles have been respected in 
each case, but without exercising an ex ante review 
of the merits of the legislative proposal that has 
been withdrawn.
In the follow-ups to the judgment in the new 
interinstitutional agreement on better law-making 
and in the new EP rules of procedure, an intent to 
‘proceduralise’ and above all to ‘parliamentarise’ 
the power of withdrawal is somewhat evident, 
formalising some elements which had partly 
already emerged in the institutional practice and 
repeating all the limits to this power as set by the 
Court of Justice. 
75 The expression “constitutional basis” is not used by 
the judgment, but appears in the opinion of Advocate General 
Jääskinen, delivered on 18 December 2014: points 36 and 52.
It is clear that the recognition of this power now 
offers the Commission a mighty weapon as it can 
be used throughout the legislative process (at least 
until the completion of the first reading, in respect 
of Art. 293, para 2, TFEU: “as long as the Council 
has not acted”) to impede any amendment the 
Commission does not like. However, it is a weapon 
that should be used loyally and avoiding surprises, 
if possible with its use announced in the annual 
programming procedures, whose interinstitutional 
character has been strongly underlined recently, in 
particular by the new interinstitutional agreement 
on better law-making.76 
The aim of this parliamentarisation is twofold. On 
the one hand, it allows both the Parliament and 
the Council to assess the political significance of a 
withdrawal, also in order to concentrate the debate 
on cases of major political importance. On the 
other hand, it makes sure that both the Parliament 
and the Council may exercise their legislative 
function without the unexpected risk that all the 
work already done – which normally tends to 
anticipate the formal steps of the first reading – 
can be nullified by a surprise and unmotivated 
withdrawal of a proposal by the Commission.
76  On the trend toward the diminishing role of the 
Commission as agenda-setter, see (also for further references on 
political science research) A. Kreppel-B. Oztas, ‘Leading the Band 
or Just Playing the Tune? Reassessing the Agenda-Setting Powers 
of the European Commission’, in Comparative Political Studies, 50 
(2017) 8, p. 1118 ff. 
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This article focuses on the role that performance 
audits by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) 
play in the scrutiny work of the European 
Parliament (EP). It looks at the use of special 
reports as a ‘scrutiny tool’, examining the role of 
the newly established European Parliamentary 
Research Service (EPRS) in dealing with the ECA 
reports in the legislative context. It considers the 
extent to which the audit of policy performance 
can provide insights into the effectiveness of 
programmes financed by the EU budget, and in 
so doing, help the co-legislator deliver improved 
regulation and better policy instruments. 
The article argues that ECA performance audits 
are a crucial input for EP oversight as part of a 
larger ‘toolbox’ of informational resources.
77 Paul Stephenson is Assistant Professor at Maastricht 
University. He was a Marie Curie Research Fellow at Sciences Po, 
Paris, where he conducted the project APPLAUD (Accountability 
in Public Policy Audit), which examined the institutionalisation of 
financial accountability mechanisms in the EU with a particular 
focus on the creation and evolution of the European Court of 
Auditors. He is the founder of the interdisciplinary research 
network EUFINACCO (Financial Accountability in the EU 
/ https://eufinacco.wordpress.com/), which brings together 
researchers taking a range of institutional, policy and conceptual 
perspectives on questions concerning the financial accountability 
of the EU budget.
1. Introduction: the EP’s 
capacity for oversight and 
scrutiny
Legislative scrutiny of public spending is a vital 
mechanism for holding the executive to account. 
A recent report by the Association of Chartered 
Certified Accounts (ACCA) has stressed that 
legislatures must improve their performance if 
scrutiny is to keep up with budget and accounting 
reforms, and with other financial developments.78 
In the wake of the financial crisis, parliamentary 
scrutiny processes have been slow to evolve. 
Systematic evaluation and monitoring is essential 
but they depend on input and own resources. 
Parliamentary oversight has been conceptualized 
as “legislative supervision and monitoring of the 
decisions and actions of executive agents.”79 80 
The ability of European parliamentarians (MEPs) 
to probe the executives of the Commission and 
Member States on issues pertaining to budgetary 
implementation rests on the parliament’s capacity 
to provide sufficient insight into how money is 
spent. Budget processes and policy programmes 
are complex, presenting a barrier to engagement 
by MEPs. The task of budgetary control is 
complicated by the fact that committee members 
are required to have oversight of a range of policy 
areas – not just one, as most select committee 
members are – and as such they must cultivate 
and maintain expertise inside while drawing on 
external experts. Technical support is a crucial 
factor, as are the allocation of sufficient time for 
debate and access to appropriate support, resources 
and information, including high-quality analysis 
of policy performance by auditors, evaluators 
78 ACCA (Association of Chartered Certified Accountants), 
‘Parliamentary financial scrutiny in hard times,’ 2011. Available 
at: <http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-
technical/public-sector/tech-tp-pfs.pdf>.
79 N. Font and I. P. Durán, ‘The European Parliament 
oversight of EU agencies through written questions,’ Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 9, 2016, pp. 1349-1366, at p. 
1350.
80 M. D. McCubbins, R. Noll and B. Weingast, 
‘Administrative Procedures as instruments of political control,’ 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, No. 3, 1987, pp. 242-
279.
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and third parties. EP committees are supported 
by permanent secretariats, whose officials have 
“long held a prominent role in supporting MEPs 
in drafting parliamentary reports,”81 particularly 
committee chairmen, although their role over time 
has diminished. Some scholars have questioned 
whether technical staff are fundamentally engaged 
in technical work to assist “the smooth functioning 
of the policy process” or if their role might have a 
political dimension.82 
Since it is the EP’s role to scrutinize how the 
executive has implemented the EU budget, it must 
also scrutinize the evaluations conducted and 
commissioned by the executive. Part of this process 
may be to seek alternative evaluations in order to 
test or triangulate findings. This means turning 
to the work of third parties, initiating its own 
evaluations, and making use of the audits by the 
European Court of Auditors (ECA). As part of the 
ex-post scrutiny role, the EP’s Budgetary Control 
Committee (CONT) has traditionally looked at 
the audit findings of the EU’s external financial 
control body, though other EP committees now 
increasingly consider the ECA’s audit findings. 
Audit findings help “provide public confidence and 
certainty in the systems of governance and public 
spending,” but the findings themselves depend 
on reliable and trusted audit systems.83 SAIs are 
traditionally “the most effective legislative vehicle 
for scrutiny,”84 providing assurance of financial 
and regulatory compliance, but in recent years 
also paying greater attention to value-for-money 
examinations of expenditure, otherwise known 
as performance auditing. Performance audits 
of policies, programmes and other initiatives 
draw conclusions on effectiveness, efficiency 
and economy,  and make recommendations to 
executive bodies. Their conduct is normally 
81 T. Winzen, p. 28; C. Neuhold, ‘The “Legislative Backbone” 
keeping the institution upright? The role of European Parliament 
committees in the EU Policy-Making Process,’ European Integration 
Papers Online, Vol. 5, No. 10, 2001. 
82 T. Winzen, p. 28.
83 Ibid, p. 20.
84 Ibid, p. 20.
guided by the use of international standards (e.g. 
INTOSAI) within the auditing profession.
Broadly speaking, zooming out from the work of 
the ECA and EP, arriving at any notion of what 
the EU delivers (output legitimacy) itself depends 
on throughput legitimacy, i.e. on ensuring the EU 
institutions and their administrative machinery 
have effective governance processes and practices. 
Throughput is “based on the interactions – 
institutional and constructive – of all actors 
engaged in EU governance.”85 The quality of 
interaction and deliberation both matter. In 
this regard, throughput legitimacy relies on 
effective scrutiny and oversight of the audits and 
evaluations of budgetary spending by legislatures. 
In the same way, the throughput legitimacy of 
ex-post parliamentary scrutiny depends on 
the throughput legitimacy of auditing practice 
itself. Ultimately, there is a limit to the potential 
impact of audit reports if they are not taken up 
effectively by the legislature; audit only aids 
democratic accountability, it does not deliver it.86 
Thus, the potential for audit findings to be used in 
a way that can influence future law-making and 
programming depends on their quality, timeliness 
and relevance for MEPs.
2. The rise of performance 
auditing and ECA special 
reports 
As established in the previous section, 
performance auditing, in particular, can help 
scrutinizers in parliament by drawing attention to, 
and making value judgements on, policy outcomes 
in terms of the three ‘E’s: economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness. Performance auditing is less 
concerned with whether the sums add up but 
rather whether money has been spent effectively.87 
85 Schmidt 2013, p. 5.
86 A. Kanis, ‘Ex-Post Budgetary Oversight in Europe, 
European Court of Auditors Journal, No. 6, 2011, pp. 15-17.
87 P. Stephenson, ‘Reconciling Audit and Evaluation? The 
Shift to Performance and Effectiveness at the European Court of 
Auditors,’ European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2015, 
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It focuses on the additionality of EU policy and 
what has ultimately been delivered to the taxpayer. 
In this sense, it comes closer to the general notion 
of policy evaluation, given the focus on results, 
impact and effectiveness. As Mendez and Bachtler 
state,88 performance auditing has developed 
since the mid-1980s. It resembles evaluation in 
probing the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
programmes but is undertaken in a manner 
resembling auditing.89 Performance audits usually 
include evaluative elements of selected subjects 
and consider evaluation systems and information 
with a view to assessing their quality and, when 
they are considered to be satisfactory and relevant, 
use evaluation information as audit evidence. 
Being less dense than annual reports, special 
reports can make for “arresting reading.”90 
Special reports are not new. Since 1977 the ECA 
has produced “a myriad of special reports on 
policy programmes or financial procedures.”91 In 
its first 20 years, the ECA published 102 special 
reports and studies (1977-1996), followed by 112 
special reports in the following seven years alone 
(1997-2004) and 71 in the following five years 
(2005-2010). The ECA claims that special reports 
“provide a means to focus on specific topics 
reflecting a high-level of risk and public interest, 
in particular performance issues.”92 A House of 
Lords report (2001) found special reports to be of a 
“generally greater value than the Annual Reports,” 
pp. 79-89.
88 C. Mendez and J. Bachtler, ‘Administrative Reform and 
unintended consequences: an assessment of the EU cohesion 
policy “audit explosion”,’ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 18, 
No. 5, 2011, pp. 746-765.
89 M. Barzelay, ‘Central audit institutions and performance 
auditing: a comparative analysis of organizational strategies in the 
OECD,’ Governance, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1997, pp. 235–60.
90 D. O’Keefe, ‘The Court of Auditors’ in Institutional 
dynamics of European integration: essays in honour of Henry G. 
Schermers, vol. II, pp. 177-1994.
91 G. Karakatsanis and B. Laffan, ‘Financial Control: the 
Court of Auditors and OLAF’ in J. Peterson and M. Shackleton 
(Eds), The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford University 
Press, 2012, pp. 242-261.
92 European Court of Auditors, Gaps, overlaps and 
challenges: a landscape review of EU accountability and public audit 
arrangements, 2014, p. 7. Available at: <http://www.eca.europa.eu/
Lists/ECADocuments/LR14_01/QJ0214776ENC.pdf>.
while recognising variations in quality.93 Reports 
examined the effectiveness of internal programme 
expenditure (e.g. ERDF assistance, energy 
programmes, and fisheries), external expenditure 
(e.g. development aid, PHARE and TACIS, nuclear 
safety in the CEECs), customs union/revenue (e.g. 
risk analysis in customs control, protection of EC 
financial interests, assessment of VAT and GNP) 
and EU institutions (MEPs’ allowances, the added 
value of EU agencies).94
A 2012 report on the future role of the ECA 
conducted by international peer reviewers, refers 
to the EP’s Budgetary Control Committee (CONT) 
belief - which arguably still stands - that the ECA is 
in a pre-eminent position to provide the legislator 
with valuable opinions on the results achieved 
by the Union’s policies in order to improve the 
performance and cost-efficiency of the delivery 
mechanisms for of Union-financed activities, 
identify economies of scale and scope, spillover 
effects among national policies of Member States, 
and provide Parliament with external assessments 
of the Commission’s evaluation of public finances 
in the Member States.95
The case for a greater focus on special reports 
persists among many in the ECA’s management. 
As Klaus-Heiner Lehne, the recently appointed 
president of the ECA, then German member of 
the ECA, and former MEP in the Committee on 
Legal Affairs, asserted in 2014,96
  “Politicians need to know specifically what 
has gone wrong and where; the Court 
of Auditors does not provide enough 
information on this. On the political side, 
be it at the Commission, the Parliament 
93  G. Karakatsanis and B. Laffan, p. 249.
94 B. Laffan, ‘Auditing and accountability in the European 
Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 10, No. 5, p. 772.
95 European Parliament, Report of 9 January 2014 on the 
future role of the Court of Auditors (2012/2064 (INI)). Available 
at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//
EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2014-0014+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>.
96 Interview with Klaus-Heiner Lehne in the European 
Court of Auditors Journal, May 2014. Available at: <http://www.eca.
europa.eu/en/Pages/Journal.aspx>.
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or the Council, it is extremely difficult 
to do anything sensible just with error 
rates. On the other hand, it is very helpful 
that special reports deal with substantive 
issues, draw substantive conclusions and 
put forward solutions.”
The fact that the ECA increasingly makes value 
judgements in its special reports, and therefore in 
its policy recommendations (largely aimed at the 
Commission), creates a tension in so far as the 
ECA is expressing how policy fared. The ECA has 
traditionally been the (supposedly) apolitical agent 
of the EP, itself a political and directly elected body. 
Moreover, the fact that the EP has sought external 
assessments of the Commission’s own evaluations 
implies not only that performance auditing is 
being carried out to ‘evaluate evaluations,’ but that 
the EP is endorsing the ‘meta-auditing’ of the work 
of the executives responsible for implementation 
at both the supranational and national levels. 
3. The EP’s CONT committee 
and its use of ECA special 
reports
EU legislators and policy-makers are subject to 
fast-paced change in the external environment 
and the demands of social media. The legislature 
is under pressure to react more quickly, to 
deliver value judgements and opinions and to 
provide sound evidence-based insights into 
policy performance. The EP has never had much 
capacity for ex-post programme evaluation and 
scrutiny, relying largely on CONT for oversight. 
Today CONT retains its prerogative to be 
consulted first in EP-ECA consultation since it is 
the main committee responsible for the discharge 
procedure. In practice, this has meant dependence 
over time on the commitment of individual 
MEPs and rapporteurs, input from the library, 
and the ad hoc work of research staff within the 
parliamentary DGs and committee secretariats. 
CONT takes a retrospective perspective, while 
standing (also known as sectoral, specialised or 
spending) committees look forwards, tending 
to largely overlook questions regarding ex-post 
evaluation. 
Arguably, there is a tension within the institutional 
machinery of the EP when it comes to budgetary 
scrutiny ex post. First, as co-legislator the EP 
decides upon new laws, which provide the legal 
basis for policies/programmes to be financed; 
then, a few years down the line, it engages in 
scrutinising the effectiveness of these very 
policies/programmes, drawing on the findings 
of audits on budgetary spending and ex-post 
evaluations The EP holds the Commission to 
account for implementing legislation and policies, 
but does it – and can it – hold itself to account? 
Is it able to conclude objectively whether its laws 
have been effective policy instruments? There 
is arguably a role conflict given that the EP acts 
both as a (political, biased) decision-maker and 
as a (supposedly objective, unbiased) overseer of 
policy performance. MEPs both legislate (before 
spending) and scrutinise (after spending), and 
make judgements on the value of the results and 
impacts of the policies that have emerged from 
legislation. However, MEPs are not objective 
evaluators; they are biased politically-driven 
actors who may use ex-post evaluation to advance 
their political agendas and interests, often for 
short-term goals, including re-election.
Second, most of the EP’s committee machinery, 
with its forward-looking perspective, is engaged 
in tasks relevant to the agenda-setting, policy 
formulation and decision-making stages of the 
policy process, whereas CONT has traditionally 
been the sole committee explicitly working to 
examine implemented policy and engage in some 
sort of ex-post evaluation. In short, CONT’s 
motives and rationale are markedly different to 
those of standing committees committees. Like 
other committees, it works on the basis of a 
committee chair and rapporteur and comprises 
MEPs with relevant policy expertise or who have 
expressed an interest in committee membership. 
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The strength of the committee has arguably been 
dependent on the personality and drive of the 
chair and on the commitment of its rapporteur 
to gather information on behalf of its members 
and invite external experts and speakers to its 
meetings, including public hearings. 
But what of the motives of the standing committees? 
Why have they become more interested in the 
ECA’s work? The Juncker Commission’s priority 
was to have fewer legislative proposals, which has 
arguably encouraged much of the EP to develop 
a greater interest in policy implementation and 
evaluation.
A recent report by CONT on the future role of the 
ECA – the Sender report of 2014 – noted that the 
ECA’s mandate provides for significant flexibility 
to allow the Court to carry out its mission beyond 
the scope of the SOA (the statement of assurance 
produced in financial and compliance auditing, 
long referred to as the DAS, a French acronym, is 
the ECA’s opinion on EU finances, as established 
at Maastricht as part of a package of reforms of 
the EU institutions, and first used for the financial 
year 1994, now in Article 287 TFEU). It stated 
that the results of its performance audits in special 
reports “provide a significant opportunity to add 
value by focusing on and investigating high-risk 
areas.” In addition, it asserted that special reports 
“provide information to European citizens on 
the functioning of the Union and the use of 
European funds in many sectors, helping to bring 
Europe closer to its citizens and to make it more 
transparent and easier to understand.”97 98
97 European Parliament 2014. Report of 9 January 2014 
on the future role of the Court of Auditors. The procedure on 
the appointment of Court of Auditors’ Members: European 
Parliament consultation (2012/2064(INI)).’ See the section ‘The 
Court’s new dimensions and challenges’, note 10). Available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+REPORT+A7-2014-0014+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> 
98 The 2014 report followed the 2012 public hearing of the 
Committee on Budgetary Control. The proceedings were entitled 
‘Future role of the European Court of Auditors: Challenges ahead 
and possible reform.’ Rapporteur: Inés Ayala Sender. 30 May 2012.
4. The emerging role of the 
EPRS: helping auditing feed 
audits into scrutiny
Being wary of relying too heavily on Commission 
evaluations, the EP has sought to streamline its own 
processes and develop its own evaluation capacity. 
The creation of the European Parliamentary 
Research Service (EPRS) appears to be a major 
milestone in this process even if it has resulted in 
a power play with other DGs inside the EP. The 
2011 Niebler report called for the establishment 
of an integrated impact assessment process within 
the EP in support of parliamentary committees.99 
The report invited the EU institutions to adopt 
a holistic approach to impact assessment 
“throughout the whole policy cycle, from design 
to implementation, enforcement, evaluation and 
to the revision of legislation” (point 2), stressing 
a need to “evaluate more accurately whether the 
objectives of a law have actually been achieved 
and whether a legal act should be amended or 
retained” (point 25). A service was set up in 
January 2012 within the EP’s own administration 
with the focus initially on ex-ante impact 
assessment. In November 2013 the service became 
part of the newly created Directorate General for 
Parliamentary Research Services and broadened 
its remit to ex-post evaluation. The importance 
of both ex-ante and ex-post impact assessment 
for evidence-based policy-making in the context 
of better law-making was subsequently reiterated 
in the EP’s 2016 resolution on the state of play of 
REFIT and the outlook for it.100
To assist in digesting and processing the audit 
reports, MEPs can now turn not only to the research 
99 European Parliament Report of 18 April 2011 on 
guaranteeing independent impact assessments (2010/2016(INI)), 
Committee on Legal Affairs, Rapporteur: Angelika Niebler. 
Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0159&language=EN>  
100 European Parliament, Report of 24 June 2015 on 
Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT): State 
of Play and Outlook (2014/2150 (INI)). Available at: <http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+REPORT+A8-2015-0208+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN/>.
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services within the parliament’s directorate-
generals but also to the EPRS. The service provides 
added value by studying ECA special reports 
in depth to extract the essential information 
and then providing a legal context to the audit 
through an overview of the committee’s working 
documents, draft reports and EP resolutions that 
emerged both before and after the publication 
of the ECA special report. This provides a huge 
amount of policy-relevant information for MEPs 
and committees, who can better understand 
where the ECA’s findings come from, and check 
whether the criticisms and shortcomings have 
been sufficiently taken up by the legislature, and 
also monitor how the Commission has responded 
to ECA recommendations. This closer and more 
effective monitoring of the ECA provides valuable 
insight for parliamentary scrutiny.
How does this work? The EPRS regularly compiles 
and issues comprehensive ‘rolling checklists’ of 
what it refers to as “important, but otherwise 
largely inaccessible, material relating to various 
aspects of the EU law-making and policy 
cycles.”101 Cumulatively, these seven checklists 
already amount to about a thousand pages of, 
often interactive, text. As far as policy evaluation 
is specifically concerned, it monitors ex-post 
evaluation exercises in the European Commission 
and the ECA special reports, which have steadily 
grown in number from 15 to 25-35 a year. 
Although the special reports are easily retrievable 
from the ECA website, committee MEPs now 
receive relevant special reports directly by email 
via the ECA’s stakeholder management system. 
The rolling checklist of ECA special reports 
published in March 2016102 provides essential 
insight into 24 special reports from December 2014 
to March 2016 with “recent findings.” The reports 
are sorted into 12 policy categories. As an example, 
101 European Parliament, ‘EPRS Scrutiny Toolbox’, European 
Parliamentary Research Service Blog, 2017. Available at: https://
epthinktank.eu/scrutiny-toolbox/.
102 Ibid.
let us take a recent special report on ‘EuropeAid’s 
evaluation and results-oriented monitoring 
systems.’103 First, the checklist provides a report 
number, title and date, including a hyperlink to the 
full report and to the summary. It then explicitly 
states the questions asked by the auditors and the 
observations and recommendations made by the 
ECA. Thereafter, in the following row of the table, 
the EPRS provides a direct link to the CONT 
working document of the meeting (30 March 
2015) held soon after publication of the special 
report, and lists the specific recommendations 
of the committee rapporteur. Next, it provides a 
link to related EP reports and resolutions by other 
committees, in this case a DEVE draft report 
(March 2016) awaiting committee decision. It 
also provides direct hyperlinks to, and summaries 
of, ten EP resolutions relevant to the subject of 
the special report, dating from April 2012 to 
October 2015 (two months before publication of 
the report). For each resolution, the legal base 
(individual legislation and relevant decisions) is 
clearly stated. Finally, it provides direct links to 19 
oral and written questions from MEPs, indicating 
the rule number, name, political group affiliation 
and question subject matter. The questions cover a 
seven-year period from 2009 to 2016.
Looking more closely at the CONT committee 
hearing following the ECA report, the rolling 
checklist details the rapporteur’s recommendations 
word for word.104 In its scrutiny, the committee 
can then draw attention to the inadequacies of 
evaluation at the programme level. The committee 
shares the ECA’s concerns over the ‘insufficient 
reliability’ of EuropeAid’s evaluation systems, 
supervision and monitoring activities (1-2). It 
points out that “it is indispensable to provide 
Parliament and the budgetary authority with a 
clear view of the real extent to which the Union’s 
103 European Court of Auditors, Special Report No 18/2014: 
Europe Aid’s evaluation and results-oriented monitoring system, 
11 December 2014. Available at: <http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/
Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=30363>.
104  European Parliament, ‘EPRS Scrutiny Toolbox’.
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main objectives have been achieved” and asserts 
that “feedback on the performance of Commission 
aid projects and programmes should be provided 
as part of the Commission’s commitment to 
quality assurance” (3-4). Furthermore, it considers 
that “outcomes of the evaluations are key elements 
to feed into policy and political review” (5). It 
considers that “the sharing of knowledge by 
all means and tools is crucial for developing a 
culture of evaluation and an effective culture of 
performance” (6). Finally, it supports the ECA’s 
recommendations with regard to Europe Aid’s 
evaluation and results-oriented monitoring 
systems. In a word, by extracting from the 
CONT committee minutes, the rolling checklist 
documents describe step-by-step how the EP has 
formally considered the findings of the ECA and 
subsequently endorsed its position.
The wealth of data provided in the interactive 
rolling checklists constitutes a valuable resource 
and should improve the work of MEPs in their 
scrutiny function. As a consequence, this suggests 
the need to reconsider and recalibrate how the EP 
manages and uses effectively the findings from 
external financial control work that departs from 
- i.e. doesn’t look like - traditional audit activity.
Arguably, the more oversight provided by the 
EPRS, the more empowered the committees, the 
better the quality of deliberation, and potentially, 
the more effective the follow-up, including 
communication with standing (legislative) and 
drafting committees. Encouraging more reflexive 
governance means more thorough and close-
up scrutiny of past policies with a view to better 
future policy programming.
5. Towards EP scrutiny 
beyond the CONT committee?
If we consider the institutional machinery for 
scrutiny in the EP, then there has been a clear 
case of path dependency – and lock-in – since 
the establishment of CONT in the late 1970s. It 
has remained the single formalised venue for 
scrutiny, and held the de facto monopoly on 
oversight within the committee system. This is not 
to suggest that the standing committees do not 
read and discuss audits and reports on spending 
in their policy domain; nonetheless, their formal 
role has not been to monitor and gauge the results 
of spending. The ECA president has traditionally 
presented the annual report to CONT, while a 
member of the ECA, from one of the five audit 
chambers, presents each special report. As a 
result, the ECA has arguably had a rather narrow 
and predictable audience for its work, which 
might to some extent explain the perception by 
some stakeholders, including MEPs, of the limited 
relevance and impact of its work. That said, the 
Commission generally perceives the ECA’s work 
to have a high impact, as evidenced by the fact that 
it takes on board 80% of recommendations.
ACCA recognises standing committees as the 
‘engine rooms’ of parliaments and important 
fora for holding governments to account.105 
Nonetheless, it recognises a greater need for 
the training and professional development of 
parliamentarians to “promote a culture of financial 
awareness and to empower politicians to ask more 
searching questions on financial matters,” which 
requires high-quality accounting information and 
“effective independent audit.”106 The ECA has been 
seeking to establish direct relations with standing 
committees in recent months. It has now had 
direct audiences with 12-13 standing committees 
For example, by presenting an ECA special report 
on the effectiveness of the EU budget in paying for 
rail freight infrastructure directly to the transport 
committee, it has sought to encourage greater 
interest in its work among parliamentarians. Such 
a strategy should ultimately empower the standing 
committees and provide greater information of 
relevance to policy-making. If the EP as a whole 
has more insight into the success and failure of 
past policies (and the legislation from which 
they emanated), then arguably it should make 
more informed decisions about future policy, and 
perhaps even design more effective legislation, 
105  Ibid, p. 1.
106  Ibid.
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recognising that legislation is the policy 
instrument that provides the fundamental legal 
basis for policies and programmes financed by the 
EU budget.
In the past, the CONT committee has expressed 
frustration about the quantity of reports and its 
ability to process the findings, and hence a need for 
more concise and better-written audit reports. The 
issue is today one of quality rather than quantity; 
where once it wanted fewer reports, today it wants 
more, but delivered in a timely manner and with 
greater foresight as to the special reports to come. 
This perhaps also provides further justification for 
scrutiny to be mainstreamed across committees. 
CONT has in the past suggested topics for ECA 
audits, quite logically in areas of most (political) 
interest to the EP. The ECA continues to make 
clear its independence as an official EU institution 
but in so doing it must strike a balance between 
appearing receptive and responsive to EP interests 
while maintaining control over its priorities and 
internal decision-making over the selection of 
audit topics. As such, the ECA actively approaches 
the Committee of Committee Chairs (CCC) for a 
list of suggestions.
6. Conclusion
Closer attention paid to the conclusions and 
recommendations of ECA special reports, which 
address the performance of programmes, projects 
and initiatives paid for by the EU budget, should 
lead to more effective scrutiny. Likewise, a better 
understanding of policy, particularly the dynamics 
of implementation, gained through specific 
insights into the successes and shortcomings of 
spending programmes at street level, should better 
enable MEPs to reconsider the design of legislation 
as a policy instrument. Auditing and evaluation 
that place greater specific emphasis on the (lack 
of) achievement of policy objectives and questions 
of effectiveness might encourage decision-makers 
– through scrutiny and oversight of past spending 
– to look forwards in order to legislate and design 
policy more effectively.
At the institutional level, the EPRS is increasingly 
playing a key role within in the EP in terms of 
stimulating learning: processing information, 
seeing what is relevant, distilling the main findings 
and ‘feeding’ them to committees or MEPs where 
appropriate. It is arguably contributing to more 
informed and transparent law-making, in line with 
the goals of the Better Regulation agenda. More 
precisely, the EPRS offers increased support to 
committees in their scrutiny work by monitoring 
and assessing a wealth of studies, reviews, reports 
and audits conducted by other EU institutions 
and policy stakeholders. These institutional 
developments imply that we should also not think 
of scrutiny as an event that takes place purely in 
the confines of the committee venue at a specific 
point in time, but rather as a continual process of 
monitoring and judging, made possible through 
the provision of high-quality information, i.e. 
the interpretation of policy-relevant data by a 
permanent corps of EP researchers. 
These institutional developments also raise the 
key question of whether or not ex-post evaluation 
risks becoming politicised. Why might this be so? 
First, because it is taking place inside a political 
institution; and second, because it is taking place 
for political actors. There is of course a risk of the 
politicization of evaluation since the EPRS was set 
up to serve the needs of the institution. We should 
remember that all scrutiny by MEPs is inherently 
political. As elected representatives of their 
constituents, they belong to domestic political 
parties and transnational political groupings 
within the EP, whose aim is to secure more seats. 
As such, oversight and scrutiny by MEPs can 
never be a technocratic exercise. Even if objective 
impartial evaluations, reviews, reports and 
audits are made available to CONT, the findings, 
including conclusions and recommendations, will 
ultimately be used to secure political objectives in 
the pursuit of obtaining and maintaining political 
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power. All ex-post evaluations conducted by 
objective external stakeholders have the potential 
to feed into the process of political deliberation, 
although MEPs will be likely to pick and choose 
the findings that support their political cause. 
However, the mixed political composition of 
committees should ensure a balance in the way 
that audits and evaluations are taken up in scrutiny 
work.
In short, there is arguably an ongoing tension 
between ECA special reports (largely ex post), 
Commission evaluations, and the EP’s own impact 
assessments (largely ex ante), when it comes to 
the evaluation/appraisal findings that influence 
the debate and determine the shape of legislation 
for future EU policies. The committees and MEPs 
might consult and use both. Ultimately, there are 
a series of institutional, political and technical/
professional agendas at play. Scrutiny can only be 
effective if the scrutinisers are well informed and 
can understand the policy and legal context.
Presented at the workshop Better Regulation: 
Scrutiny of EU Policies, 23-24 February 2017.
This article draws partially on the extended article: 
P. Stephenson, P. (2017) ‘Why better regulation 
demands better scrutiny of results: the European 
Parliament’s use of performance audits by the 
European Court of Auditors in ex-post impact 
assessment’,  European Journal of Law Reform, 
19(1), 97-120. The journal gives full permission 
for the reuse of the material.
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QUALITY OF EU 
LEGISLATION – THE 
ROLE OF NATIONAL 
PARLIAMENTS
 by Katrin Auel 
Ensuring the quality of legislation is clearly an 
important topic for national parliaments (NPs) in 
the EU, and one that they have focused on for at 
least two decades. As early as 1997, the Conference 
of Presidents of European Parliaments discussed 
the issue at its Helsinki meeting and agreed to set 
up a working group on the ‘Quality of Legislation.’ 
The working group also cooperated closely with the 
OECD on the first OECD report on ‘Parliamentary 
procedures and Relations’ presented at the 2000 
Conference of Speakers in Rome (OECD 2000). 
Although domestic legislation remains their 
main concern, NPs have also for a long time been 
involved in the scrutiny of EU legislation (Hefftler 
et al. 2015). Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, NPs only 
had the opportunity to influence and control EU 
politics through their governments, mainly by 
scrutinising EU documents and issuing – more 
or less binding – positions on them. However, 
the Lisbon Treaty changed their role somewhat 
fundamentally (Auel and Neuhold 2016), most 
importantly with the introduction of the Early 
Warning System (EWS)107 designating NPs as the 
guardians of the subsidiarity principle (Protocol 
no. 2 to the TEU and the TFEU, Jonsson Cornell 
and Goldoni 2016). From a purely institutional 
107 National parliaments can send a reasoned opinion within 
eight weeks of receipt of a legislative proposal if they consider the 
proposal to violate the principle of subsidiarity. These opinions 
are counted as votes – two per parliament, one per chamber in 
bicameral systems – and if certain thresholds are reached (one-
quarter of votes for freedom, security and justice proposals and 
one-third for all other proposals) the proposal must be reviewed 
(‘yellow card’). If a threshold of over 50 per cent of votes is reached, 
the so-called ‘orange card’ not only forces the Commission to 
review the proposal, but also allows the European Parliament or 
the Council, acting by defined majorities, to reject the proposal. 
point of view, the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, 
together with the already existing Political 
Dialogue108 (PD), give NPs a direct role in EU 
law-making and thus turn them into EU actors 
– in their own right and independently of their 
national governments. 
The aim of this paper is therefore to look at the 
specific role of NPs in, and contribution to, 
ensuring the quality of EU legislation, with a 
particular focus on pre- and post-legislative 
scrutiny of EU law. Given the broadness of the 
topic, and the scarcity of empirical data, the 
paper can only highlight a few issues. As will be 
shown, NPs are still in many ways marginalised, 
yet this marginalisation is a result of both a side-
lining of national parliaments by EU and domestic 
actors and a lack of parliamentary capacity and 
willingness to become more involved. 
The Commission’s Better 
Regulation Agenda and the 
Role of NPs
As mentioned above, the EWS turned NPs into 
genuine European actors: the EU institutions must 
send them their draft legislative acts and wait for 
incoming opinions, which are then weighed and 
counted as votes. As with the Political Dialogue, 
the Commission has promised not only to reply to 
all parliamentary opinions but also to take them 
into due consideration (Preising 2011). This role 
of NPs is also emphasised in the Commission 
Better Regulation Agenda (for an excellent 
overview and discussion, see Jančić 2015). In fact, 
the Commission tends to view the involvement of 
NPs as separate from stakeholder consultations, as 
suggested in the Commission’s ‘Better Regulation 
Guidelines’ (European Commission 2015a: 64), 
which explicitly mention that the term ‘stakeholder 
consultation’ does not apply to opinions from 
108 The Political Dialogue, introduced with the Barroso 
initiative in 2006, aims at establishing a dialogue between national 
parliaments and the European Commission early in the policy-
making process and is not, like the EWS, limited to aspects of 
subsidiarity (see Jančić 2012).
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national parliaments. NPs can take part in the 
consultations as ‘public authorities’ (European 
Commission 2015a: 74, 2015b: 22), and since 
2014 they receive automatic notifications of the 
launch of such consultations, but formally their 
role is only defined with regard to the control of 
the subsidiarity principle under the EWS. While 
stakeholders are invited to take part in public 
consultations during a 12-week period prior to the 
publication of a new proposal, the guidelines only 
refer to an opportunity for national parliaments to 
submit reasoned opinions “after the Commission 
proposal has been published” and explicitly in 
parallel with the stakeholder consultations on 
proposals (European Commission 2015c: 6, 
2015d: 5). Within REFIT (Regulatory Fitness 
and Performance Programme), the scheme was 
launched in 2012 with the aim of identifying policy 
areas with potential for regulatory simplification. 
The role of NPs is again defined as “playing a key 
role in checking that the subsidiarity principle is 
correctly applied” (European Commission 2012: 
11), yet NPs are neither mentioned in the “national 
dedicated networks” (Jančić 2015: 49) and nor are 
they included in the new REFIT Platform, which 
consists of stakeholder representatives (businesses, 
social partners and civil society organisations), 
representatives of the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions and Member State public officials 
(European Commission 2015e: 4). In other words, 
“virtually all interested actors from the public and 
private sectors – except NPs – are included in this 
element of the better regulation process” (Jančić 
2015: 49). 
It thus seems that the Commission sees the role 
of NPs within the EWS (and possibly the PD, 
although it is never explicitly mentioned) as the 
appropriate form of parliamentary input. Indeed, 
it can be argued that providing NPs with an 
exclusive consultation procedure reflects their 
role as elected and central democratic institutions 
of the Member States, which cannot be reduced 
to that of ‘simple’ stakeholders. At the same time, 
however, this also limits their involvement. The 
Early Warning System and the Political Dialogue 
only unfold once the Commission has published 
a proposal, thus providing an input opportunity 
only after the crucial stage of the development of 
a proposal. Moreover, while the Commission has 
pointed out that subsidiarity checks are important 
not only for new legislative drafts but also for 
fitness checks of existing legislation or non-
legislative documents (European Commission 
2015b: 21-22), the EWS only applies to legislative 
drafts. All other documents can only be responded 
to under the more informal PD, where NPs have 
an overall weaker role. 
Unsurprisingly, NPs have not been too happy 
about this. The House of Commons European 
Scrutiny Committee remarked in a recent 
report that it found it “disappointing” that the 
Commission’s draft Inter-Institutional Agreement 
on Better Regulation did “no more than ‘reiterate 
the role and responsibility of national Parliaments 
as laid down in the Treaties’” (House of Commons 
2015:13). Similarly, the 2014 Rome COSAC 
Contribution states that “COSAC supports 
the idea of ad hoc public consultations aimed 
at national Parliaments, including a dedicated 
section for national Parliaments’ replies in the 
European Commission’s summary report on 
the consultation. COSAC invites the European 
Commission to explore the possibility of creating 
such a dedicated section” (COSAC 2014). 
Moreover, as will be shown in the next section, 
NPs so far also consider neither EWS nor PD to be 
working in a satisfactory way.
Pre-Legislative Scrutiny of 
EU Law in Action
Unfortunately, very little comparative data on the 
involvement of NPs in pre-legislative scrutiny 
is available. A recent ECPRD seminar on ‘Pre- 
and Post Legislative Scrutiny’ (ECPRD 2016) 
indicated that about 25% of the responding NPs 
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conducted some type of pre-legislative assessment 
or evaluation, while in most parliaments the 
scrutiny process starts with the introduction of a 
bill. Similarly, an Oireachtas research paper states 
that “PLS [pre-legislative scrutiny] per se is not 
widely practised in other European parliaments” 
(Oireachtas 2014: 6). With regard to EU 
legislation,109 there is also no aggregate data on the 
participation of NPs in the Commission’s public 
consultations as ‘public authorities,’ and such data 
is also not readily accessible without a section on 
parliamentary contributions in the consultation 
reports. However, given that the Commission has 
repeatedly “encourage[d] national Parliaments 
to … participate more actively in public 
consultations” (European Commission 2014), 
they do not seem to make very active use of the 
instrument. 
Data generated in the context of the OPAL project 
for the period 2010 to 2012 (Auel et al. 2015) 
indicate that during the first few years after the 
coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty many 
NPs had already been fairly actively involved 
in the scrutiny of pre-legislative documents 
109 Existing databases such as IPEX make it difficult to 
search for aggregate data on NP scrutiny activities on specific types 
of EU documents, such as Commission White/Green Papers or 
Communications; documents have to be analysed individually.
such as Green/White papers or Commission 
Communications and Work Programmes (CWPs) 
(Figure 1; see also COSAC report 20110). The figure 
also shows, however, that most of them focused 
their scrutiny efforts on their own government; 
only a few NPs regularly sent PD opinions on 
pre-legislative documents to the European 
Commission. As the Presidency of the Conference 
of the Speakers of the EU Parliaments pointed out, 
“especially as regards the European Commission’s 
consultation documents, greater use should be 
made of political dialogue in the pre-legislative 
phase, when there is more potential to perform 
guidance functions” (EUSC 2015: 6).
Figure 1: Scrutiny of and PD Opinions Sent on 
Pre-Legislative Documents 2010 -2012
Source: OPAL data (Auel et al. 2015)
Regarding the EWS, we see a similar picture. Some 
national chambers have made very frequent use of 
the instrument, but overall participation varies 
(Cornell and Goldoni 2016; see Figure 2). 
110 The bi-annual reports of COSAC are available at: cosac.
eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac.
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Figure 2: Reasoned Opinions Submitted 2010 
to 06/2016
Source: Auel and Neuhold (2016)
The absolute frontrunner in the EWS is the 
Swedish Riksdag, followed by the French Senate 
and the two chambers of the Dutch Parliament, 
while other parliaments have been more reluctant 
in their use of the EWS. One reason may be 
disappointing experiences with the instruments. 
Indeed, national parliaments have so far issued 
only three ‘yellow cards,’111 which have all been 
ultimately unsuccessful.112 However, the EWS, 
111 These were: ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
exercise of the right to take collective action within the context 
of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services’ (‘Monti II’; COM/2012/130; 19 votes); ‘Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office’ (COM/2013/534; 19 votes); and ‘Proposal 
for a Council Directive concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services’ (COM/2016/128; 22 votes).
112 In the case of the Monti II regulation, the Commission 
subsequently withdrew the proposal but stated that a breach of 
the subsidiarity principle was not evident in the parliamentary 
opinions. Instead, the Commission explained, the proposal 
was withdrawn because it was “unlikely to gather the necessary 
political support within the European Parliament and the Council” 
(European Commission 2012b: 1). Regarding the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office and the Posting of Workers, the Commission 
decided to maintain the proposals without amendments despite 
the yellow card (European Commission 2013, 2016). 
and this is true for the PD as well, also does not 
seem to live up to the expectation of establishing 
a constructive and meaningful exchange of 
arguments between national parliaments and 
the Commission. A large number of parliaments 
have repeatedly criticised the fairly late, vague and 
generally inconsequential replies by the European 
Commission to both reasoned and Political 
Dialogue opinions (COSAC reports 18, 19, 20, 22, 
24, 26; see also Mastenbroek et al. 2014). As the 
most active parliament in the EWS, the Swedish 
Riksdag, pointed out, it was not clear to what 
extent “the Swedish Parliament’s objections to 
the application of the principle of subsidiarity are 
taken into account in legislation that is adopted” 
(COSAC report 20: 23). Thus, although they 
have a special role in (pre-)legislative scrutiny, 
parliaments feel that their input is usually ignored. 
This may also explain why they have not been 
more actively engaged in the Commission’s public 
consultation, where they only have an individual 
voice among many others. 
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Post Legislative Scrutiny: 
Transposition and Evaluation
NPs are in a somewhat stronger position when it 
comes to post-legislative scrutiny, as the related 
processes move from the European to the domestic 
level. Here, a distinction needs to be made 
between the implementation and the evaluation 
of EU legislation. While the former relates to the 
involvement of NPs in the transposition of EU 
legislation (directives) into domestic law, the latter 
concerns the assessment of EU legislation already 
in force. In the following, both will be discussed 
in turn.
Ensuring the Quality of EU 
Legislation During Transposition
Despite the fact that quality of legislation has been 
a concern for national parliaments for at least two 
decades, there is again little recent comparative data 
available, especially regarding EU legislation. A 
study commissioned by the EP (2001) provided an 
overview of ‘Regulatory Impact Analysis’ (RIA) in, 
inter alia, EU member states, and a comparative study 
by the Estonian Parliament in 2001 dealt with ‘Impact 
Assessment of Legislation for Parliaments and Civil 
Society’ (Riigikogu 2001). Both studies concluded 
“that the national Parliaments are not the competent 
institutions for performing [RIA]” (EP 2001: 5), which 
is primarily the task of the government, but that most 
parliaments were informed of the results of the RIA. 
In addition, all parliaments also take steps to verify 
the accuracy of the information supplied by the 
government, either by requesting further information 
or though more detailed evaluations by their own 
services or external experts (Riigikogu 2001: 94; see 
also OECD 2000: 7). However, the Riigikogu report 
remarked that “the use of socio-economic studies and 
RIA models in the parliamentary decision-making still 
remains a black box for many countries” (Riigikogu 
2001: 50), and this is especially true when it comes 
to EU legislation. As a result, the following can only 
present a fairly sketchy picture.
Regarding the transposition of EU legislation, a 
report on a recent ECPRD Seminar on ‘Pre- and 
Post- legislative scrutiny in and beyond parliament’ 
concluded that “[a]pparently parliaments do not 
distinguish specifically between purely ‘national’ bills 
and those which have their origin in EU law” (ECPRD 
2016: 2). Similarly, the most recent COSAC report (no 
27: 15f.) shows that the possibility for MPs to raise 
issues regarding the implementation of EU law either 
in committee or in the plenary was most common, 
followed by regular, often annual, reports on the state 
of play regarding the transposition of directives by the 
government. Other instruments, such as the possibility 
to compile own-initiative reports on implementation 
issues, hardly exist. This is also mirrored by an ECPRD 
enquiry in September 2016 into ‘Best practices on how 
to ensure the quality of legislation with specific regard to 
transposition, implementation and enforcement of EU 
law’ conducted by the Italian Senate (results published 
in European Parliament 2016a). The study, to which 
only 21 chambers (out of 41) replied, also revealed 
that most NPs treat the transposition of European 
legislation no differently to domestic legislation – and 
most stated that they relied on information provided by 
the government. Only a few NPs reported that they had 
established specific procedures for the transposition 
of EU directives. Overall, the EP therefore concluded 
“that transposing and implementing EU Law is not a 
real issue.” 
The question remains, however, of whether transposing 
and implementing EU law is not ‘a real issue’ because 
the process runs smoothly in most parliaments or 
rather because NPs are, in fact, hardly involved in 
the transposition of EU law at all. König et al. (2012: 
32-4) show that, with few exceptions, the share of 
EU directives transposed with formal parliamentary 
involvement between 1984 and 2010 hovered at 
around or even below 20 per cent in the EU-15 (Figure 
3), although the results varied considerably across 
individual EU policy fields. 
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Figure 3: Parliamentary Involvement in the 
Transposition of EU Directives Over Time
Source: König et al. (2012: 32)
A recent COSAC report (no 25) also indicated 
that things have not changed all that much since. 
COSAC has therefore put parliamentary scrutiny 
of the implementation of EU legislation on the 
agenda for the 2017 conference in Malta (COSAC 
2016). The relevant COSAC report (no 27) 
indeed revealed that slightly more than half of the 
responding chambers (16 out of 29) considered 
that NPs should have a greater role in monitoring 
the implementation and transposition of EU law. 
“Most parliaments/chambers wishing for a greater 
role in this matter, however, did not elaborate on 
what an increased role should look like, as such 
debates had not taken place yet.” (COSAC report 
27: 6)
Evaluation of Existing EU 
Legislation 
Finally, to what extent are NPs engaged in 
evaluating the quality of existing EU legislation? 
A recent OECD report (Arndt et al. 2015: 18) 
suggests that “[c[ontrary to ex ante impact 
assessment, most countries do not systematically 
conduct ex post assessments and are only starting 
to develop the methodology.” This is even more the 
case for NPs regarding the evaluation of existing 
EU legislation. According to the latest COSAC 
report (no 27: 14f.), 33 out of 37 responding 
chambers do not carry out any evaluation. The 
only chambers where evaluations do take place 
are the French Sénat, the Italian Senato della 
Repubblica, the Romanian Camera Deputaţilor 
and the Belgian Chambre des Représentants. In 
most NPs, involvement in the evaluation of EU 
legislation is therefore indirect. Around half of the 
chambers reported that they scrutinised, at least 
occasionally, their government’s position on the 
reports of the European Commission evaluating 
existing legislation. It is therefore perhaps not 
astonishing that many chambers also had no 
opinion regarding the level of detail provided 
by the Commission report. A number of NPs 
that do scrutinise them, however, are satisfied 
with the level of detail but would find additional 
information helpful. 
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We do, however, see an increasing engagement 
of NPs in the scrutiny of the Commission’s mid-
term reviews of, e.g. the Multiannual Financial 
Framework or Europe 2020 (COSAC report 20), 
and also scrutiny of CWP and REFIT proposals. 
Particularly the CWPs have recently become 
much more important means for NPs to plan 
their scrutiny activities more strategically. 
According to the latest COSAC report (no. 27), 
30 chambers had already discussed the CWPs and 
five intended to do so. In addition, the CWPs are 
not only regularly discussed at COSAC meetings, 
especially the meeting of COSAC’s Chairpersons 
at the beginning of the year, but they also serve 
to identify one or two subjects as the focus of 
COSAC’s activity for the coming year (for details, 
see Fasone and Fromage 2016: 300-1). 
Finally, further developments may increase 
parliamentary ex-post scrutiny and evaluation. In 
June 2014, the European Parliament launched an 
initiative to increase inter-parliamentary exchange 
of information on the implementation, application 
or effectiveness of EU law to support the EP in 
the preparation of ‘implementation appraisals’ 
or ‘European Implementation Assessments’ 
(European Parliament 2016b): 12). In Summer 
2016, the EP’s related Unified Repository Base on 
Implementation Studies (URBIS)113 went online. 
So far, however, the response by NPs has been 
somewhat lukewarm. COSAC welcomed the idea 
in at a meeting in Riga in June 2015, and NPs broadly 
expressed their willingness to share information in 
COSAC report 25. A number of NPs also pointed 
out that monitoring lies within the competence of 
the executive and/or the European Commission or 
that they were not dealing with the transposition 
or evaluation and/or had no information to share. 
Similarly, the contribution of NPs to URBIS has 
so far not been overwhelming, but there are some 
exceptions. Both French chambers, both UK 
chambers and the Italian Senate have been among 
the most active suppliers of documents. However, 
113  http://urbis.europarl.europa.eu
overall the parliamentary documents found on the 
website are a rather eclectic mixture of research 
or briefing papers on various EU-related topics 
and Committee reports on EU policy issues or 
legislative proposals – all published in the original 
language. 
Other more recent developments are the proposals 
for a ‘red’ and ‘green card.’ The so-called ‘red card’, 
intended to strengthen NPs’ position in the EWS, 
was originally proposed by the UK government in 
the context of its negotiations over EU reform and 
subsequently included in the European Council’s 
draft settlement with the UK (European Council 
2016). National parliaments would be able to 
submit (within 12 weeks) reasoned opinions 
regarding alleged violations of the subsidiarity 
principle. If these represent more than 55 per 
cent of national parliaments’ votes, these opinions 
would be “comprehensively discussed” in the 
Council. If the EU draft legislative proposal 
were then not changed in a way that reflects the 
concerns of national parliaments, the Council 
would have to discontinue the consideration of 
that draft. While the settlement with the UK has 
become moot following the British referendum 
and the triggering of Article 50 TEU, the ‘red card’ 
proposal still seems to be on the table (Rozenberg 
2017: 35). 
In addition, NPs have also recently pushed for the 
inclusion of a ‘green card’ in the PD which would 
allow parliaments to propose new legislative 
or non-legislative initiatives, or amendments 
to existing legislation (for the following, see 
Rozenberg 2017: 35-38). This not only receives 
strong support from NPs (COSAC reports 23, 24), 
but the EP has also signalled its backing of the 
proposal (European Parliament 2017: para 60) and 
the Commission has declared its general openness 
to the idea (European Commission 2017). A 
number of, albeit completely informal, ‘green cards’ 
have already been issued. The first, organised by 
the House of Lords in March 2014 on the topic of 
food waste, was followed by green cards organised 
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by the Latvian (revision of the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive) and the French Parliaments 
(EU corporate social responsibility). Although 
none of them have been very successful so far 
(Rozenberg 2017: 37), they do indicate that NPs 
are willing to take a more active role in EU law-
making. If properly institutionalised, it would 
not only provide NPs with an active and more 
constructive involvement in EU law-making, but 
could also encourage NPs to engage more actively 
in the assessment of existing EU legislation. 
Conclusion: NPs’ Marginal 
Role in Better Legislation – 
Inflicted or Homemade?
Despite the scarcity of empirical comparative data, 
the above indicates that pre- and post legislative 
scrutiny of both domestic and EU legislation has 
become an important topic for NPs over the last 
two decades, but that their actual involvement 
seems to trail behind. On the one hand, this 
seems to be due to a sidelining of NPs both at the 
domestic and at the EU level. As argued above, 
the role of NPs with regard to the European 
Commission’s Better Regulation policies remains 
somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, they are 
in a rather privileged position as the EWS and 
the PD respectively constitute institutionalised 
opportunities to voice their objection regarding 
a breach of the subsidiarity principle or general 
concerns regarding a legislative proposal. On 
the other hand, the Commission’s pre-legislative 
consultation scheme does not exclude NPs but 
it does tend to separate public consultation from 
parliamentary input through the EWS. However, 
the EWS limits parliamentary involvement to 
legislative proposals and thus does not apply to 
the drafting stage. Similarly, research has shown 
that the role of national parliaments in the 
transposition of EU directives remains, with few 
exceptions, fairly marginal. 
At the same time, however, NPs could also make 
more active use of the opportunities for pre- and 
ex-post legislative scrutiny available to them. NPs 
neither seem to participate very actively in the 
public consultations organised by the Commission 
and nor do they seem to fully exploit the 
opportunities provided by the PD for input during 
the drafting stage of EU legislation. Participation 
in this varies greatly, but many NPs seem to focus 
instead on well-established domestic scrutiny 
procedures when it comes to pre-legislative EU 
documents. As discussed, one of the reasons may 
be (mounting) frustration with the lack of (or 
unclear) impact of their input in the EU legislative 
process. However, regarding both pre- and ex-
post legislative scrutiny, and the evaluation of 
legislation in particular, parliamentary capacities 
play a role as well: compared to the executive, NPs 
often simply have neither the resources nor the 
infrastructure to conduct impact assessments or 
evaluations and thus have to rely on government 
information. 
To conclude, despite the stronger institutionalised 
role in EU legislation, NPs’ involvement in pre- 
and post-legislative scrutiny has not yet lived up 
to its full potential. For it to do so, NPs certainly 
have to make greater use of their opportunities 
for involvement at the EU level. However, in 
turn, the EU institutions, and the Commission 
in particular, also need to be willing to take NPs’ 
input into account. Otherwise, parliamentary 
involvement in EU legislation is little more than 
symbolic politics.  
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BETTER LAW-










Better law-making, as an institutional target 
addressed to all subjects involved in the 
composite EU decision-making process, is open 
to contributions from national parliaments (NPs). 
However, contrasting perspectives affect national 
parliaments’ involvement in better law-making 
processes, particularly in impact assessment (IA) 
procedures. Contrary to normative approaches, 
this paper aims to assess how national parliaments 
approach IA tools from a legal-constitutional 
point of view with reference to the EU decision-
making process and the type of functions they 
perform. IA procedures are framed in the 
relationship between national parliaments and the 
relevant executive(s). The engagement of national 
parliaments in IA is analysed by focusing on the 
three stages of the better law-making cycle: the 
pre-legislative stage that precedes the inception of 
the EU legislative procedure; the legislative stage, 
which takes place while EU legislative proposals 
are being negotiated; and the post-legislative 
stage that follows the enactment of EU pieces of 
legislation. 
Parliaments are neither councils of state or 
independent authorities or courts of auditors. The 
large variation in the willingness and capacity of 
national parliaments to engage in IA processes can 
hence be explained as a variable dependent on the 
more general variation in the standard scrutiny/
oversight relationship linking each parliament 
to the national government in EU affairs. Some 
common trends may, however, be highlighted. On 
the one hand, NPs mainly scrutinise governmental 
IA and are only occasionally able to develop 
their own IA analysis. IA processes therefore 
tend to highlight the role of NPs as scrutinisers/
gatekeepers rather than as agenda-setters/
decision-makers. 
On the other hand, NPs’ involvement in IA 
procedures produces differentiated outcomes at 
the national and at the European levels. At the 
national level, it is part of the scrutiny/oversight 
cycle linking the parliament to the national 
government in the ex-ante and ex-post stages 
related to the formation and implementation of EU 
law. At the European level, national parliaments’ 
involvement in IA functions both as a means of 
contributing to the Euro-national composite 
decision-making process and as an indirect 
tool for holding the EU institutions, including 
the Commission, accountable for the role they 
play in initiating, approving and implementing 
EU legislation. The call for enriched inter-
parliamentary and inter-institutional dialogue 
on IA thus leads to the presence of a strategic 
dimension in inter-parliamentary cooperation 
for future steps towards an ever more integrated 
better law-making process.  
* Senior Parliamentary Official of the Italian 
Senate and Adjunct Professor at Luiss Guido Carli 
University. 
The views and opinions expressed in the text are 
those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of any institution. 
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Summary
1. Better law-making in the EU: contrasting 
perspectives on the involvement of national 
parliaments in impact assessment processes. 2. 
How national parliaments relate to pre- and post-
legislative scrutiny: the conceptual framework. 3. 
The participation of national parliaments in the 
different stages of the better law-making cycle. 3.1. 
The pre-legislative stage. 3.2. The legislative stage. 
3.3. The post-legislative stage. 4. Conclusions. 
1. Better law-making in the 
EU: contrasting perspectives 
on the involvement of 
national parliaments in 
impact assessment processes
The integration of impact assessment (IA)114 in the 
decision-making process as a priority target of the 
EU better regulation agenda115 is often perceived 
as being subject to ‘executive dominance.’ Better 
regulation and IA have been central to the agenda 
of the EU Commission in Brussels since 1986, 
when the first methods for assessing the impact 
of EU regulations were launched under the UK 
Presidency.116 The Commission has played a major 
role in proceduralising and operationalising 
impact assessment requirements into the EU 
legislative cycle.117 Two factors contribute to 
explaining the Commission’s prominent place 
in ensuring better law-making targets: on the 
114 For the purposes of this Chapter, IA refers both to ex-
ante impact assessment and to ex-post evaluation processes, thus 
relating to the whole legislative cycle. On the definition of IA as a 
tool for better law-making, see the Interinstitutional Agreement on 
Better Law-Making (OJC 321, 31.12.2003, 12-18). 
115 On the initiatives undertaken over the past two decades 
at the EU level to improve the quality of regulation through ex-
ante IA, see A Renda, Impact Assessment in the EU. The State of the 
Art and the Art of the State (Brussels, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2006) 43 ff.
116 See European Commission, Enterprise Directorate-
General, ‘Business impact assessment pilot project. Final report - 
Lessons learned and the way forward’ (2002) 9 Enterprise Papers 
(http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/newsroom/cf/
itemdetail.cfm?item_id=2435&lang=en). 
117  See ACM Meuwese, Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking 
(The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 2008) 51 ff.
one hand, the Commission has a monopoly on 
initiating legislation,118 and on the other hand 
the integration of IA in decision-making is time-
consuming and technically demanding. 
However, further steps in the implementation 
of better law-making targets in the EU have 
increasingly featured inter-institutional 
cooperation. Since 1994, the European Council, 
the European Commission and the European 
Parliament have formally committed to better 
regulation standards through inter-institutional 
agreements or declarations.119 The Interinstitutional 
Agreement on Better Law-Making adopted on 13 
April 2016,120 which replaces a former agreement 
dating back to 16 December 2003,121 confirms this 
trend.122 
118 On IA as a tool instrumental to the exercise of the 
right of initiative of the Commission, see European Commission, 
‘Impact Assessment: Next Steps. In Support of Competitiveness 
and Sustainable Development’ (2004) SEC(2004)1377 Commission 
Staf Working Paper 3. In fact, art. 34 TEU, in the original version 
preceding the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, set no 
requirement or commitment on Member States to conduct IA 
on (ex) Third Pillar proposals, for which they shared the right of 
initiative with the Commission. See Meuwese, supra, at 4, 126. 
119 See the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 December 
1994 on an Accelerated Working Method for Official Codification 
of Legislative Text (OJC 102, 4.4.1996, 2–3), the Interinstitutional 
Agreement of 22 December 1998 on Common Guidelines for the 
Quality of Drafting Community Legislation (OJC 73, 17.3.1999, 
1–4), the Interinstitutional Agreement of 28 November 2001 on 
a More Structured Use of the Recasting Technique for Legal Acts 
(OJC 77, 28.3.2002, 1–3), the Joint Declaration of 13 June 2007 on 
Practical Arrangements for the Co-Decision Procedure (OJC 145, 
30.6.2007, 5–9) and the Joint Political Declaration of 27 October 
2011 on Explanatory Documents (OJC 369, 17.12.2011, 15–15). 
120 OJL 123, 12.5.2016, 1–14.
121 Supra at 1. 
122 These Agreements partially stand as a reaction to the 
EP’s plea for stronger interinstitutional dialogue in the better 
law-making processes. Further to the European Commission’s 
2001 White Paper on European Governance (the so-called 
‘Kaufmann Report’, COM(2001)727, 25 July 2001, the European 
Parliament issued a resolution - European Parliament, ‘Report 
on the Commission White Paper on European Governance’ (29 
November 2001) A5-0399/2001 (OJC 153E, 27.06.2002, 314-322) 
- to deplore the lack of cooperation between the Commission and 
the Parliament in defining the EU agenda for better regulation.  
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For all the institutional bodies involved in the 
legislative cycle to be formally committed to better 
law-making processes is not an exclusive pre-
requisite of the EU institutional architecture.123 
Experiences at the national level of improving 
the quality of legislation have similarly been 
conducted through inter-institutional agreements 
between legislative bodies and executives.124 What 
is particular to the EU legislative cycle is the 
composite nature of the decision-making process, 
which involves both EU and national institutions. 
On the one hand, EU institutions (the European 
Commission, the Council, the European 
Parliament), and on the other, Member State 
authorities (national governments represented in 
the Council of Ministers and national parliaments) 
contribute to legislative decisions.125 The 
polycentric nature of this system126 explains why 
national parliaments, although they lack direct 
decision-making authority over EU legislation, 
are a constitutionally relevant component of the 
law-making process.127 
123 The OECD ‘Recommendation of the Council on 
Regulatory Policy and Governance,’ adopted on 22 March 
2012 (http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/2012-
recommendation.htm) clearly recognises that “Ensuring the quality 
of the regulatory structure is a dynamic and permanent role of 
governments and parliaments” (ivi, 22). The Report on Regulatory 
Policy is drafted through consultation with both governmental and 
parliamentary institutions. 
124 In the UK, one of the political systems which has gained 
sound experience in ex-ante appraisal, IA has been institutionalised 
in pre-legislative scrutiny by means of UK draft bills presented to 
Parliament. See Renda, supra at 2, 26.
125 The EU decision-making process, growing out of 
the interaction between EU institutions and Member States, 
has been intensively studied in the literature, with somewhat 
divergent approaches. For an overview, see T König, ‘Divergence 
or convergence? From ever-growing to ever-slowing European 
legislative decision making’ (2007) 26 European Journal of 
Political Research 417-444. On the evolving nature of competing 
expectations regarding key aspects of this composite political 
system, see R Thomson, Resolving Controversy in the European 
Union: Legislative Decision-Making Before and After Enlargement 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
126 On the absence of a single ‘legislator’ and the presence 
of many co-actors as a particular feature of the EU regulatory 
authority compared to national constitutional systems, see EMH 
Hirsch Ballin and LAJ Senden, Co-Actorship in the Development of 
European Law-Making (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2005).
127 In contrast to the paradigm of ‘multilevel 
In this framework, a question arises regarding 
the role that national parliaments are expected 
to play in ensuring better law-making standards, 
including the working out of IA processes. The 
Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 
on Better Law-Making explicitly recognises the 
role and responsibility of national parliaments 
in EU decision-making, as laid down in Protocol 
No. 1 and Protocol No. 2 annexed to the Treaty 
of Lisbon.128 In addition, jointly with the EP 
and with the Council, national parliaments are 
included among the privileged addressees of IA 
results delivered by the Commission.129 However, 
it is difficult to approach the issue from a factual 
point of view. If national parliaments are clearly 
perceived as essential players in the better law-
making cycle, problems arise when it comes 
to proceduralising and implementing their 
participation in IA processes. 
There are two contrasting perspectives regarding 
the involvement of national parliaments in IA 
processes. One is grounded on a normative 
approach; the other on an empirical one. From 
a normative viewpoint, the participation of 
national parliaments in IA is often perceived as 
an added value in that it adds higher input and 
output legitimacy to EU policy-making.130 Input 
constitutionalism,’ which on the whole suggested a relative 
separateness between the European and the national levels, under 
the ‘polycentric’ paradigm the EU and national institutions are 
viewed as forming part of one constitutional order; see L. Besselink, 
‘National Parliaments in the EU’s Composite Constitution: A Plea 
for a Shift in Paradigm,’ in P. Kiiver (ed), National and Regional 
Parliaments in the European Constitutional Order (Groningen, 
Europa Law Publishing, 2006) 117-131. A similar approach is 
implied in the conception of the ‘Euro-national parliamentary 
system’ by N Lupo and A Manzella, Il sistema parlamentare 
euro-nazionale (Torino, Giappichelli, 2014). For a theorisation of 
the representative dimension in the EU in terms of a ‘multilevel 
parliamentary field,’ see B Crum and JE Fossum, ‘The Multilevel 
Parliamentary Field: a framework for theorizing representative 
democracy in the EU’ (2009) 1 European Political Science Review 
249 ff. 
128 Supra at 1, premise No. 4.
129 Supra at 1, par. 13. 
130 On the connection with the additional dimension 
of ‘throughput’ legitimacy, theorised in terms of “efficiency, 
accountability, transparency and openness to consultation with the 
people of the EU’s internal governance processes,” see V Schmidt, 
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legitimacy arguments can see the involvement of 
national parliaments as a way to secure increased 
democratic participation.131 The output legitimacy 
discourse can instead highlight the positive 
outcomes of engagement by national parliaments 
in IA, resulting in Member States complying with 
policy outputs and effectively implementing legal 
measures.132 In principle, parliamentary access to 
information on the consequences of legislation 
on social, economic and environmental issues 
is seen as a prerequisite for effective democratic 
accountability.133 
On the other hand, from an empirical 
viewpoint, three sets of reasons stand against the 
proceduralisation of the engagement of national 
parliaments in IA. On purely legal grounds, 
national parliaments are not formally eligible for 
involvement in better law-making mechanisms. 
Moreover, circumstantial evidence indicates that 
as a core instrument for better law-making IAs are 
structured to be implemented by governments, 
not by parliaments. A number of arguments 
relating to political, resource, organisation and 
time constraints faced by parliaments seem to 
demonstrate that representative assemblies may 
lack the political motivation, technical capacity, 
organisational arrangements and time availability 
to engage in exhaustive IA (especially in the ex-ante 
‘Dealing with Europe’s other deficit’ (2012) 19 Public Policy 
Research 108.
131 See P Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy. Reconciling 
Europe and the Nation-State (Oxford, OUP, 2010) and S Micossi, 
‘Democracy in the European Union’ (2008) 286 CEPS Working 
Document 7 (www.ceps.eu).
132 On the ‘legitimacy through subsidiarity’ argument, 
claiming that national Parliaments can contribute to making EU 
policy-making fully compliant with input and output legitimacy 
standards, see K Boronska-Hryniewiecka, ‘Legitimacy through 
Subsidiarity? The Parliamentary Control of EU Policy-making’ 
(2013) 1 Polish Political Science Review 84-99.
133 This point was raised in the so-called ‘Doorn Report’ on 
IAs (European Parliament, ‘Report on Assessment of the Impact of 
Community Legislation and the Consultation Procedures’ (2004) 
2003/2079(INI) 5 and it specifically refers to the position of the 
European Parliament. However, due to the composite nature of EU 
constitutional architecture, a similar instance can be referred to the 
position of national parliaments. 
stage).134 Lastly, regarding dimensional concerns, 
it could be argued that in EU decision-making the 
role of NPs is marginal (as these institutions are 
not able to exercise a binding force) and limited (as 
each parliament is only able to cover the domestic 
sphere of action).135 The involvement of national 
parliaments in IA should therefore turn out to be a 
somewhat limited and partial means of supporting 
the enhancement of higher law-making standards.
Each of these three empirical sets of objections 
to national parliaments engaging in IA finds a 
corresponding counter-argument. Against the 
legal objection, it has been claimed that the legal 
basis for including national parliaments in better 
law-making mechanisms already exists in the 
Treaties and is to be found in the Protocols annexed 
to the Treaty of Lisbon pertaining to the role of 
national parliaments in the EU.136 Contrary to the 
factual argument that representative assemblies are 
inadequate to serve better law-making enforcing 
134 Before the European Parliament started developing 
its own IA expertise, no existing impact assessment system 
had been sufficiently tested in any national assembly. For a long 
time, parliaments therefore lacked concrete reference models for 
engaging in IA processes. See Renda, supra at 2. 
135 C Neuhold and J Smith, ‘Conclusion’, in C Hefftler, C 
Neuhold, O Rozenberg and J Smith (eds), The Palgrave Handbook 
of National Parliaments and the European Union (London, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015) 668 ff. Moreover, not all national parliaments 
have been able to fully exploit their participative opportunities 
in EU affairs. See O Höing, ‘Differentiation of Parliamentary 
Powers. The German Constitutional Court and the German 
Bundestag within the Financial Crisis,’ in M Cartabia, N Lupo 
and A Simoncini (eds), Democracy and Subsidiarity in the EU. 
National Parliaments, Regions and Civil Society in the Decision-
Making Process (Bologna, Il Mulino, 2013) 255 ff.; J Neyer, ‘Justified 
Multi-level Parliamentarism: Situating National Parliaments in the 
European Polity’ (2014) 20 The Journal of Legislative Studies 126.
136 D Jančić, ‘The Juncker Commission’s Better Regulation 
Agenda and Its Impact on National Parliaments,’ in C Fasone et al 
(eds), Parliaments, Public Opinion and Parliamentary Elections in 
Europe (2015) 18 EUI MW Working Paper 45 ff. (http://cadmus.eui.
eu/handle/1814/37462). Article 12 TEU and Protocol No. 1, giving 
national Parliaments limited involvement in the legislative process, 
are explicitly mentioned in A Renda, ‘European Union and Better 
Law-Making: Best Practices and Gaps’, in A Renda et al, Workshop 
on the best practices in legislative and regulatory processes in a con-
stitutional perspective (European Parliament, Study for the AFCO 
Committee, 2015) 5-29, spec. 8 among the constitutional key prin-
ciples serving as an EU legal basis for better regulation and better 
law-making.
68 Better Law-making and the Integration of Impact Assessment in the Decision-making Process:  the Role of National Parliaments - Elena Griglio
mechanisms, it can be observed that the European 
parliament has specific experience in using IA.137 
Finally, dimensional limits can be easily overcome 
by national parliaments either individually, 
engaging in a strict oversight of government 
performance in better law-making, or collectively, 
acting as collective actors in the supranational 
dimension by means of their European ‘direct’ 
powers.138 
By pointing out these contrasting perspectives, 
this article aims to reframe the main question on 
the contribution of national parliaments to better 
law-making processes in the EU. The focus in 
not on whether, normatively speaking, national 
parliaments should be involved or more involved 
in IA processes. Rather, the article acknowledges 
that, in spite of increasing progress in the 
institutionalisation of IA and in the call for greater 
inter-institutional participation, the contribution 
of national parliaments to the implementation 
of the procedure is still uncertain, partly due to 
persisting disagreements on the role and status of 
IA in the European legislative process.139
A number of related questions are therefore 
addressed in this article. On the one hand, what 
are national parliaments to do when faced with 
the Commission’s IA? How are they allowed 
to scrutinise these documents? What is the 
procedural outcome of scrutiny by national 
parliaments of Commission IA? On the other 
hand, can national parliaments draw up their 
own IA? What procedural use can they make of 
these texts? In both cases, what type of function 
137 For an overview of initiatives undertaken in the last 
decade by the EP to develop its own IA capacity, see Renda, supra 
at -23, 17 f. 
138 I. Cooper, ‘A ‘Virtual Third Chamber’ for the European 
Union? National Parliaments after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2012) 
35 West European Politics 441 f. A Cygan, ‘Collective subsidiarity 
monitoring by national parliaments after Lisbon: the operation of 
the early warning mechanism,’ in M Trybus and L Rubini (eds), 
The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy 
(Cheltenham e Massachusetts, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) 55 
ff.
139 Meuwese, supra at 4, 21 ff. 
(relating to codified parliamentary procedures) do 
they perform when engaging in IA processes? 
After an overview of the theoretical framework 
describing the place of national parliaments 
in pre- and post-legislative scrutiny (§ 2), an 
assessment of the above-mentioned constitutional 
and empirical issues is provided in § 3. This 
analysis will be conducted by distinguishing the 
involvement of national parliaments between the 
supranational level and in the domestic arena. 
Some final remarks and normative suggestions on 
the constitutional significance of the contribution 
of national parliaments to better law-making in 
the EU are included in the Conclusions (§ 4). 
2. How do national 
parliaments relate to 
pre- and post-legislative 
scrutiny: the conceptual 
framework
The contribution of national parliaments to the 
integration of IA in EU policy-making should 
be conceived of as part of the relationship 
linking these assemblies to the “fragmented EU 
government(s).”140 This formula comprises the 
national governments acting at the national and 
supranational levels and the executive bodies 
of the EU institutional architecture, including 
the EU Commission. Different theoretical 
conceptions can therefore be used to describe 
the role played by national parliaments in this 
decision-making cycle. From a constitutional 
viewpoint, parliamentary engagement in IA 
processes can be framed within theories of IA as 
a constitutionally relevant topic. They contribute 
to enforcing the potential of regulatory policy 
in the constitutional sphere as a mechanism for 
securing accommodation between political and 
legal systems, assessing how constitutional norms 
are made effective within political practice141.
140 D Curtin, ‘Challenging Executive Dominance in 
European Democracy’ (2014) 77 The Modern Law Review 29 ff.
141 C Scott, ‘Regulating Constitutions,’ in Christine Parker et 
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Against this background, parliamentary 
engagement in IA takes on somewhat different 
institutional meanings depending on whether it 
affects national or EU law-making. In the national 
legislative cycle, parliaments can integrate IA in 
preliminary legislative work carried out during 
consideration of bills as a tool aiming to support 
their legislative function.142 IA therefore become 
a relevant constitutional topic “as it is part of the 
legislative process and has consequences for the 
position of the legislator, either as a fetter on its 
discretion or as a means of holding (a part of) the 
legislature accountable.”143 
At the EU level, by contrast, national parliaments 
are not formal law-making authorities in the 
EU legislative cycle. Their participation in 
IA processes is thus instrumental not to the 
legislative but to the oversight function. Whether 
they oversee government IA or they themselves 
assess the impact of EU legislation, they do 
not act as decision-makers, but instead they 
exercise an indirect action which is mediated 
by the oversight of government conduct.144 This 
relational dimension binds national parliaments 
regardless of whether they engage in IA to hold 
the government accountable for its conduct of EU 
affairs145 or to advance proposals for amending 
draft legislative proposals/legislation in force. In 
al. (eds), Regulating Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 
226-45.
142 For specific reference to the pre-legislative scrutiny 
debate and experience in the UK Parliament, see Hansard Society 
Commission on the Legislative Process, Making the Law (London, 
Hansard Society, 1992); G Power, Parliamentary scrutiny of draft 
legislation 1997-1999 (London, UCL Constitution Unit, 2000); J. 
Smooker, ‘Making a difference: the effectiveness of pre-legislative 
scrutiny’ (2006) 59 Parliamentary Affairs 523 ff.; M Korris, 
‘Standing up for Scrutiny: How and Why Parliament Should Make 
Better Laws’ (2011) 63 Parliamentary Affairs 564 ff. 
143 Meuwese, supra at 4, 23. 
144 Framed in this way, the function can be interpreted as a 
form of ‘political safeguard of federalism.’ See G Martinico, ‘Dating 
Cinderella: On Subsidiarity as a Political Safeguard of Federalism 
in the European Union’(2011) 4 European Public Law 649 ff.
145 T Raunio, ‘The gatekeepers of European integration? The 
functions of national parliaments in the EU political system’ (2011) 
33 Journal of European Integration 315.
the EU dimension, the constitutional relevance of 
IA therefore goes beyond national standards. 
The approach of national parliaments to IA in 
EU policy-making should instead be explained 
with reference to the more general oversight/
accountability cycle linking national parliaments 
to the EU fragmented executive(s).146 According 
to Article 10 TEU, parliamentary representation 
in the EU flows through two channels: one 
embodied by the EP and the other centred on 
national parliaments.147 These two channels, 
jointly considered, are meant to satisfy the 
principle of accountability as a fundamental 
component of democratic government.148 To 
scrutinise government proposals, decisions and 
actions, parliaments use their oversight powers 
to cover all stages of EU decision-making,149 
holding the government to account both ex ante, 
in view of the position to be adopted in European 
146 On the original chain of accountability in the EU as 
“overstretched on a range of accounts,” see B Crum, ‘Legislative-
Executive Relations in the EU’ (2003) 41 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 379. On the oversight/accountability circuit in the 
EU institutional architecture, see O Costa, N Jabko, C Lequesne and 
P Magnette, ‘La diffusion des mécanismes de contrôle dans l’Union 
européenne: vers une nouvelle forme de démocratie?’ (2001) 51 Revue 
française de science politique 859-867; C Harlow, Accountability in 
the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002); C 
Harlow and R Rawlings, ‘Promoting Accountability in Multi-Level 
Governance: A Network Approach’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 
542-562; D Curtin and A Wille (eds), Meaning and Practice of 
Accountability in the EU Multi-Level Context (Mannheim, Connex 
Report Series No. 07, 2008); M Bovens, D Curtin and P ‘t Hart, P 
(eds), The Real World of EU Accountability. What Deficit? (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2010); L Vehrey, P Kiiver and S Loeffen 
(eds), Political accountability and European Integration (Groningen, 
Europa Law Publishing, 2009); S Gustavsson, C Karlsson and T 
Persson (eds), The Illusion of Accountability in the European Union 
(New York, Routledge, 2009).
147 L Besselink, A Composite European Constitution 
(Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2007); Micossi, supra at 18; P 
Lindseth, supra at 18.
148 V Bogdanor, ‘Legitimacy, accountability and democracy 
in the European Union’ (2007) A Federal Trust Report. fedtrust.
co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/FedT_LAD.pdf. 
149 T Raunio, ‘Holding Governments Accountable in 
European Affairs: Explaining Cross-National Variation’ (2005) 
11 The Journal of Legislative Studies 319; C Neuhold and R de 
Ruiter, ‘Out of reach? Parliamentary control of EU affairs in the 
Netherlands and the UK’ (2010) 16 The Journal of Legislative 
Studies 57 ff.
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negotiations, and ex post, in the implementation 
of EU decisions and policies.150
The proposed perspective contributes to explaining 
why, in the following sections, the involvement of 
national parliaments in the IA process is framed 
within the ‘scrutiny’ of EU legislation. Other 
theoretical conceptions might nonetheless be used, 
taking a politological viewpoint. IA processes in 
the EU could be examined in a principal-agent 
perspective ‘adapted’ to the specificities of the EU 
context.
Positive political theory is usually sceptical 
about the willingness of parliaments to engage 
in ex-ante and ex-post analysis of legislation. 
‘Classical’ principal-agent theory, in fact, claims 
that representative assemblies are keen on 
relying on constituency feedback rather than on 
investing resources in the systematic appraisal 
of legislation.151 However, in the EU context, 
the interaction between regulatory principals 
and agents is influenced by the particularity 
– missing in most national legal orders – that 
law-drafting is delegated to a third party, the EU 
Commission (regulatory agent). In view of this 
delegation option, IA acts as a means of reducing 
information asymmetry and minimising the 
costs of transactions and monitoring between the 
principal (the elected legislator) and the drafting 
agent (the Commission).152 Due to the composite 
nature of EU law-making, the importance of IA 
is not limited to the position of the European 
Parliament as the main regulatory principal. The 
same benefits may come from engagement by 
150 K Auel, ‘Democratic Accountability and National 
Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in 
EU affairs’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 487 ff.
151 MD McCubbins and T Schwartz, ‘Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms’ (1984) 
28 American Journal of Political Science, 165-179. According to G. 
Regonini, ‘Parlamenti analitici’ (2012) 1 Rivista italiana di Politiche 
Pubbliche 33-87, spec. 78, the institutionalisation of regulatory 
policies in the last few decades has completely changed the political 
framework on which these classical theories were based. 
152 G. Luchetta, ‘Impact assessment and the policy cycle in 
the EU’ (2012) 4 European Journal of Risk Regulation, 561-575.
Member States, including national parliaments, 
in IA processes. These serve as mechanisms that 
aim to shape the behaviours of political actors 
and enhance the governance of their relations by 
imposing constraints on them. This contributes 
to explaining why national parliaments’ 
consideration of IA may further contribute to 
enhancing the overall political coherence of the 
system by reducing information and transaction 
costs. 
3. The participation of 
national parliaments in 
the different stages of the 
better law-making cycle 
Better law-making is pursued throughout the 
legislative process, just as better regulation 
covers the whole policy cycle.153 Each stage of 
the legislative cycle acknowledges a number of 
better law-making principles, objectives and 
tools to make sure that EU laws achieve their 
targets at minimum cost. These relate to planning, 
impact assessment, stakeholder consultation, 
implementation and evaluation.
To examine the involvement of national parliaments 
in better law-making processes and highlight their 
engagement in IA, the following three stages of 
the legislative cycle can be focused on.154 The pre-
legislative stage precedes the inception of the EU 
legislative procedure and involves the preparation 
of legislative initiatives. The legislative stage, 
which starts with submission of an EU legislative 
bill by the Commission, steers the design of the 
definitive text subject to final adoption. Lastly, the 
post-legislative stage follows the enactment of EU 
pieces of legislation; it encompasses monitoring 
153 According to European Commission, ‘Better Regulation 
Guidelines’ (2015) COM(2015) 215 final - SWD(2015) 110 final 5, 
better regulation covers policy design and preparation, adoption, 
implementation (transposition, complementary non-regulatory 
actions), application (including enforcement), evaluation and 
revision. 
154 On Better Regulation as composed of these three stages, 
see Jančić, supra at 23, 45 ff. 
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of the transposition and implementation phases. 
Instances related to each of the above-mentioned 
stages are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
3.1. The pre-legislative stage
The pre-legislative stage serves as a preliminary 
phase in the law-making cycle; it spans from 
legislative or policy planning to the submission 
of a draft legislative act to the European 
Parliament and to the Council. At this stage, 
national parliaments have different scrutiny and 
IA options and different ways to channel their 
contribution to EU decision-making (see Figure 
1). Better law-making begins with good legislative 
planning based on inter-institutional cooperation. 
Multiannual and annual programming is in fact 
subject to a dialogue between the Commission, 
the European Parliament and the Council.155 
National parliaments are not formally supposed 
to participate in this stage. However, the Annual 
Work Programme of the Commission, and other 
instruments of legislative or policy planning and 
Commission consultation documents (green and 
white papers and communications) are made 
directly available to national parliaments by the 
Commission.156 These documents are therefore 
open to contributions by national parliaments 
through Political Dialogue, the practice started 
in 2006 with the ‘Barroso initiative.’ Lacking a 
Treaty basis, the functioning of the mechanism 
relies entirely on voluntary engagement and 
participation. 
Partly because of these intrinsic limits, the 
capacity of national parliaments to scrutinise 
the Commission Work Programme still 
proves rather weak. Most of the parliaments 
have not so far been able to use this scrutiny 
window to engage in an early assessment of the 
substance of EU policy options. In its turn, the 
155 See the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-
Making (supra at 1), Section II ‘Programming.’ 
156 See art. 1, Protocol No. 1 on the role of national 
Parliaments in the European Union, annexed to the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
Commission does not usually provide insightful 
replies that may contribute to strengthening 
the background information and awareness of 
national parliaments.157 In order to bypass these 
weaknesses, national parliaments may engage in 
‘collective’ scrutiny of the Commission’s Work 
Programme by resorting to Cosac’s contributions 
to the Commission, as provided for by art. 10 of 
Protocol No. 1 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Although the Commission is not bound by these 
contributions, “this avenue allows NPs to discuss 
the Work Programme in concreto.”158 Moreover, 
because of the way that it is structured, the Annual 
Work Programme provides a means of assessing 
the composition of legislative and non-legislative 
initiatives planned to fulfil specific political goals 
and of reviewing information on IA and evaluation 
work that is expected to accompany them.159 
Further to the planning and validation stage, 
according to the Better Regulation Guidelines160 it 
is in the following stage of evaluation and policy 
preparation that two major better law-making 
tools are used by the Commission with the aim 
of defining the scope and impact of planned 
initiatives. On the one hand, when introducing 
a new law or policy the Commission may resort 
to either roadmaps or to an inception impact 
assessment.161 The former are documents aiming 
to explain what the Commission is considering, 
which problems must be tackled, which objectives 
pursued, why EU action is needed and what the 
added value is. The latter is a roadmap for initiatives 
157 On this point, see C Fasone and D Fromage, ‘National 
Parliaments and the EU Commission’s Agenda: Limits and Recent 
Developments of a Difficult Partnership’, in Fasone et al, supra at 
23, 33 f. 
158 Ibidem, 34.  
159 The Annual Work Programme includes major legislative 
draft acts and non-legislative proposals for the following year. 
For each initiative, the programme provides legal and procedural 
information, including information concerning IAs and evaluation. 
160 See supra at 40, Section ‘Guidelines on planning’. 
161 According to the Better Regulation Guidelines, the 
Commission also uses roadmaps to initiate the evaluation or fitness 
checking of existing laws and/or policies. Roadmaps are required 
to justify the absence of an impact assessment. 
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subject to an IA that describes the problem in 
detail, addressing issues related to subsidiarity and 
clarifying the likely impacts of each option.
On the other hand, stakeholder consultation is 
another essential tool serving better law-making 
purposes in the process of policy preparation, 
evaluation and review. A 12-week internet-based 
public consultation is provided for by Section VII 
of the Commission Better Regulation Guidelines 
as part of the consultation strategy for initiatives 
subject to impact assessments, evaluation and 
fitness checks and for green papers. The key 
elements of the consultation strategy are outlined 
in the roadmap or the inception impact assessment. 
The consultation is addressed to ‘stakeholders,’ 
including those who will be directly impacted 
by the policy and also those who are involved in 
ensuring its correct application. However, this 
does not apply to inter-institutional consultations, 
thus explicitly excluding national parliaments 
from the process of preventative assessment of 
a policy’s initial design. This exclusion has two 
potential implications. It may indicate that national 
parliaments are sidelined, as the Guidelines don 
not even mention the political dialogue as a 
parallel channel for participation. Alternatively, 
it may imply that national parliaments are not 
treated like the public consulted at large and that a 
special treatment is reserved for them (consisting 
in participation through the political dialogue) 
as institutions exercising public power. Another 
possible interpretation may be that the Guidelines 
leave national parliaments the choice of whether 
to engage in IA at this stage or later. This is the 
interpretation followed in implementing practice.
Notwithstanding their formal exclusion from 
stakeholder consultations, in fact, national 
parliaments have been informally included in the 
EU online system of automatic notifications about 
new roadmaps and consultations. The Commission 
has not yet clarified what the procedural outcomes 
available to national parliaments gaining access 
to these documents are.162 However, this practice 
allows them to be timely informed of ongoing 
initiatives, thus enabling them to actively 
participate in the pre-legislative phase should they 
elect to do so.
At this stage, national parliaments willing to engage 
in a dialogue on EU decision-making have two 
alternative ways to integrate IA in their decisions: 
they may draw on Commission roadmaps and 
inception IAs and carry out an appraisal of 
the estimated impact/expected outcomes of a 
proposal; or they may invest in autonomous (and 
possibly streamlined) IA. In the former case, two 
distinct channels are open to national parliaments. 
The ‘direct’ channel offers national parliaments 
the opportunity to address an opinion directly to 
the Commission through non-binding informal 
political dialogue. Consultation documents (such 
as communications, green and white papers, work 
programmes and any other legislative or policy 
planning instrument) are directly sent to national 
parliaments by the Commission. These documents 
cannot be scrutinised under the EWS163 but 
they can be considered by national assemblies 
under the heading of political dialogue. Without 
posing any legal constraint on the Commission, 
this procedure enables national legislators to 
participate in the consultation on incoming 
draft EU legislation through the adoption of a 
‘contribution’. 
Additionally, or alternatively, by means of the 
‘indirect’ channel national parliaments may 
try to engage in a ‘mediated’ dialogue with EU 
institutions, resorting to standard oversight 
procedures addressed to the national government 
162 However, as highlighted by D Jančić, supra at 23, 49, the 
Better Regulation Toolbox, complementing the Better Regulation 
Guideline (available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/better-
regulation-toolbox_en), mentions en passant (and contrary to 
what is provided for in the Better Regulation Guidelines) national 
Parliaments among public authorities (potentially) contributing to 
open public online consultations. 
163 The EWS, in fact, only encompasses draft EU legislation 
(see art. 6 of Protocol no. 2 and art. 1 of Protocol no. 1 annexed to 
the Lisbon Treaty). 
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and adopting any other parliamentary document 
(e.g. resolution, report, decision).164 These 
procedures aim to shape the official position 
of Member States on initiatives planned by 
the Commission and indirectly contribute to 
the improvement of EU initiatives. In both 
hypotheses, we lack robust data with which to test 
if and how national parliaments engage in either 
of the two channels as means of ex-ante appraisal 
of initiatives planned by the Commission.165 
Case studies can, however, be drawn from a 
detailed analysis of questionnaires annexed 
to the latest Cosac bi-annual report dealing 
with national parliaments’ examination of pre-
legislative initiatives advanced by the Commission 
on selected topics (e.g. trans-European transport 
infrastructure, EU energy policy, migration). 
These reports often question national parliaments 
on whether and how they have discussed actions/
proposals from the Commission. The answers 
provided by national parliaments only occasionally 
clarify whether these documents have been 
scrutinised under the lens of the political dialogue 
or through any other parliamentary scrutiny 
procedure.166 Even fewer details are offered on the 
methodology followed by the parliament to assess 
164 National Parliaments may eventually decide to ‘debate’ 
the proposal, in committee or in plenary, without adopting any 
conclusive document. This hypothesis is not specifically taken 
into consideration in this article as it only marginally relates to the 
integration of IA in decision-making. 
165 Some comparative data on procedures and practices 
followed by national parliaments are available through the 
Cosac bi-annual reports and through the European Centre for 
Parliamentary Research & Documentation (ECPRD) Network (see 
infra). 
166 This is the case of the answers to the survey annexed 
to the Cosac ‘Eighteenth Bi-annual Report: Developments 
in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to 
Parliamentary Scrutiny’, 27 September 2012 (http://www.cosac.
eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/) 20, dealing with the 
proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure 
and repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC (COM(2011) 658). The 
survey found that 27 out of 41 Parliaments/Chambers scrutinised 
the proposal, but only 4 through the ‘political dialogue’ (submitting 
a contribution to the proposal). The remainder either merely 
‘debated’ the proposal (12) or used the ‘indirect’ channel, adopting 
another type of document (11).
the proposal and whether it includes an (even 
simplified) appraisal of the impact assessment 
estimated by the Commission itself. 
On the whole, national parliaments have more 
chances to engage in IA reasoning when they 
scrutinise the Commission’s proposals or actions 
by means of the political dialogue. This is due 
to the fact that subsidiarity and proportionality 
concerns may be better explained through basic 
IA arguments.167 Outside the remit of political 
dialogue, parliaments may try to challenge 
specific estimations of Commission IAs as a 
means of arguing against the political desirability/
sustainability of a proposal. An example is offered 
by the survey included in the twenty-fourth 
Cosac report on parliamentary discussion of 
action proposed by the European Commission 
concerning the relocation and resettlement of 
migrants.168 Many parliaments from eastern 
Europe169 opposed country quotas defined by 
the European Commission and supported the 
distribution of refugees on a voluntary basis. 
Some of them made use of basic IA reasoning to 
167 See, for instance, the survey on national parliaments/
chambers’ discussion of a number of proposals and communications 
on energy security and energy efficiency, as well as renewables 
and other related dimensions, published in Cosac, ‘Twenty-Sixth 
Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures 
and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny’, 18 October 2016 
(http://www.cosac.eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/) 15 
ff. A minority of parliaments/chambers planned to engage in the 
political dialogue on two communications from the Commission, 
one on ‘An EU strategy for liquefied gas and gas storage’ (COM 
(2016) 49) and the other on ‘An EU Strategy on Heating and 
Cooling’ (COM (2016) 51), raising concerns about the expected 
impact on both consumers and on Member States. 
168 Cosac, ‘Twenty-Fourth Bi-annual Report: Developments 
in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to 
Parliamentary Scrutiny’, 4 November 2015 (http://www.cosac.eu/
documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/) 26 f. The relocation and 
resettlement actions were included in the first implementation 
package on the European Agenda on Migration (European 
Commission, ‘Communication to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions’ (13 May 2015) COM/2015/0240 final).
169 The Polish Senat and Sejm, the Hungarian Országgyülés, 
the Estonian Riigikocu, the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna and Senát, 
the Lithuanian Seimas, the Latvian Saeima and the Slovak Národná 
rada. 
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support their political position.170 However, this 
reasoning did not always result in the adoption of 
a document to be addressed either to the European 
Commission or to the national Government.171 
The incomplete picture resulting from these 
partial data seems to show that national 
parliaments are keener to use the indirect channel 
than to participate in direct dialogue with the 
Commission. The use of IA reasoning is far 
from made explicit; it is randomly used mostly 
to support political arguments against a specific 
proposal and it is only occasionally applied to 
draft formal parliamentary documents (opinions, 
resolutions, reports) for submission either to the 
Commission or to the national Government. 
Alternatively to referring to Commission 
roadmaps and inception IAs, national parliaments 
may themselves engage in forms of ex-ante 
assessment to scrutinise Commission documents 
under the heading of political dialogue. Among 
the most relevant tools are public consultations. 
The use of public consultations by national 
parliaments to improve their cooperation with the 
Commission in the early stages of the legislative 
170 For instance, the position agreed by the EU Affairs 
Committee of the Polish Sejm stressed that the European 
Commission had exceeded the mandate established by the 
European Council on the relocation and resettlement programme, 
which expressly refers to voluntariness and not compulsoriness. 
The principle of voluntariness implies allowing every Member 
State that would like to support frontier countries to assess its 
capacity, asylum system, integration capabilities, etc (Annex to 
Cosac, supra at 55, 286 f.). In its Resolution No. 161 of 18 June 2015 
the Czech Senát rejected the mandatory relocation of migrants, 
noting that it does not address the reasons for the current massive 
wave of migration, has no relation to the protection of migrants in 
the Mediterranean Sea and does not contribute to a reduction in 
migration pressure on Europe as a whole; on the contrary, it may 
encourage more people to illegally migrate to the European Union 
in life-threatening ways (ivi, 84). The Romanian Senate expressed 
disagreement with using a standard mechanism without taking 
into consideration the particularities of each Member State in 
respect of relocation in the EU and resettlement and contributions 
to the activities of European agencies such as Frontex (ivi, 332).
171 Many answers are ambiguous in this regard, as 
respondents from national parliaments/chambers often refer 
to a ‘common position’ rising out of debates in committee or in 
the plenary that, however, did not result in a vote over a formal 
document. 
process is mentioned in the 22nd Cosac bi-annual 
report on “new trends in the EU policy- and 
decision-making process.” The Report primarily 
highlights the necessity of consultations by 
national parliaments resulting in direct inputs 
addressed to the Commission, and of the 
Commission including in its summary report on 
the consultation a dedicated section for national 
parliaments’ replies.172 
A complete picture of how intensively national 
parliaments use these tools as a means of ex-
ante appraisal of Commission proposals is 
not yet available. Some relevant practices can, 
however, be examined. For instance, during 
the Interparliamentary Conference on Energy, 
Innovation and Circular Economy held in The 
Hague on 3-4 April 2016, the EU Commissioner 
for environment, Karmenu Vella, appreciated as a 
best practice the consultation by the Italian Senate 
on the second circular economy package published 
in December 2015 by the EU Commission. The 
public internet-based consultation held for 8 
weeks between February and March 2016 was 
deliberately promoted by the Environmental 
Standing Committee of the Italian Senate within 
the new better law-making framework as a means 
of participating in the EU decision-making 
process with contributions on the merits of the 
EU Commission’s proposals. The consultation 
gathered oral and written evidence from a large 
number of private and public bodies.173 Based 
172 The Report states that a large majority of responding 
parliaments/chambers (25 out of 30) favour the idea of ad hoc 
national parliament public consultations and of having a dedicated 
section for their replies in the European Commission’s summary 
report on the consultation. The UK House of Lords expressed 
the hope that the Commission’s annual report on relations with 
national parliaments would be used to identify the impact of 
engagement by national parliaments. See Cosac, ‘Twenty-second 
Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures 
and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny’, 4 November 
2014 (http://www.cosac.eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-
cosac/) 31.
173 Details on the methodology followed, on the contributions 
submitted by respondents and on the outcomes of the consultation 
are published in the report drafted by the Italian Senate’s Research 
Service. See Servizio studi del Senato, ‘La consultazione pubblica 
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on these results, the Environmental Commission 
drafted a resolution, which was submitted to the 
European Commission through the political 
dialogue, including proposals for amendment. 
3.2. The legislative stage
According to the Interinstitutional Agreement on 
Better Law-Making,174 the Commission carries 
out IA of legislative initiatives which are expected 
to have significant economic, environmental 
or social impact. The initiatives included in the 
Commission Work Programme are, as a general 
rule, accompanied by an IA. The Agreement 
explicitly provides for the final results of IAs to be 
made available (as ‘privileged’ addressees) not just 
to the EP and to the Council but also to national 
parliaments175 along with the opinion(s) of the 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board.176 This accreditation 
does not seem to have major practical implications, 
as the final results of IAs are in any case made public 
at the time of adoption of a Commission initiative. 
However, its institutional meaning should not be 
underestimated. The explicit reference to national 
parliaments is, in fact, directly connected to the 
role that they play in the scrutiny of legislative 
initiatives under the lens of the subsidiarity 
principle.177 
Since the Mandelkern Report, published in 
2001,178 the subsidiarity principle has been 
known as a ‘regulatory principle’ in the EU.179 
della 13ª Commissione (Territorio, Ambiente, Beni ambientali) 
sull’economia circolare’ (2016) 328 Dossier.  
174 See supra at 1, par. 13. 
175 Ibidem. 
176 This is the body established within the General 
Secretariat of the Commission to replace the Impact Assessment 
Board charged with checking impact assessments conducted by the 
Commission itself. 
177 This is true for initiatives falling within an area where the 
EU does not have exclusive competence. 
178 The Mandelkern Report was adopted in 2001 by 
the High Level Advisory Group established in response to the 
‘Lisbon strategy’ and the call for a simplification of the regulatory 
environment both at the national and European levels.
179 O Pimenova, ‘Subsidiarity as a ‘regulation principle’ in 
the EU’ (2016) 4 The theory and practice of legislation 381-398, 382. 
The participation of national parliaments in the 
Early Warning System (EWS) is therefore treated 
as a fundamental component in the better law-
making cycle.180 Not by chance, the Resolution 
of the European Parliament on EU Regulatory 
Fitness and Subsidiarity and Proportionality – 
Better Lawmaking,181 while noting the crucial 
importance of IAs as tools for aiding decision-
making in the legislative process, “stresses the 
need, in this context, for proper consideration 
to be given to issues relating to subsidiarity and 
proportionality.” It thus strongly underlines the 
importance of parliamentary scrutiny by national 
parliaments, beside the European Parliament, 
and welcomes the closer participation of national 
parliaments in the framework of the European 
legislative process. 
However, the regulatory relevance of the 
subsidiarity scrutiny carried out by national 
parliaments is not universally acknowledged. 
There is widespread scepticism about the practical 
potential of the EWS to serve IA purposes. The 
EWS is often approached as a mechanism for ex-
ante political scrutiny which can contribute to the 
multi-level dialogue but in no way can act as an 
administrative tool for evaluating legislation. In 
fact, the involvement of national parliaments in 
the EWS may prove to be a more or less relevant 
regulatory tool depending on how subsidiarity 
scrutiny is interpreted and performed and on 
As highlighted in S Blockmans et al, ‘From Subsidiarity to Better 
EU Governance: a Practical Reform Agenda for the UE’ (2014) 10 
CEPS Essay 3 (www.ceps.eu), “subsidiarity is inherently connected 
to debates on smarter regulation, deregulation, improving 
the democratic accountability of EU policies and institutional 
equilibrium.” 
180 The 8 weeks available to national Parliaments for 
subsidiarity scrutiny within the EWS run in parallel with the 8 
weeks open to feedback from stakeholders. According to the Better 
Regulation Guidelines (Section 4), citizens and stakeholders are 
given 12 weeks to react to consultation documents. Therefore, 
once a proposal is formally adopted, 8 more weeks are provided 
for feedback on the initiative and, when applicable, on the impact 
assessment. 
181 European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 4th February 2014 
on EU Regulatory Fitness and Subsidiarity and Proportionality - 
Better Law-making’ (2014) 2013/2077/INI, par. 15. 
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whether it encompasses embryonic forms of IA 
(see Figure 2). 
The implementing practices of the last ten 
years have shown quite different conceptions of 
subsidiarity scrutiny and views of its connection 
to other related principles. On the one hand, 
the European Commission has come to adopt a 
‘narrow’ vision of the EWS in which it is confined 
to a legal assessment of the principle of subsidiarity. 
Any further consideration and contribution 
should instead be channelled through the political 
dialogue.182 On the other hand, national parliaments 
have drawn up quite different approaches to 
subsidiarity review. Some parliaments/chambers 
have shared the narrow EWS vision fostered 
by the EU Commission. Conversely, others 
have supported (whether explicitly or through 
consequential arguing in their reasoned opinions) 
that the review of the subsidiarity compliance of a 
measure may comprise assessment of other related 
principles that are an intrinsic part of subsidiarity 
scrutiny, including the ‘adjacent’ principle of 
proportionality.183 Whereas subsidiarity scrutiny 
implies assessing whether legislation is needed 
(necessity test) and EU action is appropriate 
(added value test), the principle of proportionality 
questions whether the means that are provided for 
are the least intrusive or burdensome to achieve 
the goals fixed. These two tests are closely related 
182 In its Communication to the European Parliament, 
the Council and the national Parliaments on the review of the 
proposal for a Council regulation on the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office with regard to the principle 
of subsidiarity, in accordance with Protocol No. 2 (COM (2013) 
851 fin), the European Commission, in assessing the ‘yellow card’ 
raised by national Parliaments declared that there was no breach 
of subsidiarity because many of the reasoned opinions were 
motivated on the basis of proportionality or through other policy 
issues unrelated to subsidiarity. 
183 The principle of proportionality, jointly with the 
principle of conferral, is considered ‘adjacent’ to subsidiarity “in 
the sense that the three of them appear together in Article 5 TEU 
as consecutive tests of the appropriateness of EU legislation;” I 
Cooper, ‘Is the Early Warning Mechanism a Legal or a Political 
Procedure? Three Questions and a Typology,’ in AJ Cornell and M 
Goldoni, National and Regional Parliaments in the EU-Legislative 
procedure Post-Lisbon. The Impact of the Early Warning Mechanism 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2017) 17 ff. 
to each other. The subsidiarity test may not be 
satisfied by an abstract and formal appraisal of 
whether EU legislation is needed and appropriate 
in a certain regulatory area. Subject to the goal 
that is assumed,184 the subsidiarity concern may 
require that the content of the proposal is taken 
into consideration and the relationship between 
goals and means is assessed. Not by chance, art. 5 
of Protocol No. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon 
provides that all draft legislative acts forwarded to 
national parliaments must be justified with regard 
both to subsidiarity and to proportionality.185 By 
contrast, arts. 6 and 7 of the same Protocol limit 
the EWS to subsidiarity scrutiny,186 thus leaving 
the proportionality test to the “constructive 
criticism” of the political dialogue.187 Regardless of 
this formal constraint, some national chambers or 
parliaments have taken a ‘broad’ approach to the 
EWS, either including aspects of proportionality 
in the subsidiarity control or factually combining 
(on procedural grounds too) the EWS and the 
political dialogue.188 This is the case, among 
others, of the Swedish Riksdag,189 the Italian 
184 As highlighted in GA Moens and J Trone, ‘The Principle 
of Subsidiarity in EU Judicial and Legislative Practice: Panacea or 
Placebo’ (2015) 41 Journal of Legislative Studies 78, the subsidiarity 
test is not about questioning the goal, but rather assessing who is to 
achieve it.  
185 According to the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better 
Law-making (par. 25), the Commission accomplishes this duty 
by providing, in the explanatory memorandum accompanying 
a proposal, an explanation and justification to the European 
Parliament and to the Council regarding its choice of the legal basis 
and type of legal act. In the memorandum, the Commission must 
explain how the measures proposed are justified in the light of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
186 Art. 8 of the same Protocol also limits appeals to the ECJ 
to the sole principle of subsidiarity, thus excluding proportionality 
from this sphere of action.
187 Cooper, supra at 70. 
188  D Jancic, ‘The Game of Cards: National Parliaments in 
the EU and the Future of the Early Warning Mechanism and the 
Political Dialogue’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 939. 
189 The Riksdag’s Committe of Constitution has declared 
that there is no obligation to jointly scrutinise subsidiarity and 
proportionality, but that there is support for including a limited 
proportionality test. This interpretation is the one prevailing in 
implementing practice. See AJ Cornell, ‘The Swedish Riksdag as 
Scrutiniser of the Principle of Subsidiarity’ (2016) 12 European 
Constitutional Law Review 308 ff.
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Senate190 and the Portuguese Parliament.191 The 
option for a narrow or a broad approach to the 
subsidiarity test deeply influences the connection 
with IA. The proportionality test, even more than 
‘simple’ subsidiarity scrutiny, may in fact offer 
national parliaments the opportunity to engage in 
an embryonic form of IA of an EU proposal. 
Further opportunities for engaging in IA arguments 
are offered to those national parliaments willing 
to include in their scrutiny a sort of ‘political 
judgment’ on the policy effectiveness of proposals. 
This may include assessing whether legislation 
is designed to achieve its stated purposes, thus 
contributing to IA purposes.192 These evaluations, 
which are formally confined to the political 
dialogue, have at various times been included 
in the reasoned opinions forwarded by national 
parliaments under the EWS.193 
Depending on how the subsidiarity assessment 
is conducted with reference to both the scope of 
the review and the connection with the political 
dialogue, national parliaments are offered 
mechanisms of variable intensity for engaging 
in IA processes and contributing to better law-
making. This does not, however, automatically 
imply that the broader the approach to subsidiarity 
190 On the combination of the EWM and the political 
dialogue in the practice of the Italian Senate, see N Lupo, ‘The 
Scrutiny of the Principle of Subsidiarity in the Procedures and 
Reasoned Opinions of the Italian Chamber and Senate,’ in Cornell 
and Goldoni, supra at 70. 
191 D Jančic, ‘The Portuguese Parliament and EU Affairs: 
From Inert to Agile Democratic Control’, in Hefftler, Neuhold, 
Rozenberg and Smith, supra at 22, 366 ff.
192 On the ‘insufficiency’ test relating to policy efficiency 
objections, see Cooper supra at 70. 
193 The ‘policy effectiveness’ criterion has been used, for 
instance, in some of the reasoned opinions that contributed to 
raising the ‘yellow card’ on the Monti II proposal for regulation on 
the right to strike (COM (2012) 130 fin). Many objections deemed 
the proposal unsuited to the purpose stated in the explanatory 
memorandum. See I Cooper, ‘A yellow card for the striker: national 
parliaments and the defeat of EU legislation on the right to strike’ 
(2015) 22 Journal of European public policy 1406 ff.; F Fabbrini 
and K Granat, ‘“Yellow card, but no foul”: The role of the national 
parliaments under the subsidiarity protocol and the Commission 
proposal for an EU regulation on the right to strike’ (2013) 50 
Common Market Law Review 115 ff. 
scrutiny, the greater the chances offered to 
national parliaments to engage in forms of IA. 
Excesses in broadening the subsidiarity test may 
lead to including in this scrutiny forms of political 
judgment over a proposal’s compliance with given 
political priorities or values that have little to do 
with IA.194 These purely political objections go 
beyond the IA remit. They do not aim at providing 
arguments to challenge the Commission’s 
appreciation of the necessity and appropriateness 
of proposals; rather, their sole scope is to debate 
initiatives relying on given political preferences.
Regardless of the ‘title’ used by NPs to scrutinise 
EU proposals – whether they resort to the EWS 
or they take advantage of the political dialogue – 
they mostly rely upon Commission IAs to assess 
the effects of proposals. However, there seems 
to be at least one instance suited to engaging 
national parliaments in endogenous embryonic 
forms of IA. This lies in the connection between 
regional parliaments and involvement in the EWS. 
According to art. 6 of Protocol No. 2, in fact, within 
the EWS “it will be for each national parliament 
or each chamber of a national parliament to 
consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments 
with legislative powers.”195 The wording does not 
clarify whether national parliaments are obliged 
to consult regional parliaments or whether this is 
left open to their choice. The practice of the last 
decade in the eight EU Member States featuring 
decentralisation of legislative powers to regional 
entities has shown that the latter interpretation 
prevails. Further to an intensive differentiation 
in the procedural interaction between national 
194 Cooper (supra at 70) labels these behaviours as “political 
expediency: objections based on the values and/or interests of the 
parliaments or parliamentarians concerned”. 
195 On the subsidiarity scrutiny as a dimension permeated 
by the interaction between national and regional Parliaments, 
see Cornell and Goldoni, supra at 70; G Abels and A Eppler, 
Subnational parliaments in the EU multi-level parliamentary system: 
taking stock of the post-Lisbon era (Innsbruck, Studienverlag, 2016); 
GV Arribas et al, ‘Legislative Regions after Lisbon: A New Role for 
Regional Assemblies?’, in Hefftler, Neuhold, Rozenberg and Smith, 
supra at 22, 133 ff.
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and regional parliaments,196 a major variation 
has come to identify the capacity of national 
assemblies to include regional complaints in their 
contributions and opinions. As a consequence, it 
could be assumed that national parliaments that 
are willing to take into account regional arguments 
in relation to their participation in the EWS and 
political dialogue197 are factually subjecting EU 
proposals to forms of IA tailored to their regional 
organisation. 
In a number of national experiences, it is possible 
to find elements in support of the incorporation 
of regional concerns in the scrutiny carried out 
by the national parliament. This is not so much 
the case of Belgium, where regional parliaments 
are recognised with very strong and formalised 
guarantees of participation in the EWS,198 and, 
however, their involvement in the national 
parliamentary system seems to rely on an 
atomistic rather than cooperative view of inter-
parliamentary domestic relations. Rather, the 
reference is primarily to the Austrian case, where 
regional parliaments represented in the Bundesrat 
find an easy way to voice their subsidiarity 
concerns. The Italian experience offers another 
significant case of close cooperation between 
national and regional assemblies: according to art. 
9.2. of Law no. 243/2012 regulating participation 
in the EU, the two houses are formally bound to 
‘take into account’ regional contributions. This 
provision has found implementation particularly 
in the Italian Senate’s practice of cooperating with 
the Conference of the Presidents of the Regional 
196 For an exhaustive and critical overview, see D 
Fromage, ‘Regional Parliaments and the Early Warning System: 
an Assessment Six Years after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon 
Treaty’ (2016) 33 SOG Working Paper Series (www.sog.luiss.it). 
197  On regional parliaments’ participation in the political 
dialogue through their national chambers/parliaments, see 
Fromage, ibidem, 32. 
198 Unlike other regional parliaments in EU Member States, 
Belgian regional Parliaments are not dependent on the federal 
parliament to have their contributions/opinions forwarded to 
the EU Commission. See W Vandenbruwaene and P Popelier, 
‘The Subsidiarity Mechanism as a Tool for Inter-Level Dialogue 
in Belgium: On “Regional Blindness” and “Cooperative Flaws”’ 
(2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 221.
Councils, aiming at fostering political dialogue 
with regional parliaments.199 In Britain, although 
the Parliament’s relationship with devolved 
assemblies is flexible, reasoned opinions of British 
regional parliaments are in any case forwarded 
to the government in view of its participation in 
negotiations at the Council level. 
The British House of Lords’ Reasoned opinion200 
on the Draft Directive on public procurement201 
offers an interesting precedent showing how 
the expected impact of the EU proposal on the 
regional architecture can substantiate the raising 
of subsidiarity concerns. One of the main claims 
included in the opinion202 is that neither the 
explanatory memorandum nor the Commission 
IA carry out the requirement under Art. 5 of 
Protocol No. 2 to prepare a “detailed statement” 
containing “some assessment in the case of a 
directive of its implications for the rules to be 
put in place by Member States, including where 
necessary the regional legislation.” The opinion 
thus supports the concerns raised by the National 
Assembly for Wales that the proposal would breach 
the devolution principle as an inherent part of the 
UK’s constitution. It specifically “fails to reflect the 
way in which separate implementing regulations 
have hitherto been made in Scotland and the way 
in which extensive administrative and advisory 
functions in relation to procurement in Wales are 
exercised by or on behalf of Welsh Ministers.” 
These ‘best practices’ of cooperation between 
199 As correctly observed in C Fasone, ‘Towards new 
Procedures between State and Regional Legislatures in Italy, 
Exploiting the Tool of the Early Warning Mechanism’ (2013) 5 
Perspectives on Federalism 122, this outcome has been implicitly 
supported by the adoption of a wide interpretation of EWS 
scrutiny, which has allowed regions to voice their concerns not 
only on matters completely devolved to them, but also on issues 
which would in any case have a repercussion on them.
200 See House of Commons, ‘Reasoned opinion concerning 
a Draft Directive on procurement by entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors and a Draft Directive 
on public procurement,’ 6 March 2012 (http://www.parliament.uk/
business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/european-
scrutiny-committee/scrutiny-reserve-overrides/). 
201  COM (2011) 896 final.
202  Supra at 87, par. 17. 
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national and regional parliaments are, however, 
exceptions in the daily practice of the EWS and 
of the political dialogue. Problems of political 
incentives, technical expertise and capacity, time 
and procedural restraints often limit the positive 
interaction that national and regional parliaments 
can offer to better regulation.203 To overcome 
the restrictions that subsidiarity scrutiny faces 
as a potential IA tool and to promote greater 
homogeneity in implementation by representative 
assemblies, one possibility is to adopt common 
scrutiny guidelines to assist national parliaments 
in their assessment of compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity. The option has been 
formally advocated by the European Parliament204 
and some proposals in this sense have been 
shared in the Cosac context.205 From a normative 
perspective, to let subsidiarity scrutiny serve as a 
potential IA tool the guidelines should support a 
broad approach to the EWS, thus enabling national 
parliaments to evaluate in concreto the expected 
impact of proposals.206 A procedural definition of 
the different stages of the subsidiarity test would 
provide another valuable support.207 
203 From a normative perspective, it has been assumed 
that “regional parliaments with legislative competences should 
(…) only participate in the EWM in limited cases of particular 
political importance whereas all regional assemblies should 
be given the possibility to express their opinion, through their 
national Parliament, in the framework of the political dialogue.” 
D Fromage, ‘Regional Parliaments and the Early Warning System: 
An Assessment and Some Suggestions for Reform,’ in Cornell and 
Goldoni, supra at 70, 136. 
204 European Parliament, supra at 68, par. 17.
205 See for instance Cosac, supra at 55. Building on the 
Contribution of the LIII Cosac, which noted that a majority of 
parliaments/chambers were in favour of issuing a voluntary non-
binding set of best practices and guidelines, the Twenty-Fourth Bi-
annual Cosac Report collects the views of parliaments/chambers 
on the areas that these informal guidelines should cover and 
presents best practices. 
206 J Hettne, ‘Reconstructing the EWM?’, in Cornell and 
Goldoni, supra at 70, advances a proposal aiming at making 
the subsidiarity review wider so as to include the principles of 
conferral, proportionality and respect for national identity. It 
advocates conceiving of the EWS as a “constitutional dialogue” (or 
“a political dialogue regarding constitutional issues”). 
207  According to Blockmans et al, supra at 66, Cosac could 
be the right platform for exchanging best practices on approaches 
to subsidiarity and the use of subsidiarity checks by national 
parliaments. 
3.3. The post-legislative stage 
In the better law-making cycle, the post-legislative 
stage involves the evaluation of existing legislation 
and policy based on the criteria of efficiency, 
effectiveness, relevance, coherence and value 
added. This evaluatory stage should provide 
the basis for IA of options for further action. In 
this stage, national parliaments find two distinct 
levels of engagement in IA (see Figure 3). At the 
EU level, specific ex-post evaluation tools are 
‘fitness checks,’ which are carried out to assess 
the regulatory framework of a policy area. The 
Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme 
(REFIT), launched by the EU Commission in 
December 2012,208 aims to review the entire 
stock of EU legislation, to identify burdens, 
inconsistencies, gaps or ineffective measures. 
According to the Interinstitutional Agreement 
on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016, the 
evaluation of existing legislation is subject to the 
Commission’s multiannual planning, which is 
communicated to the EP and to the Council.209 
The Communication from the Commission on 
the REFIT explicitly mentions the key role played 
by national parliaments in ‘smart regulation’ in 
checking that the subsidiarity principle is correctly 
applied210. However, this statement has not led to 
concrete involvement of national parliaments in 
ex-post IA so far. The Better Regulation Agenda 
itself has not promoted any form of engagement 
for national parliaments in the evaluation of the 
added value of EU legislation that is already in 
force. 
208 COM (2012) 746 fin.
209 Supra at 1, par. 21. 
210 European Commission, ‘Communication to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘EU 
Regulatory Fitness’’ (2012) COM (2012) 746 fin 10-11 (Ch. 5.2.), 
introducing the Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme 
(REFIT), a programme aiming at promoting the accomplishment 
of EU policy goals through the so-called ‘fitness checks’: through 
regulatory mapping, the REFIT programme identifies policy 
areas with the greatest potential for regulatory costs (i.e. burden) 
reduction and simplification. 
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The EWS does not formally apply to these 
procedures. Because of its nature, the political 
dialogue is not considered applicable to fitness 
checks.211 In fact, some of the reports by the 
Commission to the EP and the Council on the 
REFIT evaluation of the implementation of 
selected pieces of legislation are scrutinised by 
a few parliaments/chambers mainly formally, 
just ‘taking note’ of the document without any 
significant political follow-up.212  
If national parliaments are marginalised in the 
REFIT evaluations, they might still find another 
indirect channel for contributing to post-
legislative IA in cooperation with the European 
Parliament. The EP has its own ex-post IA tool 
at its disposal, termed ‘Implementation Reports’. 
This tool is rooted in the power, formally entrusted 
to parliamentary committees by the EP Rules of 
Procedure,213 to scrutinise how EU legislation, soft 
law instruments and international agreements have 
been transposed into national law, implemented 
and enforced. Compared to the Commission’s ex-
post evaluations, this kind of evaluation report is 
considered to be specifically tailored to the needs 
of parliamentarians, combining ease of use214 
and political oversight purposes.215 The activity 
of parliamentary committees in the area of ex-
post IA is supported by the EP Research Service’s 
“Implementation appraisals,” which aim to assess 
the state of implementation of all the legislative 
acts listed for revision in the Commission Annual 
Work Programme. 
211 Jančic, supra at 23, 49. 
212 Data are available on the IPEX Platform. The REFIT 
Reports are usually accompanied by Staff Working Documents 
providing an executive summary of the evaluation. 
213 Annex XVII, Article 1, indent 1(e). 
214 I Anglmayer, ‘Evaluation and ex-post impact assessment 
at EU level’, European Parliament Research Service Briefing Better 
Law Making in Action, September 2016 (http://www.europarl.
europa.eu) 7. 
215 These reports not only serve as a means of publicity; they 
also act as an oversight tool aiming at holding the Commission 
accountable for surveillance over the implementation and 
transposition of EU legislation. After an implementation report 
is adopted in plenary, the EU Commission is required to inform 
the EP on how specific requests included in the report have been 
followed up.
Undoubtedly, the ex-post IA activity of the EP 
could benefit from the involvement of national 
parliaments in the collection of information on 
transposition and implementation procedures and 
in the monitoring of related deficiencies. Some 
advances have been made in this direction through 
the implementation of the online platform Unified 
Repository Base on Implementation Strategies 
(URBIS), which aims to gather and make available 
a collection of contributions from national 
parliaments, regional entities, national interest 
groups and citizens on the implementation of EU 
legislation at the national and regional levels.216 
Irrespective of its informal nature based on 
administrative inter-parliamentary cooperation, 
the URBIS framework could prove an extremely 
valuable tool for information sharing on 
evaluation and scrutiny across Member States. 
However, the results achieved so far have not 
proven sufficiently effective.217 This is not due to 
a lack of administrative commitment or distrust 
in inter-parliamentary cooperation in this field.218 
216 The initiative was presented in December 2015 through 
a letter from the Secretary-General of the EP addressed to the 
Secretaries-General of the national parliaments. This was followed 
by a request entitled “Contributions of National Parliaments to 
the pre-legislative phase of EU law,” submitted on 11 March 2016 
within the ECPRD Network to collect the opinions of national 
parliaments on how to contribute to the new platform. National 
parliaments were asked to confirm whether the evaluation/scrutiny 
of EU legislation is recorded in any kind of parliamentary working/
research/reflection document or political resolution that can be 
made available for public consultation, and were asked whether 
they were willing to share these evaluation/scrutiny documents 
publicly via URBIS. These administrative initiatives were preceded 
by a letter from the EP President dated 5 June 2014 which offered 
national parliaments a new form of cooperation with the EP 
enabling them to share their positions or background knowledge 
on the implementation of legislation that the Commission intends 
to amend.
217 For a critical appraisal of the main limits of the URBIS 
platform, see Auel, in this Volume. 
218 A survey carried out in the Cosac network and published 
in Cosac, ‘Twenty-Third Bi-annual Report: Developments 
in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to 
Parliamentary Scrutiny’, 6 May 2015, 40 (http://www.cosac.eu/
documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/) has shown that the vast 
majority (26 out of 32) of the responding parliaments/chambers 
are willing to share with the EP their best practices and/or ideas 
on parliamentary monitoring of transposition, implementation 
and enforcement of EU law. Only a few parliaments (the Finnish 
Eduskunta and the Polish Sejm) formally opposed the idea. 
However, in their answers to the survey published in the Annex 
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Rather, as the Cosac twenty-third bi-annual report 
clearly pointed out, the involvement of national 
parliaments in the sharing of information is limited 
by the fact that many representative assemblies do 
not deal at Member State level with the monitoring 
of transposition and implementation of EU 
legislation, and therefore have no information to 
share.219 
This leads to the second level of the engagement 
of national parliaments in ex-post IA, which 
consists of participation in national procedures for 
monitoring the transposition and implementation 
of EU legislation. In the domestic arena, national 
parliaments have a somewhat differentiated 
experience of post-legislative scrutiny of EU and 
EU-derived legislation. The comparative data on 
this issue are extremely limited. However, some 
general remarks can be drawn on the factors 
influencing the approach of national parliaments 
to this activity. The formal role reserved for 
national parliaments in the procedures leading to 
the implementation and transposition of EU law 
does not seem to represent a key influencing factor 
on the whole. Parliaments may be engaged in the 
transposition of EU directives, but they may lack 
information on the ex-post impact of domestic 
transposing legislation or in any case they may 
consider the task outside their remit. 
Two major factors contribute to determining 
whether and how national parliaments are engaged 
in the monitoring of EU law implementation: 
access to information/capacity to develop a 
parliamentary background knowledge on whether 
EU legislation/policies are implemented and 
to the Report, some parliaments objected that this information is 
already made available on IPEX, in some cases misunderstanding 
the type of contributions that they should share on Urbis: not 
opinions and contributions adopted in participation in the 
subsidiarity scrutiny and political dialogue, but the information 
and background knowledge developed in the monitoring of EU law 
implementation and transposition.  
219 This argument has been explicitly advanced by a number 
of parliaments/chambers, namely the Portuguese Assembleia 
da República, the Spanish Cortes Generales, the Polish Sejm, the 
Austrian Nationalrat, the Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati. Ibidem. 
applied and whether they have produced the 
intended effects,220 and setting formal ex-post 
scrutiny prerogatives/competences in favour of 
the national parliament.221 Due to the combination 
of these factors, most national parliaments in EU 
Member States have no specific experience of this 
sort. 
Things are different for parliaments with an 
established capacity/experience in the post-
legislative scrutiny of domestic law.222 It is highly 
probable that representative assemblies engaging 
in the ex-post monitoring of the implementation 
of domestic legislation/policies devote part of their 
activity to EU-derived legislation. Even within 
this more limited level of experiences, a difference 
should be drawn between a ‘bureaucratic’ and an 
‘evaluatory’ approach to monitoring duties. In the 
former case, the parliament is merely concerned 
220 In the Annex to the Cosac Twenty-Third Bi-annual 
Report (supra at 105), some parliaments/chambers declare that they 
do not systematically collect/have access to this type of information 
(Czech Senate, Luxembourg Parliament), which might be available 
through more appropriate channels, such as the EU Commission 
or the Court of Auditors (Belgium Chamber), and that they have 
no experience of the issue (Maltese Parliament).
221 More parliaments/chambers (Cosac, supra at 105) have 
objected that they have no formal competence on the monitoring 
of EU legislation implementation, claiming that: the parliament 
is not accountable for the implementation of EU law (Portuguese 
Parliament); this is instead a task for the European Commission 
(Belgium Chamber, Polish Sejm) or the ECJ (Austria Nationalrat); 
or that no specific parliamentary procedure has been established 
in this area of activity, which could however be included in the 
general function of parliamentary control (Cyprus Parliament, 
Spanish Cortes Generales).
222 Some national parliaments have developed their own 
expertise and experience in the field of policy and legislative 
ex-post evaluations. This is a most likely outcome: a) where the 
parliament enjoys a formal competence in this sphere of action, set 
in constitutional or legislative clauses, as in the case of France. See P 
Avril, ‘Le contrôle. Exemple du Comité d’évaluation et de contrôle 
des politiques publiques’ (2008) 6 Jus Politicum; L Baghestani, ‘A 
propos de la loi tendant à renforcer les moyens du Parlement en 
matière de contrôle de l’action du Gouvernement et d’évaluation 
des politiques publiques’ (2011) 78 Les Petites affiches; P Türk, Le 
contrôle parlementaire en France (Paris, LGDJ, 2011); b) where the 
Parliament can count on research and evaluation administrative 
units and/or external bodies (for an overview of the evaluation 
bodies supporting national parliaments in post-legislative scrutiny, 
see E.M. Poptcheva, ‘Policy and legislative evaluation in the EU’, 
Library of the European Parliament Briefing, 3 April 2013 (http://
www.europarl.europa.eu). 
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with checking the formal compliance of national 
legislation with EU obligations, in a perspective 
of preventing future infringements.223 In the latter, 
by contrast, the parliament engages in an in-depth 
evaluation of the effects of EU law transposition 
and implementation, assessed against the 
specificities of the domestic context.
Some experiences from the Westminster Parliament 
are good examples of ex-post scrutiny carried out 
through IA analysis.224 The reference is to the 
inquiries produced by the House of Commons 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee 
on the national impact of a range of European 
Directives relating to waste management. The 
findings of the House of Lords Select Committee 
on the Merits of Statutory Instruments concerning 
the Horse Passports (England) Regulations 2004 
instead offer an example of evaluation able to 
prove that the method of implementation at the 
national level is more burdensome than required 
by EU standards.225  
223 For instance, since 1971 the French Senate has promoted 
a post-legislative scrutiny mechanism aiming at assessing how laws 
have been implemented. The scrutiny is carried out by the standing 
legislative committees and every year each committee releases a 
report on the outcomes of the scrutiny activity. These reports have 
a specific section devoted to EU-derived legislation, but the focus 
is more on the fulfilment of formal implementing legal duties that 
on the evaluation of the economic, environmental or social impact 
of each piece of legislation. 
On the limits of this experience, see P Preuvot, ‘Réflexion sur les 
remèdes aux difficultés d’application des lois,’ 18 June 2011 (www.
droitconstitutionnel.org/congresNancy/.../preuvotTD6.pdf) 16 
ff. On the activity carried out in this field by the French National 
Assembly, see Assemblée Nationale, ‘Fiche de synthèse n. 52: Le 
contrôle de l’application des lois et l’évaluation de la législation 
et des politiques publiques.’ 6 June 2017 (http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr). 
224 These cases are mentioned in UK Law Commission, 
‘Post-Legislative Scrutiny’ (31 January 2006) Consultation Paper 
No. 178 par. 9.9. and 9.13. They confirm not only that part of the 
post-legislative scrutiny work carried out by the UK Parliament 
covers the implementation of legislation derived from the EU; 
more significantly, they witness that the scrutiny is concerned with 
the impact and effects produced by this type of legislation.
225 House of Commons Select Committee on the 
Modernisation of the House of Commons, ‘2nd Report’, (2004-
05) HC 465-I Scrutiny of European Business par. 105. The concern 
with whether the national regulatory instrument inappropriately 
implements EU legislation is explicitly mentioned among the 
working methods of the Committee. See House of Lords Select 
These kinds of evaluation reveal a clear connection 
with one of the requirements set by Section VII of 
the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 
concerning the “Implementation and Application 
of Union Legislation.” As a fundamental criterion 
for better law-making, Member States are in 
fact required,  when transposing directives into 
national law, to make the added elements that 
are in no way related to Union legislation (so 
called ‘gold-plating’) identifiable. To comply with 
this standard method of legislation, national 
legislative institutions will clearly need to engage 
in IA analysis. However, such ‘best practices’ 
still represent exceptions in the framework of 
participation by national parliaments in post-
legislative scrutiny of EU-derived legislation. On 
the whole, their pro-active engagement in this 
sphere of activity continues to be constrained by 
a variety of factors, relating not only to a lack of 
political motivation, a scarcity of technical capacity 
and subjection to informative asymmetries.
A connection with a formal parliamentary 
function related to the scrutiny of legislation or 
oversight of governmental conduct is of crucial 
importance to raise the concern of national 
parliaments with the monitoring of EU legislation. 
In other words, why should they invest in a time-
consuming and technically demanding activity if 
the outcome in terms of parliamentary procedure 
and the potential for political oversight is unclear? 
This brings us back to the original insight on 
involvement in IA as an extension of standard 
scrutiny formal prerogatives enjoyed by national 
parliaments in their interaction with the EU 
composite constitutional system. 
4. Conclusions 
Engaging in IA activity is a serious challenge for 
national parliaments. The difficulties are not only 
due to a lack of the expertise, capacity, time and 
political motivation to participate in IA processes. 
Rather, these factors may become very limiting 
Committee on the Merits of Statutory Instruments, ‘1st Special 
Report’, (2003-04) HL18 Inquiry into Methods of Working. 
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constraints depending on the setting of IA activity 
within the standard scrutiny/oversight relationship 
linking national parliaments to the fragmented 
EU executive. Only where the European or 
national law provides national parliaments with 
adequate ‘opportunity structures’ can they can 
play a proactive role in IA processes. Conversely, 
it cannot be taken for granted that national 
parliaments may effectively engage in IA activity 
when it is framed within codified parliamentary 
functions with a potential for political oversight.226 
Parliaments are not councils of state in relation 
to the implementation of the EWS;227 nor are they 
independent authorities or courts of auditors with 
respect to the implementation of IA analysis. They 
do not think and act ‘in a court-like manner’ and 
they are not bound to take their decisions on the 
basis of technical evidence. Rather, when they 
approach IA methods, they think and act like 
legislators whose decisions are mainly adopted by 
striking political compromises.228 Therefore, if IA 
is framed in the standard scrutiny/oversight circuit 
aiming at making the executive power accountable 
before parliament, there is no scepticism as regards 
the possibility of implementing embryonic forms 
of IA and evidence-based policy-making. Framed 
in these terms, analysis of the involvement of 
226 On this notion, see C Neuhold and A Strelkov, 
‘New opportunity structures for the “unusual suspects”? 
Implications of the Early Warning System for the role of 
national parliaments within the EU system of governance’ 
(2012) 4 OPAL Online Paper Series, speaking of the new 
opportunity structures provided for by the Lisbon Treaty 
for national parliaments that have thus far not played a ‘pro-
active’ role in EU affairs.
227 This vision, advocated in P Kiiver, The Early-Warning 
System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: Constitutional Theory 
and Empirical Reality (Abingdon, Routledge, 2012) 126 ff. and 
in Fabbrini and Granat, supra at 80, is contrasted by many other 
authors, among whom M Goldoni, ‘The Early Warning System 
and the Monti II Regulation: the Case for a Political Interpretation’ 
(2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 90 ff.; Cooper, supra 
at 70; and Hettne, supra at 93.  
228 On the institutional purposes supporting the 
parliamentary evaluatory function as an activity where the 
democratic dimension is predominant and prevails over economic 
arguments typical of management or budgetary controls, see JP 
Duprat, ‘Le parlement évaluateur’ (1998) 2 Revue Internationale de 
Droit Comparé 552. 
national parliaments in IA processes, referred 
to the three main stages of EU law-making (the 
pre-legislative, legislative and post-legislative 
stages), offers some provisional insights. On the 
one hand, national parliaments mainly scrutinise 
governmental IAs and only occasionally are able 
to develop their own IA analysis. IA processes 
tend to highlight the role of national parliaments 
as scrutinisers or gatekeepers229 rather than as 
agenda setters and decision makers.230 On the other 
hand, the involvement of national parliaments in 
IA procedures produces differentiated outcomes 
at the national and at the European levels. At the 
domestic level, it is part of the scrutiny/oversight 
relationship linking the parliament to the national 
government. Its main purpose is to hold the 
government to account for its conduct of EU 
legislative policies in the ex-ante and ex-post stages 
related to the formation and implementation of 
EU law. At the European level, the involvement 
of national parliaments in IA processes acts as 
a means of contributing to the Euro-national 
composite decision-making process and 
strengthening the information and data available 
to the EU Commission in the monitoring of EU 
law implementation. Indirectly, it also serves as 
a tool for holding EU institutions, including the 
Commission, accountable for the role they play 
in initiating, approving and implementing EU 
legislation.
The involvement of national parliaments in 
the IA cycle is thus a potentially strategic factor 
not only for the input and output democratic 
legitimacy of decision-making. In the EU 
composite constitutional system of representation 
and decision-making, national parliaments are 
repositories of key competences and pieces of 
information that are crucial to the better law-
making purposes and cannot be otherwise gained. 
229 Raunio, supra at 32. 
230 C Fasone and D Fromage, ‘From Veto Players to Agenda-
Setters? National Parliaments and Their ‘Green Card’ to the 
European Commission’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 294 ff. 
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Compared to these expectations, the Better 
Regulation Agenda has been considered to be a 
sort of “missed opportunity” for introducing new 
forms of involvement by national parliaments that 
could go beyond the traditional formats of the 
political dialogue and of the EWS.231 Pressures 
from national legislators towards the introduction 
on an ‘enhanced political dialogue’ or ‘green 
card’232 could have pushed ahead the three EU 
institutions to figure out different forms of 
structural participation in the better law-making 
cycle. 
From a normative perspective, some improvements 
would therefore prove desirable at both the 
European and national levels. At the European 
level, one priority is to reinforce the involvement 
of national parliaments in the early stages of EU 
decision-making, aiming to get feedback on 
subsidiarity, proportionality and administrative 
burdens after the publication of Commission 
roadmaps and during the consultation process. 
This would reduce the perceived disconnect 
between the setting of the legislative layout in the 
early phases when stakeholders are involved and 
the official negotiations on the text submitted to 
national and European institutions.233 Further 
reasons for an early involvement of national 
parliaments in IA may be found in studies dealing 
with the functions of pre-legislative parliamentary 
scrutiny at the national level: these deal with 
informing the legislative process, highlighting the 
significant issues for the subsequent part of the 
decision-making process, providing a political 
judgement on proposals, and assessing the impact 
of proposals on outside groups.234 At the national 
level, pursuant to the two-level game played by 
national parliaments in the EU arena235 it has been 
231  See Jançic, supra at 23, 49.
232  Fasone and Fromage, supra at 117. 
233  See Blockmans et al, supra at 66, 6. 
234 On these functions, identified with regard to pre-
legislative scrutiny by the UK Parliament, see Power, supra at 29, 
47 f. 
235 A Benz, ‘An Asymmetric Two-Level Game: Parliaments 
argued that strengthening national parliaments’ 
oversight of the national government represents an 
indirect means of strengthening their involvement 
in EU policy-making. From this perspective, 
“binding mandates for national governments 
would engage parliaments more closely in EU 
policy-shaping and make them co-responsible for 
the decisions taken in the Council.”236 
A third potentially strategic dimension for future 
steps towards an ever more integrated better law-
making process is inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
Due to the composite nature of the EU decision-
making process, an enriched inter-parliamentary 
dialogue on IA would prove a valuable stage in 
which to share national positions and views on 
the impact of EU legislation both ex ante, in the 
pre-legislative and legislative stages, and ex post, 
in the monitoring of EU law implementation and 
transposition.237 The Cosac, through its bi-annual 
surveys, is already contributing to this purpose 
by means of sharing views and best practices. 
However, this form of cooperation could be made 
more systematic in coordination with the topics 
and proposals listed in the Commission Annual 
Work Programme or included in the agendas of 
the EP and the Council238. 
in the Euro Crisis,’ in B Crum and JE Fossum (eds), Practices of 
Inter-Parliamentary Coordination in International Politics: The 
European Union and Beyond (Colchester, ECPR Press, 2013) 125 ff.; 
B Crum, ‘Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: 
what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance?’ 
(2017) Journal of European Public Policy 1 ff.
236 Blockmans et al, supra at 66, 7. 
237 The value of inter-parliamentary cooperation in ex-post 
IA is clearly demonstrated in sectors with low technical intensity, 
where transposition of EU law can be fulfilled through a variety of 
pieces of legislation. One example is offered by the Employment 
Equality Directive (Directive 2000/78/EC), which only contains 
general requirements and is open to a variety of transposing and 
implementing measures. Exchanging best practices through inter-
parliamentary cooperation would therefore contribute to gaining 
sound experience of the Directive’s interpretation and application 
at the Member State level.  
238 Some proposals for strengthening the instrumental role 
of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU are advanced in C 
Heffler and K Gattermann, ‘Interparliamentary Cooperation in 
the European Union: Patterns, Problems and Potential,’ in Hefftler, 
Neuhold, Rozenberg and Smith, supra at 22, 94 ff. and D Fromage, 
‘Increasing Interparliamentary cooperation in the EU: Current 
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Fostering an IA-sensitive approach in the 
different formats and sectoral applications of 
inter-parliamentary cooperation would in fact 
contribute to meeting two main goals. On the one 
hand, it would act as an instrumental dimension, 
preparatory to the exercise of reinforced individual 
scrutiny by national parliaments, directed either at 
the national government or to EU institutions.239 
On the other hand, it would support the exercise of 
‘collective’ action by national parliaments, directly 
addressed to EU institutions but incidentally also 
pushing on national executives.240 
To conclude, a fundamental component of 
the involvement of national parliaments in IA 
is the set of follow-up requirements to which 
executives are bound both at the European and 
national levels. A key part of the process lies in 
governmental accountability to parliament on 
IA work conducted by parliamentary scrutiny 
bodies. The accountability target may be pursued 
through a variety of tools and procedures, 
either binding on the government or relying on 
informal interinstitutional practices. Regardless 
of the procedural solution adopted, pushing 
executives (the EU Commission, but also national 
governments) to respond to parliament in reaction 
to the outcome of its engagement in IA processes 
may offer a strategic incentive for representative 
assemblies to fully engage with IA processes.241 
Trends and Challenges’ (2016) 22 European Public Law 749 ff.
239 On the role of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the 
EU as an instrumental dimension that could help the European 
Parliament and national parliaments to strengthen their oversight 
capacity in their respective domains, see E Griglio and N Lupo, 
‘Parliamentary oversight in the European economic governance: 
the Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 
Governance’ (forthcoming) Journal of European Integration. 
240  See supra at 25. 
241 This conclusion is highlighted in M Russell and M 
Benton, Selective Influence: the Policy Impact of House of Commons 
Select Committees (London, UCL, The Constitution Unit, 2011) 
86, focusing on the experience of the UK Parliament, and in 
Preuvot, supra at 110, 19, referring to the experience of the French 
Parliament. 
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Figure 1 - National parliaments’ integration of IA in 
the pre-legislative scrutiny of EU legislation 
Figure 2 - National parliaments’ integration of 
IA in the legislative scrutiny of EU legislation 
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Figure 3 - National parliaments’ integration 
of IA in the post-legislative scrutiny of EU 
legislation 








by Béatrice Taulègne 242
First of all, I would like to thank the European 
University Institute for giving me the opportunity 
to address the contribution by the European 
Committee of the Regions (CoR) to this dynamic 
discussion on better scrutiny of European policies 
and to highlight the relevance of the territorial 
dimension of EU legislation. This discussion 
reflects a commitment to a territorial vision 
for Europe and a fully fledged translation of the 
concept of territorial cohesion enshrined in the 
Lisbon Treaty into operational guidelines.
The rise in inequality and the deepening of 
disparities in Europe plea for a territorially- 
integrated approach and more evidence-based 
policy-making. It is always necessary to remember 
that the majority of EU policies have a regional and 
local dimension which can be assessed through a 
territorial impact assessment (TIA), which should 
be taken into account when these policies are 
being designed and revised.
The European Committee of the Regions has 
always been concerned about the insufficient 
knowledge about the territorial impact of global 
strategies and sectoral policies, and by the fact 
that the current statistical data on the Members 
States do not necessarily represent the real socio-
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economic situation and, as such, should not be the 
sole basis for the future design and implementation 
of policies. If possible asymmetric effects of EU 
and national policies are not taken into account, 
these policies can never be sufficiently efficient or 
effective and potentially could result in unwanted 
effects. This challenge has been explicitly 
addressed in the 2017 European Commission 
work programme focused on the delivery of 
European policies and a proper implementation 
of European laws with collective responsibility at 
the local, regional, national and European levels. 
Promoting better regulation is a shared objective 
also requiring an overall commitment from local 
and regional authorities.
Local and regional authorities are therefore 
convinced that the Territorial Impact Assessment 
is one of the key instruments for achieving 
territorial cohesion and the application of the 
Territorial Agenda 2020.
1.  An irretrievably belated 
recognition
Four milestones have led to the CoR commitment 
to imposing a territorial dimension on the impact 
assessment framework:
 - the European Commission white paper on EU 
governance in 2001;243
 - the CoR white paper on multi-level governance 
in 2009;244
 - the better regulation package in 2015;245
 - the interinstitutional agreement between the 
European Parliament/European Commission 
and the Council on Better Law Making signed 
in 2016, which recommends also addressing 
the territorial impact of policies.246
243   COM (2001) 428 final.
244   CdR 89/2009 final.
245   COM (2015) 215 final.
246   COM (2015) 2016 final.
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TIA is included as one of the tools in the European 
Commission’s 2015 Impact Assessment 
Guidelines and the territorial dimension is 
mentioned throughout the new Better Regulation 
package published in May 2015. At the same time, 
successive steps towards an urban agenda for the 
European Union have played a significant role 
in the emergence of TIA in EU policy-making. 
Indeed, the urbanization process in the EU 
and the lack of statistical data at the urban level 
argue for developing urban assessment tools. 
In this respect, the Council and the European 
Parliament invited the European Commission to 
take specific and immediate steps to “enhance ex-
ante impact assessment of new EU initiatives and 
legislation with regard to their territorial impacts 
and consequences for local authorities” as part of 
the EU Urban Agenda. 
The European Parliament, in particular in its 
report247 on ‘The urban dimension of EU policies,’ 
asked the “Commission to systematically introduce 
a territorial impact assessment on the urban 
dimension of all relevant EU policy initiatives and 
to make sure that all relevant sectoral EU policies 
adequately address the challenges that towns, cities 
and larger functional urban areas are facing” and 
called on the Commission “to concentrate these 
territorial impact assessments on the following 
elements: balanced territorial development, 
territorial integration and territorial governance.” 
Its report248 on ‘Cohesion policy and the review of 
the Europe 2020 strategy’ calls on the Commission 
to provide information about the role of territorial 
issues as factors in economic growth, job creation 
and sustainable development, and demands that 
the review of the Europe 2020 strategy addresses 
territorial impacts and provides guidance on 
how to tackle them.
247  2014/2213(INI), published 6 February 2015.
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The interinstitutional consensus on the need for 
better cooperation on impact assessment has been 
reiterated in the recent report by the European 
Parliament on ‘improving the functioning of 
the European Union building on the potential 
of the Lisbon treaty’249 adopted in Strasbourg on 
16 February 2017, which “calls on the European 
Parliament the Council and the Commission to 
improve cooperation modalities with the CoR, 
including at the pre-legislative stage during the 
conduct of impact assessments in order to ensure 
that their opinions and assessments can be taken 
into account throughout the legislative process.”  This 
recommendation pays tribute to the permanent 
CoR commitment for TIA to become a standard 
practice which is also promoted by the other 
institutions.
2. The European Committee 
of the Regions as an 
advocate for TIA
The consultative role of the CoR in the EU 
institutional framework implies implicitly 
contributing to better legislation. Its mission 
statement contains the message that the CoR 
members “are committed to ensuring that policies 
are implemented more effectively and at greater 
proximity.” 
This responsibility has also been formally 
acknowledged in the protocol on cooperation 
between the CoR and the European Commission 
and in the cooperation agreement with the 
European Parliament.
In 2014, the CoR adopted its first Territorial 
Impact Assessment strategy and launched a pilot 
phase during which several methodologies and 
instruments were tested in order to determine the 
most suitable ones to meet its objectives. This pilot 
phase aimed to provide CoR rapporteurs with 
specific analyses of the territorial dimension of key 
EU policies. Following the pilot phase, the CoR 
249   PE 573146
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adopted a renewed Territorial Impact Assessment 
strategy as part of its objective to scrutinise and 
assess the territorial impact of EU legislation 
on the single market and initiatives which are 
designed to have a territorial impact. The strategy 
is guided by four main objectives: i) to allow CoR 
rapporteurs to have access to specific analyses 
and information that can be used to improve 
the territorial dimension of CoR opinions and 
to strengthen the consultative role of the CoR as 
a whole; ii) to improve the quality of EU policy-
making by ensuring that territorial impacts of 
new policy proposals and existing EU legislation 
are taken into account by the EU institutions; 
iii) to improve the visibility of territorial impact 
assessment as an important element in better EU 
legislation; and iv) to develop the role of the CoR 
as a TIA knowledge centre.
The files requested for TIA need to fulfil the 
following criteria: (i) they should have clear 
political interest for local and regional authorities; 
(ii) they should touch on competences of local 
and regional authorities; (iii) they should have 
a potential territorial impact; (iv) they should 
concern a legislative dossier. Preference will be 
given to dossiers on which the CoR plans to issue 
an opinion.
Pro-active interinstitutional cooperation has 
been developed since 2016, first of all with a 
modest but focussed contribution in the context 
of a pilot phase to two Directives for two ex-post 
exercises: the Birds and Habitats Directive and 
the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. 
For 2017, encouraged by positive feedback from 
the European Commission and the European 
Parliament, the CoR has identified the following 
key dossiers:
 - the Future of Cohesion policy;
 - Cross-border obstacles;
 - the Implementation of public procurement 
directives; 
 - the REFIT revision of the legislation on goods; 
 - the European Pillar of Social Rights; 
 - Smart specialization;
 - Trade agreements on specific regional 
concerns.
Over recent years, considerable efforts have been 
made to promote TIA within the EU institutions, 
with the following outcomes:
• The CoR has been invited to participate in the 
outreach activities of the Regulatory Scrutiny 
Board (RSB) in order to achieve better 
interaction to provide practical steps towards 
a more systematic assessment of potential 
territorial impacts of future EU legislation.
• The CoR is contributing to the DG REGIO 
pilot project to create an urban impact 
assessment peer group of cities to be consulted 
on legislation with a potential impact on 
urban areas. In this respect, the Committee 
has planned to consolidate its experience with 
urban partnerships.
• Based on good cooperation with DG 
REGIO, the CoR has also been invited 
to intensify its cooperation with 
the European Commission on TIA: 
 - By including the CoR in its 
TIA work programme for 2017; 
 - By asking the CoR to co-operate closely 
on TIA activities with regard to the 
preparation of post-2020 Cohesion policy; 
 - By participating in the working group 
on TIA to further develop TIA tools and 
methodologies in close co-operation with 
ESPON and DG JRC.
Nevertheless, the CoR not only sees its role as being 
to request more and better impact assessments 
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from the European Commission; it is also engaged 
in better analysing possible asymmetric territorial 
impacts of existing and future EU legislation. In 
this respect, CoR intends to enhance its analytical 
capacity for performance appraisal and impact 
assessment of EU policies.
3. A concept, a methodology 
and various instruments
With a view to them becoming standard 
practice, the TIA concept and the appropriate 
TIA methodologies and instruments have been 
progressively developed. ESPON Quick Scan was 
identified as one of the most suitable instruments 
and the CoR will continue to study it in order to 
make it more effective.
3.1 The vulnerability concept:
The CoR, the European Commission and the 
European Territorial Observation Network 
(ESPON) rely on the ‘Vulnerability concept.’ 
The ESPON TIA Quick check is indeed based on 
the vulnerability concept developed by the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
As the figure above shows, territorial impact is a 
combination of what is termed regional sensitivity 
and the exposure caused by the implementation 
of a policy initiative. The effects deriving from 
a particular regional measure (exposure) are 
combined with the characteristics of the region 
(territorial sensitivity) to produce the potential 
territorial impact.
3.2 Flexible instruments 
In the current situation, the following instruments 
are considered to be the most appropriate:
 » Quick Scan territorial impact assessment 
workshops 
Quick Scan TIA workshops are intended to assess 
the potential asymmetrical territorial impact of a 
given legislative proposal by applying the ESPON 
Quick Scan tool. They consist of specialised 
expert workshops which provide the basis for 
data calculations leading to a regional mapping 
of possible impacts. The workshops can assess the 
effects of EU legislation on EU regions (NUTS 2 
and NUTS 3).
The advantages of the tool are that it provides:
 - a database with a wide range of indicators at 
NUTS 3 level for all EU28 Member States;
 - the possibility of uploading additional 
indicators and types of regions;
 - an assessment not only based on a statistical 
model but also considering the input of 
stakeholders as being equally important;
 - results that are more than just a map of 
territorial impact. It also provides a process 
and a discussion of data and coherences.
 » Urban impact assessment
Organised along the same lines as Quick Scan 
territorial impact assessment workshops, an urban 
impact assessment is organised if the dossier 
has a strong urban character and is expected to 
affect urban areas more than other regions. In 
contrast to TIA workshops, an urban impact 
assessment (UIA) workshop will bring together 
representatives of carefully selected cities to form 
a representative sample of the EU’s cities.
 » Ex-post territorial impact assessment
As the Quick Scan methodology is an ex-ante 
methodology and cannot be used at the moment 
for ex-post assessments, interactive workshops 
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with relevant stakeholders following a similar 
logic are organised. 
 » Cross-border territorial impact assessment
In contrast to TIA workshops, a cross-border 
territorial impact assessment workshop gathers 
representatives from the European Grouping of 
Territorial Cooperation and bordering regions 
(within the EU). These workshops can be 
organised using the Quick Scan methodology to 
assess dossiers that have a strong cross-border 
character and are expected to affect those regions 
more than others.
 » Targeted consultations 
The CoR also organises targeted consultations 
to satisfy the requirements of the TIA process. 
They can be organised in addition to TIA Quick 
Scan workshops, especially in cases where data is 
lacking. 
 » Analytical notes 
Analytical notes are drafted by the CoR TIA 
team and are based on available reports, impact 
assessment reports, evaluations and interviews 
with stakeholders to support its consultative role. 
3.3 An adequate and inclusive 
methodology 
The methodology, which consists in creating a 
systemic picture linking a policy proposed with 
territorial effects, is divided into four main parts:
1. How does policy influence the development of 
regions?
2. Which type of region is affected?
3. How is the ‘regional impact’ calculated?
4. Mapping the impact: the results are presented 
on maps.
The methodology implemented requires 
combining regional scrutiny and expert judgment. 
It needs clear indicators but must also include an 
interactive discussion among experts. During 
such interactive discussions, the experts identify 
potential territorial impacts in the fields of the 
economy, society, environment and governance, 
and also potential linkages and feedback loops 
between different effects. The entire process leads 
to policy proposals and/or suggestions from 
experts on improving the implementation of a 
directive.
4. The lessons learned from 
the recent CoR Territorial 
Impact Assessment strategy
1. The amplitude of the exercise: the process 
affects the continuum of the policy cycle: in the 
pre-legislative stage, during the legislative phase 
and when legislative authorities amend the 
legislative proposals, then in the implementation 
of a regulation, and finally in its ex-post evaluation.
Evidence-based regulatory analysis has a clear 
added value in these various stages of law-making 
and the decision-making process.  In this context, 
regarding the existing stock of EU legislation, 
the importance of the Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance Programme (REFIT) must be 
stressed and will be increasingly highlighted by the 
CoR as it can identify overlaps and inconsistencies 
that have arisen over time among a range of 
objectives and new policy initiatives, together 
with the negative effect of the practice of so-called 
‘gold-plating.’
2. The partnership approach: achieving a more 
systematic use of TIAs in EU policy making 
will also need a more systematic approach by 
the European Commission and the European 
Parliament:
 - With the European Commission: based on 
the cooperation agreement, the CoR is keen to 
contribute to European Commission impact 
assessments in the pre-legislative phase, and 
also in the ex-post phase.  On the other hand, 
the CoR could provide an additional type 
of input by implementing TIA Quick Scan 
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workshops and delivering related reports. It 
will also seek, where relevant, exchanges of 
views with the European Environment Agency 
and other relevant agencies. 
 - With the European Parliament: closer 
cooperation with the European Parliament will 
be sought by proposing regular joint hearings 
of their respective committees, and through 
the European Parliamentary Research Service 
(EPRS), which is involved during the legislative 
phase as it analyses the quality, the consistency 
and the independence of the Commission’s 
impact assessments, and – if asked to do so – 
assesses the impact of substantive European 
Parliament amendments. A new step could be 
achieved as a result of a recent invitation from 
the Chair of the Conference of Committee 
chairs (CCC) to the CoR to play a role by 
contributing to the drafting of European 
Parliament implementation reports and the 
organisation of fact-finding missions.
 - With the Member States: the CoR will continue 
to develop relations with Member States and 
involve them in the TIA process. During the 
pilot phase, Member State representatives 
actively participated in the TIA workshops 
and conferences related to territorial impact 
assessments and showed strong interest. 
With regard to the preparation of the post-2020 
Cohesion Policy, the CoR would also welcome the 
possibility of collaborating with the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) on building scenarios on the basis 
of different policy options and assessing their 
respective territorial impacts.
3. The political process behind the TIA requires 
an appropriate follow-up and reporting to feed 
into the political debate and the legislative process. 
Specific consideration must be given to three main 
questions to which the added value of a political 
assembly of the CoR is pertinent:
 - Do the results make sense?
 - What are the policy implications?
 - How to optimise and communicate TIA 
results?
4. Lack of data: current statistics leave room for 
improvement at the subnational and regional 
levels. The CoR regrets the difficulties in obtaining 
comparative data at the regional, local and sub-
local levels across the European Union and calls 
for a set of comparable and reliable indices and 
indicators. The European Union needs to develop 
suitable tools to enable the collection of statistical 
data and their use to streamline processing.
5. TIA raises awareness and provides territorial 
information and methodological support to 
local and regional authorities (LRAs). LRAs have 
a particular interest in knowing how evaluation is 
carried out and what the concrete results, findings 
and products are. TIA contributes to filling the 
‘knowledge gap’ by providing an evidence base for 
decision-makers on the accuracy and feasibility of 
challenges regarding the administrative capacity of 
public authorities to implement policies and their 
own capacity to capture diversity at the regional 
and local levels.
5. Beyond impact analysis: 
supporting EU decisions on 
policy-making
TIA contributes to the aim of drawing up a set 
of indices and indicators relating to European 
territorial development which could be used to 
support decision-making in terms of measuring 
and monitoring territorial cohesion and the 
territorial agenda for the coming decade.
In the European Commission reflection paper 
on ‘Harnessing globalisation,’ which aims to 
make a fair and evidence-based assessment of 
what globalisation means for Europe and the 
regions, the CoR suggestion regarding developing 
a concept of territorial resilience is recognized. 
The territorial impact assessment is clearly an 
instrument created to help assess the possible 
regional effects of globalisation. 
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The use of impact assessment as an efficient tool 
to promote a better regulation strategy at all 
levels of government has been exploited by local 
and regional authorities and has also become 
a clear priority for regional parliaments with 
legislative powers. Local and regional authorities, 
from experience, are convinced that a place-
based territorial approach is the only policy 
model through which the EU can address the 
expectations of European citizens. TIA helps 
to assess how a policy intervention has actually 
performed in comparison with expectations. This 
exercise must therefore not be a static exercise 
only delivered by experts but should also include 
a societal dimension linked to citizen perceptions 
of the impact, consequences and added value of 
European legislation. Therefore, the CoR members 
are ever more committed to raising the relevance 
of strengthening the territorial dimension of 
EU legislation as a democratic issue for a better 
governance, given the fall in perceptions of a 
positive impact of EU regulation and legislation by 
citizens. As such, every policy evaluation includes 
three dimensions: a scientific/technical exercise; a 
political translation process; and a communication 
approach towards citizens. 
Over the last few years, an increasing awareness 
of the importance of evaluation of public policies 
has spread all over Europe. The ‘evaluate first’ 
principle is intended to make sure that every 
decision takes into due account the lessons learned 
from past actions.
Indeed, the process of scrutiny serves many 
purposes. Evidence-based policy must take into 
account not only the perspective of opportunity 
and legal feasibility but also the political reality 
in order to fit into the European Union Agenda 
setting. The Better Regulation agenda should also 
become an instrument for policy coherence in the 
European Union, and not only an instrument for 
greater efficiency.
The continual monitoring of the performance of 
an EU regulation also means evaluation in the 
continuum of the policy cycle and contributes to 
better regulation as an instrument of coherence 
with long-term goals, as well as a proper assessment 
of the global strategies implemented. In this 
context, the European Commission’s intention 
of mainstreaming the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) is a good approach to reach better 
regulatory governance in the European Union. The 
European Committee of the Regions is strongly in 
favour of fully mainstreaming a comprehensive 
and territorial EU vision of the SDGs in the 
multilevel governance of the Union in order to 
add political salience and coherence to the overall 
process and ensure that all the policies concerned 
are adequately put in support of the 2030 Agenda. 
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Introduction
Reducing service trade costs is an important 
dimension of the challenge of increasing economy-
wide productivity and per capita incomes. All 
firms use services as inputs into the production 
of goods and other services. If input costs are 
higher than they would be in an environment 
where service trade costs were lower, this will act 
as a tax on domestic industries and reduce their 
competitiveness. The stylized fact is that trade 
costs for services are much higher than trade 
costs for goods (Miroudot and Shepherd, 2016). 
The result is a reduction in the volume of trade in 
services, and therefore a reduction in the access 
firms and households have to low cost services.
Trade costs are high in part because of the 
characteristics of services: trade often requires 
movement of people and/or establishment of a 
commercial presence (FDI). This implies that 
many policies and their administration may 
impact on trade costs. Two dimensions are 
important in this regard: (i) regulatory policies 
that apply to all firms, both national and foreign; 
and (ii) policies that are designed to discriminate 
against foreign providers or consumption abroad, 
that is, to act as barriers to trade. Regulatory 
policies vary across countries for any given sector 
and the resulting heterogeneity is an important 
source of international trade costs. These costs are 
augmented by barriers to trade in services such 
as nationality requirements or bans on foreign 
suppliers providing transport, communications 
or professional services. Research has shown 
that barriers to trade and investment in services 
are often much higher than for goods. Although 
information on service trade policy is limited, 
new datasets have been developed recently that 
characterize the restrictiveness of service trade 
and investment policies. These reveal that barriers 
to trade in services are substantial, with significant 
variation across countries and sectors (Figure 1). 
The extent to which service trade costs are due to 
explicit barriers, regulatory heterogeneity and the 
technological challenges of trading in different 
types of services is an ongoing area of research. 
What can be said is that, in general, lowering 
service trade costs can be pursued by reducing 
or eliminating formal (explicit) barriers to trade; 
working to attenuate the prevalence of regulatory 
heterogeneity across countries for given sectors or 
activities; and by taking actions to lower the costs 
for firms of complying with whatever regulatory 
policies apply to providing services across 
borders. The latter dimension has yet to attract 
research but the first two dimensions have been 
the focus of recent research. This has shown that 
the Better Regulation agenda is directly relevant 
to the trade agenda: the gains from service trade 
policy reforms depend importantly on the quality 
of regulation and regulatory processes that prevail 
in a country.
An open trade regime may to some extent substitute 
good economic governance and regulation by 
giving consumers access to a greater variety of 
high quality foreign products. However, research 
suggests that often better regulatory governance 
is an important complement to service trade 
policy. What follows summarizes and synthesizes 
some recent and ongoing research on the role of 
governance institutions in shaping the economic 
impacts of service trade policies. This provides a 
concrete example of how the implementation of 
better regulation can indirectly generate greater 
economic benefits. An important finding is that the 
interaction between regulation and trade policy 
matters and that it can vary across countries and 
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sectors. An implication is that efforts to improve 
the design and effectiveness of regulation – i.e. 
implementation of the Better Regulation agenda – 
can and should be directed to enhancing the gains 
from policies to support greater trade in services. 
Conversely, trade considerations should be an 
additional factor informing regulatory reform 
and the design of specific regulations, whether 
horizontal in nature (cross-cutting) or sectoral. 
Analysis informed by 
transparent consultation of 
stakeholders is important 
in helping to identify which 
aspects of regulation are 
most important in order 







Recent research has 
demonstrated that the cost, quality and variety 
of services available to firms across all sectors is 
an important determinant of their productivity, 
and that service trade is a channel through 
which firms’ access to services can be improved. 
Recent compilations of prevailing policies across 
countries by the OECD and the World Bank 
have shown that barriers to trade in services are 
often significant, translating into estimates of ad 
valorem tariff equivalents that are substantially 
higher than trade barriers for goods (Jafari and 
Tarr, 2017). 250  There is therefore a presumption 
that liberalization will lower average prices and 
expand the variety of services on the market. The 
effects of policies restricting access by foreign 
producers to service markets on downstream 
250 See Services Trade Restrictions Database. http://
iresearch.worldbank.org/servicetrade/aboutData.htm and OECD. 
Services Trade Restrictiveness Index. http://www.oecd.org/tad/
services-trade/services-trade-restrictiveness-index.htm
productivity performance have been estimated 
in country case studies using firm-level data (e.g. 
Arnold et al. 2011 for the Czech Republic; Arnold 
et al. 2016 for India) and across countries using 
both firm- and industry-level data (e.g. Barone and 
Cingano, 2011, Bourlès et al., 2013, and Hoekman 
and Shepherd, 2017).
Figure 1: Service Trade Restrictiveness Indices 
by Sector and Region
Notes: ECA = Europe and Central Asia, LCR = Latin American 
and the Caribbean, MENA = Middle East and North Africa, OECD 
= Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
A value of 0 means no restrictions and a value of 100 indicates 
maximum restrictiveness.
Source: World Bank Services Trade Restrictiveness Indicators 
database.
A relevant question – which applies to many trade 
policy instruments (see Rodriguez and Rodrik, 
2001 and Freund and Bolaky, 2008) – is whether 
the effect of reducing service trade restrictions 
on productivity in downstream manufacturing 
varies depending on non-trade policy factors. 
Beverelli et al. (2017) show that the downstream 
economic effects of service trade policies are 
moderated by the quality of economic governance 
institutions in the importing country. Lower 
service trade restrictiveness is found to only 
increase downstream manufacturing productivity 
in countries with good economic governance (as 
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proxied by indicators of the quality control of 
corruption, rule of law and regulatory institutions 
reported in the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Database managed by the World Bank). This 
moderating effect prevails with respect to trade 
policies that target service provision through 
foreign establishment (FDI) (mode 3 of the 
GATS) as opposed to cross-border trade in 
services (mode 1), a result that may reflect the 
lower incidence of barriers to mode 1 trade as well 
as the intangibility and non-storability of services, 
which imply that at least some share of the value 
added must be generated locally – that is, foreign 
providers must invest in local production facilities 
(establish a commercial presence) in order to be 
able to operate in the relevant market.
Unpacking economic 
governance quality – 
substitutability vs. 
complementarity
The measures of governance institutions used by 
Beverelli et al. (2017) are horizontal in nature, in the 
sense that they apply to or impact on all economic 
activities, Because of this, they are likely to capture 
to a greater or lesser extent the effects of more 
specific dimensions of regulation that determine 
the conditions of entry into a market. Examples 
include the scope of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in the economy, government involvement 
in price setting (price controls), licensing and 
permit systems, and specific service sector 
regulations. Determining the extent to which the 
latter types of economic governance impact on the 
benefits of service trade liberalization is important 
from a policy perspective as it may be both easier 
to change sector- or activity-specific regulation 
than it is to improve the rule of law or to combat 
corruption and – equally importantly – more 
feasible to do so in the short run.
To this end, Fiorini and Hoekman (2017b) 
use OECD Product Market Regulation data to 
investigate how the effects of service trade policy 
on downstream manufacturing is moderated by 
more narrowly defined measures of economic 
governance. This reveals significant heterogeneity 
across individual governance dimensions in 
terms of their impact on entry and/or operating 
costs in the economy. Some types of regulation 
– e.g. a simple registration requirement – only 
impose a small burden on operators. Other 
types of regulation may be very difficult for new 
entrants to overcome and can even prohibit 
entry, e.g. a ban on investment in complementary 
infrastructure facilities such as a warehouse/
logistics centre; highly restrictive economic 
needs tests; or regulation reserving certain types 
of transactions to a state-owned entity (SOE). 
The benefits of removing service trade barriers 
(discriminatory measures) will be affected by 
the measures applicable regulating entry. As 
long as they are not prohibitive, the most (more) 
efficient foreign providers can be expected to 
be able to satisfy the regulatory requirements. 
These may raise costs above what they would be 
if, for example, regulatory cooperation allowed 
mutual recognition or equivalence, but some level 
of trade can be expected to occur. In this case, 
market access can be a substitute for regulatory 
reform. If, however, regulation is such as to 
essentially preclude entry – e.g. because of state 
control of prices or the existence of SOEs that 
dominate (segments of) the market – service trade 
liberalization may not have much of an effect on 
incentives to enter the market. In this case there 
is more likely to be a complementary relationship 
between service trade policy and regulation: 
reforms will need to target both policy areas.
In an empirical analysis of these possible 
relationships, Fiorini and Hoekman (2017b) 
find that greater market access for service inputs 
can act as a substitute for reducing regulatory 
barriers to entrepreneurship, in particular 
complex regulatory regimes. This suggests that 
foreign service providers, once granted better 
market access, can offer better quality, variety 
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and/or prices than domestic providers by 
successfully overcoming prevailing barriers to 
entrepreneurship. Conversely, they also find that if 
regulatory policy centres on reserving activities to 
certain SOEs or instances where public ownership 
affects market conditions, liberalization of market 
access may be ineffective in increasing downstream 
productivity.
Similar dynamics may arise with respect to sector-
specific economic governance but there is likely 
to be an additional dimension in comparison to 
cross-sectoral regulatory regimes. The reason is 
that sectoral regulation is likely to be motivated 
by different types of market failures. For some 
service sectors where there are significant network 
externalities, there is a rationale for both public 
investment in infrastructure and regulation of 
the relevant network to ensure interconnection 
and access. In other sectors, the primary source of 
market failure is information asymmetries. 
For example, in the case of transport and 
telecommunications, network infrastructure is 
central. Weak regulatory regimes that permit 
exploitation of market power by incumbent 
operators can prohibit entry by new operators. This 
feature of regulation cannot be offset by service 
trade liberalization. In practice, it will often be 
prohibitively expensive for new entrants to develop 
their own network infrastructure – they will not 
be able to overcome a government’s failure to put 
in place and enforce pro-competitive regulation. 
In the absence of effective pro-competitive 
regulation, market access liberalization can be 
expected to have smaller positive downstream 
productivity effects. In line with this argument, 
Fiorini and Hoekman (2017b) find strong 
complementarity between good regulation and the 
benefits of service trade liberalization in transport 
and telecommunication.
Such a complementarity relationship is not found 
to apply between service market access and 
domestic governance in producer services where 
network externalities are less prevalent or do not 
figure at all. In the case of business services, for 
example, the main rationale for regulation is to 
deal with problems of asymmetric information. 
In cases where domestic regulation is ineffective 
in addressing this problem it is relatively easier 
for foreign providers to address such regulatory 
failure and at least to some extent take action 
to offset the underlying market imperfection, 
e.g. by establishing a reputation for quality by 
leveraging foreign regulatory certification and/
or international certification (such as compliance 
with ISO standards).
Some implications for 
policy and international 
cooperation
A general implication of these findings is that the 
objective of removing discriminatory barriers to 
service trade should not be pursued in isolation 
or unconditionally. Account should be taken 
of the existing quality of domestic economic 
governance and the operation of the relevant 
institutions. Analysis needs to be conducted in 
order to assess and quantify economic governance 
performance at a fine-grained sector-specific level 
and to identify service sectors where the removal 
of discriminatory barriers needs to be flanked 
with measures to improve domestic economic 
governance.
Fiorini and Hoekman (2017a) elaborate on this 
general implication and advance some proposals 
on how to jointly target greater market access 
and better domestic governance in the context 
of service trade agreements. They argue that 
different approaches can be envisaged to support 
greater attention to sectoral regulatory policies 
and broader economic governance variables in 
trade agreements, complementing the market 
access focus that is central in PTAs. Options range 
from enhanced transparency and policy-dialogue-
type mechanisms that provide opportunities for 
a broad set of actors to engage on both market 
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access and related economic governance matters, 
including self-evaluation and peer review (mutual 
evaluation) on the one hand, to the negotiation of 
binding policy commitments that can be enforced 
by businesses and natural persons (citizens) 
on the other. The complementarities between 
sectoral regulation/governance and market access 
barriers will differ across countries and will also 
change over time. Thus, priorities and solutions 
cannot be determined ex ante, but call for analysis 
and deliberation involving government officials, 
regulators and stakeholders focused on reviewing 
and assessing the performance of economic 
governance institutions. Such deliberation will 
also generate information on capacity constraints, 
including at the local level, which need to 
be addressed, such as a lack of knowledge or 
uncertainty on the part of implementing agencies 
as to what is required of them.
Transparency is an important necessary condition 
for increasing the profile of regulatory and 
economic governance matters. Equally important 
is analysis to identify the measures that are most 
pertinent at the sector/service provision level. 
The prospects for improving governance and 
regulatory performance through a bottom-up 
process of dialogue with stakeholders, learning 
and peer review by partner countries may be better 
than those of one based on hard law and binding 
dispute settlement procedures – not least because 
the latter may inhibit commitments from being 
made in the first place. The experience obtained in 
the EU shows that many issues arising in the EU 
single market context can be addressed without 
going to court. Analogous mechanisms involving 
the creation of national focal points could be 
a positive force for gradual improvement in 
governance and regulation-related areas. Whether 
or not such approaches can be adopted, what 
matters is to increase the attention to economic 
governance and sectoral regulation and to support 
processes to identify actions that will increase 
the benefits of service liberalization. This can be 
made part of the agenda of monitoring activities 
and the agenda of the various committees and 
summits that oversee the implementation of trade 
agreements, and could build on the experience 
and lessons obtained from intra-EU integration 
mechanisms, including the single points of contact 
and the process of mutual evaluation of sectoral 
regulatory measures. 
A more ambitious approach would be to increase 
the incentives for governments to implement 
market access liberalization commitments and 
to pursue better regulation by leveraging the self-
interest of firms. There has been much debate in 
Europe on the rationale for including investor-
State dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in 
trade and investment agreements. One reason 
for concern expressed by many opponents is the 
view that firms already have access to national 
(and EU) tribunals and that there is no need 
for a separate system of arbitration that may 
undermine the democratic process by contesting 
what polities deem to be welfare-enhancing 
changes in applicable regulation. ISDS procedures 
were incorporated into BITs for a specific, limited 
purpose – investor protection. ISDS is driven by 
the self-interest of investors (and those providing 
the associated legal services), not by public good 
considerations. However, the example of ISDS 
illustrates that it is possible for states to agree 
that enforcement of international agreements 
can be delegated to firms. In the trade area, so-
called bid-protest (domestic review) mechanisms 
are an element of the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA). These allow 
firms to challenge ongoing procurement contests 
and contract award processes that are perceived 
to violate GPA provisions (see Georgopoulos, 
Hoekman, and Mavroidis, 2017). 
Creating mechanisms through which firms can 
challenge compliance with mutually agreed specific 
economic governance-related commitments 
would harness private interests to promote the 
public good. A first step in this direction could be 
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to permit recourse by foreign persons to existing 
EU law and regulations pertaining to the Internal 
Market – as these are measures that have been 
agreed by EU member states and endorsed by 
the European Parliament. Indeed, this would not 
constitute much of a change to the status quo as 
all such measures are already enforceable. Foreign 
firms already have access to formal and informal 
dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms 
if they are established in the EU. Extending this 
possibility to firms that are not established in 
the market (have not established a commercial 
presence through FDI) could help expand the 
set of actors with an incentive to utilize existing 
channels to contest perceived violations of EU law 
and regulation. While this is unlikely to be feasible 
given the strong revealed preference on the part 
of the EU (and partner countries) for State-to-
State dispute settlement processes, establishing 
platforms through PTAs where such matters 
can be raised and discussed can make a positive 
difference. Although existing mechanisms already 
permit enforcement actions to be taken in cases 
of non-compliance with EU law, the determinants 
of compliance are complex and multidimensional. 
As König and Mäder (2014) note, there may 
be situations where the balance of incentives 
confronting the European Commission is 
insufficient to motivate enforcement action. If the 
(political) costs to the Commission of sanctioning 
an EU government are high, enforcement may 
not occur. Increasing the visibility of non-
compliance and creating the prospect of action by 
trading partners may help to swing the balance of 
enforcement towards greater action. The upshot 
would be that infringement proceedings brought 
by the European Commission through letters of 
formal notice, reasoned opinions and eventual 
referrals to the CJEU would be complemented 
by parallel enforcement pressure from trading 
partners.
Conclusion
Services comprise a substantial share of all the 
inputs used by firms. The cost, quality and variety 
of services available to firms is one determinant of 
their competitiveness. Sector-specific restrictive 
trade policies will impact on the degree of 
competition on service markets, and thus on 
markups and sectoral efficiency. Given that recent 
compilations of barriers to trade in services 
indicate these are often significant (Jafari and Tarr, 
2017), there is a presumption that liberalization 
will lower average prices and expand the variety 
of services on the market. An expanding body 
of empirical research analysing the linkages 
between service trade policies and downstream 
productivity performance has identified sizable 
positive effects of liberalizing service trade on the 
productivity and export performance of firms. 
However, the research summarized in this note 
highlights the crucial role that regulation plays 
in the context of service trade policy and the 
importance of paying more attention to how 
different dimensions of regulatory governance 
interact with service trade policies. The finding 
that in some circumstances trade policy reforms 
(service liberalization) need to be accompanied by 
action to improve domestic regulatory governance 
whereas in other situations market access 
liberalization can act as a substitute for regulatory 
improvement suggests that greater effort to 
‘unpack’ how and which regulatory institutions 
influence the effectiveness of service trade reforms 
may have a high payoff. Key principles of the 
Better Regulation agenda such as transparency 
and dialogue with stakeholders are important 
tools to inform and complement such analytical 
assessments at the country-sector level. 
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